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Abstract
Although logical empiricism is now mostly decried, their naturalist claim that a theory’s content can be read off from its structure, with no philosophical considerations needed, still supports many strategies to escape cases of underdetermination. The appeal to theoretical equivalence or to theoretical virtues, for instance, assume that there is a neutral standpoint from
which the structure of the theories can be analyzed, the physically relevant separated from the
superfluous, and a comparison made between their theoretical content and virtues. In my dissertation, I argue that the methodological principle underlying these strategies, according to
which theories with no superfluous structure should be preferred, is unpractical, for what constitutes relevant structure is determined by epistemic considerations about the aim of scientific
theories.
In chapter 2, I analyze the claim that theories with ordinary bosons and fermions are theoretically equivalent to theories with exotic ‘paraparticles’. I argue that this claim does not do
justice to the latter, as the proof is formulated in a vocabulary parochial to the former and thus
favors it while giving an impoverished version of the second.
In chapter 3, I assess the argument that any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics offering
a no-go theorem against paraparticles possesses an explanatory advantage over other interpretations and should, as such, be favored over others. Given that most physicists consider
paraparticles as surplus structure whose non-observation does not require an explanation, I
evaluate arguments of both sides and suggest a third way to approach the question.
Chapter 4 focuses on methods for excluding another kind of unphysical structure, numerical
artifacts. Simulations are the only window into what rival dark matter models predict about the
universe’s structure. But for them to play a useful role in generating knowledge, we need to
distinguish reliably between real predictions and artifacts. I argue that robustness analysis fails
to fulfill this task and propose in its place another methodology, that of crucial simulations.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The problem of underdetermination, i.e., the problem of choosing between scientific theories
that differ in the picture of the world they provide but make the same predictions, is especially
salient nowadays. As no new physics has been discovered in the most recent runs of the Large
Hadron Collider, there is no hint to where physics should go next. New data that could hint
at new phenomena and guide the development of new theories are either absent or extremely
difficult to collect. As a result, rival theories or models have been developed that fit the known
data equally well, and without any clear sense of whether empirical evidence could be found
in a few years to discriminate among them. Hence, many physicists have turned to strategies
previously discussed by philosophers to privilege their theory over another, such as the appeal to theoretical virtues simplicity or explanatory power for instance.Yet, many traditional
strategies to escape cases of underdetermination rely on the unscrutinized claim that there is
a neutral standpoint from which the structure of rival theories can be analyzed, the relevant
separated from the superfluous, and a comparison made between their theoretical content and
virtues. In my dissertation, I examine the presuppositions upon which such strategies depend.
I argue that the methodological principle underlying them, according to which theories with no
superfluous structure should be preferred, is unpractical, for what constitutes relevant structure
is determined by epistemic considerations about the aim of scientific theories.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Preliminary remarks
“Consider those utility cabinets where tools for the same purpose lie side by side,
and where partitions logically separate instruments not designed for the same task:
the worker’s hand quickly grasps, without fumbling or mistake, the tool needed.
Thanks to theory, the physicist finds with certitude, and without omitting anything
useful or using anything superfluous, the laws which may help him solve a problem” (1991, 24).

These words of Duhem describe the ideal physical theory and how it serves the physicist by
providing her the set of tools she needs to operate on the world. Like the surgical tray provides
the surgeon all the instruments and only those instruments which are needed to perform her
surgery, the theory makes sure that the physicist has at her disposal the set of well-ordered
tools she needs to ‘carve nature at its joints’. For the theory to accomplish this goal, nothing
superfluous must be included within it, to make sure that the physicist grasps the required
utensils as efficiently as possible.
How do we know however, what is superfluous and what could turn out to be useful on
this tray of principles, laws and physical quantities that the physical theory makes available to
1

2

Chapter 1. Introduction

us? Going back to our surgical comparison can be useful here. The composition of a surgical
tray is determined by the nature of the surgery performed–no need for a sternal saw or a dentist drill for an appendectomy, and the physician could be distracted by the presence of these
tools, waste precious time because of them or, even worse, grab one of them by mistake. One
might think that the same applies to a physical theory: it should include everything necessary
to achieve its role and exclude anything that does not contribute to do so. Duhem’s famous
book, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theories, from which the quote above is extracted,
seems to develop such a line of reasoning. As the title indicates, according to Duhem, the aim
and structure of a theory must be thought together, and the structure of physical theories determined by the aim assigned to them. For Duhem, the main role of a physical theory is to turn
a chaos of unorganized empirical laws into a perfectly ordered classification, which allows the
physicist to access all the knowledge gathered about this domain of phenomena conveniently.
In other words, a physical theory must efficiently organize the knowledge that would otherwise
remain the forgotten prisoner of a multitude of empirical laws lumped together with no order,
as would be lost the historical knowledge contained in old documents, piling up on the shelves
without any proper archiving system. What the theory does not aim at, for him, is to supply
metaphysical explanation going beyond the phenomena, i.e., to “put us in relation with the
reality hidden under the sensible appearances” (1906, 7). Because a theory aims at classifying,
i.e., at providing an economical representation of a set of empirical laws, it should not include
anything that is dispensable to its goal and predictive success. Therefore, it should not include
any such attempts at grounding physics in metaphysics; not only because metaphysical claims
do not contribute to fulfilling its task and are therefore superfluous, “attached to [...] (the theory) like a parasite” (1906, 33), but also because the explanatory part of a theory is misleading,
restricting, and contains “whatever is false in the theory and contradicted by the facts” (1991,
33).
What if, however, one disagrees with the aim assigned to physical theories by Duhem?
Does it mean that one would also disagree on what constitutes relevant and superfluous struc-
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3

ture within the theory? A good example of such a case is provided by Duhem himself, in his
criticism of Huygens’ mechanistic philosophy. To Duhem’s eyes, Huygens’ wave hypothesis
about the nature of light did not play any role in his successful extension of Descartes’ theory of
refraction to phenomena of double refraction. A comparison between the propagation of sound
and the propagation of light, the experimental fact that one of the two refracted rays followed
Descartes law while the other did not obey it, a felicitous and bold hypothesis about the form
of the surface of the optical wave in media of crystals (1991, 35), this was all what was needed
for Huygens to successfully extend Descartes’ theory according to Duhem, who justifies the
dispensability of metaphysical hypotheses based on this reconstruction of Huygens’ achievement. Yet, this is not how Huygens himself tells the story. Huygens suggested an ellipsoidal
model of light propagation based on the idea that waves propagate in two distinct ways, one
corresponding to light propagation in the Iceland Spar he was using to study double refraction;
the other to propagation in the aether contained in this crystal. He hypothesized that the latter
mode of propagation would be spherical, while the former would follow an ellipsoidal model.1
Even though the wave hypothesis may not have been needed, properly speaking, to account for
double refraction, it was still integral to the thought process that led Huygens to his success,
and was certainly not superfluous from his point of view. And this is precisely the problem
arising if one takes seriously the Duhemian claim that the questions of identifying the aim of a
theory and determining what its structure should be are inseparable. A sewing machine2 has an
uncontroversial function, that of sewing, and any features or elements of the machine that can
be removed without jeopardizing its capacity to sew constitute superfluous structure. But there
is no consensus on what a theory should aim at, and even less so on what a good theory is. On
the contrary, during the second half of the XXth century, many rival interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics or approaches to Quantum Field Theory have been developed precisely because of
how controversial these two questions are. If these questions are as intricate as Duhem seems
to think, can two physicists who disagree on what is a (good) physical theory ever agree on
1
2

See Huygens (1690/1920), 73).
This example is used in Ismael and Van Fraassen (2003), 371.

4

Chapter 1. Introduction

what constitutes relevant, physically significant content for a given theory and what is mere
superfluous structure?
Consider for instance what led to the development of multiple interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics. The postulates of Quantum Mechanics include the Schrödinger equation, a law
that describes the dynamical evolution of a wavefunction representing the quantum state of a
system. When applied to a typical quantum system prepared in a superposition of states and
interacting with a measuring device, the linear Schrödinger equation does not yield a unique,
definite experimental outcome, but instead a superposition of different experimental outcomes.
There are three main ways to address this difficulty:3 one can deny that the wavefunction provides a complete description of the system. Bohmian Mechanics, for instance, supplement the
theory with hidden variables which specify the position of particles at every moment, and the
particles’ velocities are expressed in terms of the wavefunction in a ‘guiding equation’. Another
strategy consists in modifying the dynamics, so that one can account for our observations that
the quantum system seems to be in a definite eigenstate of the measured observable whenever
a measurement is performed. Dynamical collapse theories, for instance, propose a collapse
mechanism that breaks the linearity of the Schrödinger equation. Finally, one can consider that
the theory provides a complete description as it stands and that the superposition of states must
be taken seriously, so seriously that it should lead us to revise our ontology. According to the
Many-Worlds Interpretation for instance, a superposition of two states (say ‘up’ and ‘down’
for the measurement of the spin of two electrons in a Stern-Gerlach experiment) is actually the
description of a universe containing two worlds, with one world recording ‘up’ and the other
recording ‘down’. This means that a measurement-like interaction has caused the universe to
split into two worlds or branches, one for each element of the superposition. Now consider
the structure of these interpretations, each adopting a distinct epistemological stance on what
a theory should be like. From the point of view of the Copenhagen or collapse interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics, the hidden variables added by the Bohmian constitute dispensable
3

See Myrvold (2018), section 4.
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structure. After all, the two theories are observationally equivalent, which is enough to show
that one can obtain from the theory all the desired observational consequences or explanatory
relevant elements without appealing to this extra structure:
Bohm’s theory adds a definite, hidden position for the particle, always possessed
by it at every moment, and our ignorance of its true value is expressed in a probability distribution. A Bohm theorist can insist that this is a physically real addition
to the ontology, so that the Bohm theory is physically distinct from traditional
quantum mechanics. A traditionalist can reply, however, that the particle position
only becomes manifest at the moment of measurement, so that standard quantum
mechanics can assert that the position and its probability distribution came to be
at the moment of measurement. All a Bohm theorist has done is to project the
position and associated probability distribution back in time to the initial set up– a
superfluous addition since all the theoretical information needed to specify the actual measurement outcome is already fully encoded in the wave function (Norton
(2008), 37).
For a Bohmian, the hidden positions may constitute additional structure compared to standard Quantum Mechanics, but certainly not superfluous structure: without them, Bohmian
Mechanics would not be the complete, fully deterministic theory, with no references to an observer needed, that Bohm strived to achieve. Of course, these features come with a cost, that of
a specific kind of non-locality that puts Bohmian Mechanics at odds with relativity.4 However,
the availability of Bohmian Mechanics shows that the non-determinism of Quantum Mechanics
4

Bell’s theorem shows that any quantum theory that is predictively equivalent to Quantum Mechanics must
violate Bell’s inequalities. These inequalities rely on a locality condition that has been analyzed by Abner Shimony as a conjunction of two distinct locality assumptions, that of Parameter Independence, according to which
the outcome of an experiment performed on particle 1 is independent of the analyzer parameters of a spatially
separated apparatus for particle 2; and of Outcome Independence, which states that the outcome of an experiment
performed on particle 1 is independent of the outcome of the experiment performed on 2. Any theory equivalent
to Quantum Mechanics must be non-local in the sense of violating either Parameter Independence or Outcome
Independence. Bohmian Mechanics violates the former, which puts it in tension with relativity, inasmuch as the
parameters of the apparatus could be adjusted such as to allow the sending of superluminal signals. Quantum
Mechanics violates Outcome Independence, which makes it a non-deterministic theory.
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and its vagueness in deciding which dynamical rule applies to which systems is a theoretical
choice, based on a specific stance adopted about what a good physical theory should be:
Why is the pilot wave picture ignored in text books? Should it not be taught, not
as the only way, but as an antidote to the prevailing complacency? To show us that
vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism, are not forced on us by experimental
facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice? (Bell et al. (2001), 990)
In other words, the very possibility of a non-local hidden variables theory, as pointed out
already by Bohm (1952, 166), shows that the assumption that the wavefunction provides a
complete description of a quantum system, determining only the probability of experimental
outcomes is not forced upon us, as was long thought given the impossibility proof famously
developed by von Neumann. On the contrary, it is a choice, based on an epistemological
take on what a theory should be like. A similar analysis could be made about the Many-Worlds
interpretation. Although I will not get into details in this case, one of the main arguments developed by De Witt (DeWitt 1970, 33) to support a Many-World Interpretation is its simplicity–i.e,
this interpretation considers that the formalism offered by the axioms of Quantum Mechanics
without random collapse is sufficient and that nothing is gained by the addition of a random
collapse rule but unnecessary complexity or even inconsistency.5 From De Witt’s point of view,
this random collapse rule is superfluous in the same sense as Duhem considers metaphysical
hypotheses superfluous: not only it is not needed, but it is also dangerous and misleading, for
it leads the standard interpretation into inconsistencies. A defender of the standard interpretation would however probably gasp at the claim that the Many-Worlds Interpretation is simpler,
when it requires an exponential inflation of our ontology and the belief into the reality of all the
simultaneous worlds corresponding to the terms of the superposition obtained when applying
Schrödinger’s equation, and the constant splitting of these worlds into branches at each new
measurement. This ontological extravagance is certainly superfluous from the point of view of
5

See for instance how the Wigner’s friend thought experiment is presented by De Witt in the aforementioned
paper.
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standard Quantum Mechanics too.
A similar debate arise with distinct approaches to Quantum Field Theory, especially between ‘conventional’ quantum field theories and the algebraic approach of Haag and Kaastler.
The development of axiomatic approaches to Quantum Field Theory in general was motivated
by the problem of infinities, i.e., of calculations showing integrals diverging to infinity and
leading to nonsensical results. But the algebraic approach is also based on two other motivations, which both had a direct impact on the analysis of the structure of the theory:
• Locality: One of the core principles of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory is the claim
that the entire content of the theory is contained in the net of observables, i.e., the collection of local algebras of observables assigned to every region of Minkowski spacetime.
Given that all possible experiments involve measurements performed in finite regions of
spacetime, the relevant physical quantities should be the ones accessible to such measurements, i.e., local quantities defined over finite regions of spacetime– as opposed
to global quantities such as total charge, energy or mass defined over infinitely extended
spacetime regions. Unobservable quantities such as the total momentum of a field should
be dismissed as physically insignificant, inasmuch as they cannot be reduced to the only
physical notions deemed relevant by Haag and Kaastler: that of a state, referring to a
statistical ensemble of physical systems, and that of an operation, i.e., of a physical apparatus acting on the ensemble (1964, 850). So, the theory is meant to be local in a very
precise sense: not only all observations must be local observations, but they must be
local in the sense of localized detections of particles by detection devices.
• Unitarily Inequivalent Representations: Another problem stressed by Haag and Kaastler
(1964) is the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations in quantum field theories.
The Stone-von Neumann theorem that guarantees the uniqueness, up to unitary equivalence, of the representations of the canonical commutation relations6 does not apply to
6

One can think of a representation of the canonical commutations relations as a collection of operators that
satisfy the commutation rules through which classical observables are ‘quantized’ or new quantum observables
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systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom, as is the case for systems described by
QFT. Hence, QFT exhibits infinitely many unitarily inequivalent representations, which
creates both an ambiguity–which representation should be chosen?– and an (at least apparent) inconsistency. Indeed, given that there is no one-to-one mapping between the
expectations values assigned to the operators in the first representation and to the corresponding observables in the second representation, unitarily inequivalent representations
are strictly speaking physically inequivalent. According to most authors, this means that
a representation must be chosen over the others, without there being any clear grounds for
such a choice however. However, according to Haag and Kaastler, unitarily inequivalent
representations only differ about these global aspects defined over infinitely extended
regions of spacetime that I mentioned above: “they differ in the global aspects of their
states but this difference is irrelevant as long as we are interested only in experiments in
finite regions” (1964, 853). If one readjusts their notion of equivalence based on what
is possibly measurable, or, more precisely, on the fact that no actual measurement can
be performed with absolute precision, then a realistic notion of equivalence is not that
of unitary equivalence, but that of weak equivalence. One of the pioneer of Algebraic
Quantum Field Theory, Segal, had pointed as a way out of the unitary inequivalent representations the fact that most of the physically interesting questions could be answered
without any reference to a concrete representation in a Hilbert space. Haag and Kaastler’s
adoption of weak equivalence as physical equivalence leads to the same result, the vanishing of the problem of unitarily inequivalent representations: if one admits that there
is no absolutely precise state of a system, but only a state determined to within a weak*
neighborhood–i.e., that one can only measure the expectations of a finite number of observables to a finite degree of accuracy–, and given that the set of relevant states of every
representation lie in this weak* neighborhood, then the choice of representations will not
make any measurable difference, and this equivalence should be considered as providing

defined. This collection is ‘concrete’ in the sense of being defined on a Hilbert space, as opposed to the abstract
algebra of observables.
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the grounds for the relevant notion of physical equivalence.
The motivations underlying the development of AQFT clearly finds their roots in Haag and
Kaastler’s operationalist take on the aim of a quantum field theory, that they see as a statistical
theory about local detection events happening in finite spacetime regions. This operationalism
in turn contributes to shaping the resources that AQFT has at its disposal. A defender of AQFT
who shares the strong operationalism of Haag and Kaastler has no difficulties to escape the
problem arising with unitarily inequivalent representations and will deem the extra structure
obtained with a concrete representation of this net of observables as superfluous. However, if
one thinks that the aim of a physical theory is to describe what the world is really like, and
not only how it appears to our measurements; then the status of global properties becomes
more controversial. Likewise, if one thinks that restricting the meaning of ‘observable’ to
‘detectable’ is too much of an impoverishment, or if one attributes to local another meaning–
that of coincidence at spacetime points for instance, instead of detections within regions–, then
the structure of the theory would not be analyzed in a similar manner in terms of what is
physically significant and what is not. But it would also not achieve the task that Haag and
Kaastler had in mind, that of avoiding mathematical difficulties and undesirable features of
the previous formulations of the theory. Again, quantum field theories present cases where
disagreements on the role of a physical theory carry over deciding the minimal structure it
should include.
Sklar, in his 2000, has criticized the strand of naturalism that claims that there is no need to
engage with scientific theories from a philosophical perspective, as theories can be understood
independently of any epistemic considerations:
On this suggestion, the scientific theories are complete and sufficient unto themselves, and they reveal to us on their face all we need to know about their “meaning” or their “interpretation”. From this perspective, the perennial philosophical
desire for an analysis of a theory’s meaning, and the desire to reformulate or reconstruct the theory based upon considerations arising out of philosophical cri-
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tique, are the pointless pursuits of will-o’-the-wisps. But, as we have seen, there is
something misguided about the suggestion that one can deal with the fundamental
theories of physics in a manner that is independent of the sort of critical arguments,
based on epistemic considerations, that are so familiar from empiricist philosophy.
For the very construction, justification, and reconstruction of theories within the
progress of science itself is replete with just that kind of reasoning we took as
paradigmatically philosophical (Sklar 2000, 32).

Sklar focuses on cases where a theory is reconstructed based on the ontological elimination of
structure deemed otiose in the previous formulation of the theory. Such projects of reconstruction can be found everywhere in the history of science, motivated by a diversity of reasons: the
desire to formulate a new theory that is not only compatible with novel data, but compatible
in a simple, non-arbitrary way; the desire to reformulate an old theory so as to make it compatible with a newly established background theory; the desire to retroactively reformulate and
rehabilitate old and discarded theories; the desire to get rid of artifacts generating conceptual
or mathematical difficulties; the desire to clarify concepts whose role may have shifted due
to a change in the assumed background theory; the desire to explain away cases of underdetermination, and finally the desire to provide a clear metaphysical interpretation of a theory
whose physical meaning may be problematic.7 In each of these cases, the reconstruction of the
theory is based on eliminating superfluous structure, based on considerations that are typically
philosophical: a debate about whether unobservable theoretical terms should be excised from
scientific theories, a disagreement on how to demarcate the observable content of a theory, or
on whether a theory should restrain itself to local, observable aspects of spacetime as opposed
to global, unobservable, ones.8 Hence, the construction and reconstruction of theories always
rely on epistemic considerations that need to be made explicit, acknowledged and taken into account when analyzing the structure of a theory in terms of its physically relevant and irrelevant
7

See Sklar (2000), pp. 15-19 for a detailed discussion of all these motivations and examples.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Its role is merely to emphasize that the debate between different forms
of empiricism–constructive empiricism, instrumentalism, positivism, operationalism– and realism is not the only
source of disagreements when analyzing the structure of scientific theories.
8
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structure.
Why should the absence of a neutral point of view to diagnose superfluous structure worry
us? Because the question of determining what constitutes additional, dispensable structure or
mathematical surplus structure with no physical counterpart is not only important for theory
reconstruction, but also plays a central role in theory choice, especially when facing cases
of seemingly equivalent theories targeting the same domain of phenomena. Indeed, two of
the most used strategies to handle these cases of underdetermination, the appeal to theoretical equivalence and to theoretical virtues, presupposes at least implicitly that one can with
no difficulty separate the essential from the superfluous within a given scientific theory. The
strategy of theoretical equivalence, for instance, assumes that there exists a neutral standpoint
from which a criterion of physical significance can be formulated that applies to both theories
indifferently; and that such a criterion captures all that and only that which is physically relevant in a theory, allowing for a comparison between the theoretical structures thusly analyzed.
Likewise, the use of theoretical virtues to privilege a theory over another presupposes that a
neutral comparison can be done between their simplicity or their explanatory power. Putting
aside the vagueness of a notion such as that of simplicity and the subsequent difficulty to apply
it, all the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics we have already met could call themselves
‘simpler’ than the other, without any chance to convince its rivals, privileging other theoretical
features. Bohmian Mechanics is simpler in the sense of more intelligible, as more directly related to our classical concepts to describe the world; the Many-Worlds interpretation only needs
one dynamical rule and dispense with the random collapse rule; the standard interpretation is
ontologically simpler, given that it does not introduce an infinity of unobservable worlds or unobservable variables assigning positions to every particle.9 Less often discussed, the strategy
consisting of privileging a theory over another because of its greater explanatory power seems
to presuppose that the structure of both theories can be fully elucidated in a way that satisfies
9

Only the last two examples make a use of simplicity that requires to determine what is superfluous and what
is not in a theory.The first example illustrates what I meant by the vagueness, or ambiguity, of the concept of
simplicity.
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both parties. Suppose that you have a body of evidence ei (i=1,...,N) and two theories T and T’.
Suppose now that the entire set ei can be deduced from the set of axioms–and the subsequent
laws derived from them–that T postulates, while in T’ a subset (e3 , e4 ) requires the addition of
an extra-postulate. This extra assumption is introduced as an ad hoc patch, whose only purpose
and justification are to recover e3 , e4 . Although T and T’ both account for ei , T seems to be in
a stronger epistemic position than T’: it gets for free what T’ only obtains by hand, by adding
an extra-postulate not required in the other.
The Cold Dark Matter model, for instance, is often defended against its rival the Modified
Newtonian Dynamics (hereafter MOND) because of its explanatory power. Through the addition of non-ordinary matter, only interacting gravitationally, this model provides a unique explanation for a multitude of anomalies–at large scales, the abundance of deuterium, the CMB
anisotropies and the study of large structure formation; at meso-scale, Zwickys study of the
Coma cluster (1933, 1937), gravitational lensing results (Gavazzi, 2002; Pointecouteau and
Silk, 2005), and the Bullet Cluster are all anomalies that find a common answer with dark
matter, at small scales, the anormal rotational velocities of galaxies is also explained if more
‘dark’, non-visible matter is added. The explanatory power of the dark matter model is really
impressive, given the diversity of scales and the number of problems that this unique hypothesis can address. But can it really convince the other side, when defenders of MOND consider
dark matter either as an artifact of applying Newtonian Dynamics at scales where it has not
been tested, or as a superfluous addition, as the modern ‘aether’10 that not only is not needed to
account for galaxy phenomenology but hides the fact that a revision of our gravitational law is
needed? Can the appeal to the explanatory power of the Cold Dark Matter Model really settle
the debate between the two theories?
As one can see from the list of examples studied so far, one of the main difficulty in this debate is how broadly this idea of superfluous structure is conceived, and how related, sometimes
overlapping, but distinct concepts are subsumed under this idea. There are at least three closely
10

See for instance McGaugh (2014).
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related concepts that can fall under this notion of superfluous structure: structure that is purely
mathematical in the sense that it fails to capture something in the world (i.e., it posits something
that is not there to begin with); structure that is mathematical surplus in the sense that too much
has been imported from a mathematical model within a physical theory; finally mathematical
artifacts that result from surplus structure, or from idealizations or simplifications made to represent the target system. In what follows, I detail these three kinds of unphysical structure and
evaluate the effectiveness of philosophical tools that have been suggested to eliminate them.

1.2
1.2.1

Three Kinds of Unphysical Structure
Additional structure

The idea of additional and dispensable structure is best understood in two different contexts:
when rival theories propose to resolve a problem, one by adding some properties or some entity
to their initial content, the other by revising at least one of their laws; and when examining the
history of the spacetime structure that was deemed necessary to explain the dynamical behavior of objects. The second scenario has been discussed by many authors, notably in Ismael
(forthcoming), 6-10, with a clarity I can certainly not rival with. The history of physics is full
of examples of the first kind, where the alternative approach that consists in revising laws turns
out to be successful and thus blames its rival for having posited superfluous structure. Compare,
for instance, Einstein’s with Lorentz’s theory of special relativity. Both accept notions such as
time-dilation or length-contraction. In Lorentz’s, light is carried by a medium, the ether, which
defines what rest is; length-contraction and time-dilation are real effects with respect to the
ether. In Einstein’s, length-contraction and time-dilation are not real, but frame-dependent appearances: the denial that the distinction between rest and inertial motions is a meaningful one
together with the postulate that light propagates at a constant speed are enough to provide an
empirically adequate account of the electrodynamics of moving bodies, thus making the ether
a superfluous notion:
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These two postulates suffice for the attainment of a simple and consistent theory
of the electrodynamics of moving bodies based on Maxwells theory for stationary bodies. The introduction of a luminiferous ether will prove to be superfluous
inasmuch as the view here to be developed will not require an absolutely stationary space provided with special properties, nor assign a velocity-vector to a point
of the empty space in which electromagnetic processes take place (Einstein 1905,
1-2).

So, one could argue that Einstein’s theory can be preferred for not positing superfluous structure, as ‘simpler’. However, from a Lorentzian point of view, the ether has a physical significance with no counterpart in Einsteins theory, which seemed too poor to explain the motion
of light. Sound waves are vibrations in the air; light waves are vibrations in the ether-the wave
motion of light made no sense without a material medium. Somebody already in board with
Einstein’s special relativity could easily buy this kind of argument, but could it possibly convince a defender of Lorentz’s theory? More importantly, could somebody try to establish the
equivalence of these two theories without discarding the physical importance of ether from the
point of view of Lorentz? In this case, the ‘superfluity’ of the entity or property postulated
can only be called so because an alternative has been developed, and because this alternative
is considered successful. But there is no available criterion to diagnose what is superfluous
structure other than a retroactive judgment informed by the success of the alternative.
Cases of additional entities vs. revised laws are even trickier to address when the extra
entity or property is by principle, or at least in the context of its introduction, unobservable.
This was the case for instance for the rivalry between the quark and the paraquark model in the
1960’s. In 1964, a particle was observed at the Brookhaven National Laboratory that violated
Pauli’s exclusion principle, according to which no two fermions can occupy the same state.
This particle, the Ω− , is a baryon, and is therefore made of three quarks. But quarks have halfinteger spin and should therefore behave as fermions, satisfying Pauli’s principle. Yet, the three
quarks seemed to be in the same state. Likewise, the baryon spectra observed for this particle
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seemed to require a symmetric wavefunction under the permutation of two of these quarks,
which is the normal permutation behavior of bosons but not of fermions. Two different answers
were suggested to address this ‘statistics problem’. One was to abandon Pauli’s principle and
replace it with a generalized principle, taking into account the non-fully symmetric behaviors
characteristic of paraparticles, i.e., to particles not obeying the perfect permutation symmetry
that bosons and fermions do. For parafermions of order 3 for instance, the wavefunction can be
symmetric up to 3 fermions. The other suggested answer was to add a hidden degree of freedom
to quarks, in order to antisymmetrize the wavefunction with respect to this new degree of
freedom. This is the choice made by the ‘colour’ quark model. If paraquarks were the correct
answer to this violation of Pauli’s principle, the exact same phenomena known at that time
and accounted for by the colour quark model would have been observed: the baryon spectra
would be the same, as would be the neutral pion decay rate, or the ratio of the cross-section of
electron-positron annihilation to hadrons to the cross-section for annihilations to muons pair
(see Greenberg 1993, 11-12). Thus, there were no known observations that could support
the idea that the world is not made of only bosons and fermions, but also of parabosons and
parafermions. On the other hand, from the point of view of the colour model, parastatistics are
mere superfluous structure: there is no need to add a new kind of particles to account for the
exact same phenomena. Yet, the colour hidden degree of freedom is by principle unobservable,
given that bounded systems of quarks are colourless and no free quarks can be observed. In
such a context, how do we tell which model should be privileged over the others? Historically,
the paraquark has been given up because it could not be gauged and thus unified with the strong
force, and because it was deemed ‘obscure’, with ‘disagreeable’ properties. Later however,
attempts to justify this abandonment have been developed that were all based on the theoretical
equivalence strategy–according to this line of thought, parastatistics are ‘superfluous’ in the
sense that they are a mere notational variant of the quark model with an extra degree of freedom,
and that both descriptions can be interchangeably used–a surprising claim given that one theory
can be unified with the strong force and not the other, but the proof was developed between
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a parafield theory and a quark theory equipped with a global gauge group, as opposed to the
locally gauged theory that was unified with the strong force. As one can see from the discussion
above however, such a proof can only be provided under the agreement that parastatistics have
no physical significance and do not define the permutation behavior of a new kind of particles
that could be observed in the world, as permutation symmetry usually do. In other words, such
a proof must rest on the dismissal of parastatistics as physically irrelevant. So, again, the idea
that parastatistics are superfluous is formulated from the point of view of the ‘winner’, i.e.,
the colour quark model. Is there any way, however, to diagnose superfluous structure from
a neutral point of view, to avoid re-writing the history from the point of view of the winner
theory? In other words, can one determine what constitutes superfluous structure from an
external, neutral point of view, free of any philosophical stance, and formulate a criterion of
physical significance that would not be formulated in the vocabulary that favour one theory
over the other, that would not impose one’s philosophical beliefs on the structure of the other?
Is there any way for MOND, for instance–granted that dark matter particles have yet to be
detected–to provide an objective criterion according to which dark matter is otiose structure? I
explore this set of questions in chapter 1, based on the case study of paraparticles and the proof
of equivalence recently provided by Baker et al. (2014). I argue for a negative answer, based
on this case study. I also contend that theoretical equivalence still can be used to clarify the
structure of rival theories and understanding which parts of the theory really contribute to its
success without pretending to pair these theories as two versions of one and the same theory.

1.2.2

Surplus Structure

Another kind of unphysical structure discussed in the literature is the concept of ‘surplus structure’ developed in Redhead (1975). Redhead analyzes the mathematical formalization of a
physical theory as an operation of embedding a physical theory into a mathematical model: a
theory T can be embedded in a mathematical structure M if and only if there exists an isomorphism (a one-to-one structure preserving correspondence) between T and a substructure M of
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Figure 1.1: Redhead’s account of surplus structure. The set of green arrows correspond to
relations between surplus elements that do not have any initial relation with the set of elements
in T as embedded in M.

M’. Thus, when embedded, the physical theory inherits a surplus from the complement of M
in M’, which allows many-to-one relations between the elements of the model in M and the
states described by T. From this many-to-one relations has been derived the idea that surplus
structure manifests itself by the emergence of multiple representations available for a unique
physical state. The surplus structure involves both relations among the surplus elements and
relations between these elements and elements of M (Redhead 2003, 128). In other words, the
physical theory not only inherits superfluous mathematical states, but the latter opens the door
to a whole ensemble of new elements, qua related to the surplus elements. The figure below
shows how more and more elements can be imported from the complement in M’.
Like in the first case, the ‘surplus’ is superfluous in the sense that it is dispensable, inasmuch
as the same phenomena can be accounted for without having to posit this extra-structure. But
unlike the first kind of unphysical structure review, this structure is not added to the theory as
obviously physical, as an answer to a physical problem but may have been unwillingly imported
within the physical theory and interpreted as physical by mistake. Although there are, to my
knowledge, no uncontroversial example of surplus structure, one that often comes back when
discussing Redhead’s account is, maybe surprisingly, that of paraparticles -again! One can find
such a description of paraparticles, i.e., of particles obeying parastatistics, in Massimi (2005),
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French and Krause (2006), in French and Rickles (2003) or in Bueno and French (2018). Read
for instance the following words by Massimi (2005, 178) :
This is an example of ‘surplus structure, to use Redhead’s terminology: a physical structure P (e.g. the quantum statistical behaviour of an ensemble of indistinguishable particles) is not represented by the mathematical structure M (e.g.
Fermi-Dirac an Bose-Einstein statistics) with a one-one structure-preserving map
between P and M. Rather, P is represented by a larger mathematical structure M
(e.g. permutation invariance), hence a surplus structure M-m (e.g. generalized
rays) in the representation of P by means of M.
As interesting as this account can be in helping us to understand how surplus structure appears
in a physical theories, it is not clear how it can actually provide a criterion for determining
what constitutes surplus. Yet, it comes according to Redhead with a methodological principle,
according to which a theory that does not exhibit such surplus structure should be preferred.
Such a principle is crucial for Redhead and Teller’s criticism of the view according to which
quantum particles have ‘transcendental individuality’, i.e., quantum particles of the same family are individual despite having the exact same properties (1991). According to Redhead and
Teller, the use of labels to refer to quantum particles that nothing yet distinguishes rests on an
unacknowledged metaphysical stance, according to which quantum particles are individuals.
To construct the configuration space of a system of identical particles, one starts by building
a Hilbert space for one particle, another one for the second particle despite their indiscernibility, and then take the tensor product of both individual Hilbert space. In the configuration
space thus obtained, each ray correspond to a state and distinct rays to distinct states. Thus,
it is assumed, if one measures the observable A whose eigenvalues can be a or b, that the ray
that describes a situation in which the eigenvalue a is assigned to particle 1 and b to particle
2 represents a physical state distinct from the situation in which the eigenvalue b is assigned
to particle 1 and a to particle 2. According to Redhead and Teller, transcendental individuality
is built-in in such a formalism. But this metaphysical assumption leads to unwanted conse-

1.2. Three Kinds of Unphysical Structure

19

quences, in that the Hilbert space of the total system contains non-symmetric and partially
symmetric vectors corresponding to states that never occur in nature. Thus, because of this
built-in transcendental individuality, Quantum Mechanics inherits surplus structure that must
be removed if possible. Redhead and Teller argues that an alternative formalism such as the
Fock space formalism dispenses with this extra-structure and is therefore preferable.
But again, how do we know when structure is surplus in this sense? This idea that the availability of many mathematical representations for describing one and the same physical system
not only is not a sufficient condition, for it captures many cases that we would not call surplus
structure, but it is also not necessary–as many cases historically accepted as surplus structure
do not really fall under this description. Let us start with the many unintented states of affairs
that are wrongly captured by this definition. A same system can be described using polar coordinates or Cartesian coordinates, depending on which representation is more convenient for the
calculus. The physical situation described by both systems of coordinates is clearly the same,
yet two mathematical descriptions are available. Likewise, one quantity can be measured using
different standard of measurements. Mineral’s ‘scratchability’ is described using a scale of 1
to 10, which means that “the physical structure involved in ordering the hardness of minerals is
mapped isomorphically onto the finite segments of the arithmetical ordinals running from 1 to
10” (Redhead (2003), 126), but any other segment, from to 2 to 11, or from 21 to 30 could have
been used instead. The current criterion for surplus structure would consider the simple difference in measurement standards as surplus structure. But would we consider the availability of
two standards of measurements as surplus structure in the same sense as parastatistics? Would
we say that, in the same sense that parastatistics fails to have any physical counterpart, rival
systems of coordinates do not capture anything in the world? More importantly maybe, this
attempt at a definition does not explain what constitutes one and the same physical situation. At
the time of the initial rivalry between quark and paraquark for instance, it was thought that the
paraquark model and the quark model could be used interchangeably, as describing the same
known phenomenology. However, those who took seriously the possibility of the existence of
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paraparticles and further developed this model succeeded to show that parafermions would violate Pauli’s exclusion in a detectable way, for instance if one were to observe the spectrum lines
of atoms in which electrons cascade down to already occupied states. In this specific scenario,
fermions and parafermions obviously do not describe one and the same specific state of affairs.
So, how do we know what constitutes surplus structure unless we have already decided that
one of the rival representations is superfluous? How do we apply this methodological principle
of Redhead and Teller to ground our choice of a theory or of a metaphysical stance?

1.2.3

Artifacts and Robustness

The third kind of unphysical structure I would like to investigate is that of artifacts. Like surplus structure, artifacts are not explicitly, willingly posited in response to a given problem but
are imported within a theory given some other choices whose consequences are not always
fully understood. They usually are the result of idealizations or simplifications made in building a model or a theory. Artifacts are surprisingly rarely discussed in the context of theoretical
physics, despite some fairly recent examples of artifacts in General Relativity and their use
to constrain choice between rival models. One such example can be found in the discussion
of singularities in the early days of General Relativity. As reported by Earmann (1999, 241)
many cosmologists in the 1930’s were considering space-time singularities as pathological and
dismissed them as resulting from the highly unrealistic symmetry assumptions upon which
Einstein’s Field Equations and Friedman-Lemaı̂tre-Roberts-Walker cosmological models were
based. The Penrose-Hawking singularity theorems, however, have shown that geodesic incompleteness11 is unavoidable for a more general class of spacetime, based on much weaker
assumptions: a generic solution to Einstein Field Equations that only assumes some energy
condition, some causal properties of spacetime and a closed trapped surface is not compati11

An easy, intuitive way to conceive a spacetime singularity is to see it as a place where the curvature of
spacetime becomes infinite. However, in General Relativity, such a definition is slightly misleading, for Einstein
field equations define spacetime and do not apply anymore for infinite curvature. Thus, one can think about
singularities as missing points in spacetime, that can be found by finding particle paths that end as they run into
the singularity–the incomplete geodesics.
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ble with geodesic completeness. Nonetheless, one can still see in the literature the idea that
a singularity-free quantum gravity theory is preferable, and as such should be chosen over its
rivals.
The Penrose-Hawking singularity theorems can be seen as establishing the robustness of
singularities, as geodesic incompleteness hold for a much more general class of spacetime than
was originally thought, and does not depend on specific symmetry assumptions. Robustness
analysis has indeed been used in many areas as a methodology allowing to determine when the
predictions extracted from a model are genuine predictions, as opposed to an artifact of the idealizations upon which this model depends. Roughly speaking, it consists in examining a variety
of models each relying on independent simplifications to look for robust properties, properties
that would hold in all models despite the fact that they rely on different simplifications or idealizations.12 Yet, this methodology does not seem to be a good candidate to identify artifacts,
for at least two reasons. First, robustness analysis cannot be of any help when the suspect idealizations generating artifacts are inevitable. This happens more often that one would believe.
Consider for instance the case of referential ambiguity that is created by the indiscernibility
of quantum particles in Quantum Mechanics. The fact that quantum particles are individually labelled does not create any problem when describing systems of particles belonging to
distinct families. However, when applied to systems of indiscernible particles, it generates
cases of referential ambiguity: labels are creating distinctions between particles that are not
grounded in any property or justified by any resources that standard Quantum Mechanics has
at its disposal. Using labels anyway has important consequences: given the linear nature of
the laws that quantum states obey, it is really easy to construct from the availability of two
seemingly distinct states an infinity of mathematical states. Among these states can be found
those describing paraparticles, which I argue in chapter 2 constitute an example of artifacts
of such referential ambiguity. One could argue, as Redhead and Teller did in their 1991, that
switching from the Hilbert formalism to the Fock formalism is enough to solve this difficulty.
12

See Levins (1966).
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Yet, although particles are not directly labelled in the Fock representation, the Fock space is
constructed from the tensor product of individual Hilbert spaces, which already contains the
paraparticles they were hoping to avoid. How can robustness analysis help us to eliminate
artifacts in such cases? More importantly, should we try to avoid them if they are based on
ineliminable idealizations, or rather to precisely pin down which assumptions are responsible
for their introduction and temporarily neutralizing them? In sum, robustness analysis does not
always constitute a possible answer, and in cases it does, does not always constitute an effective
one. In particular, in chapter 3, I will examine the failure of robustness analysis to identify artifacts in cosmological simulations, and argue that the agreement over distinct models taken to
be the symptom of the ‘physicality’ of a prediction is sometimes the result of artifacts, which
are responsible for the convergence of different models towards a similar solution. Philosophers must develop new tools to identify artifacts, especially if the absence of artifacts is taken
to be a reason to prefer a theory or model over another.
Beyond the ‘unphysicality’ of these three kinds of structure, their common features that
greatly contributed to motivate this dissertation are: 1) the fact that they all come with a
methodological injunction according to which a theory is preferable if it does not present any
extra, dispensable structure/surplus structure/artifacts; 2) the lack of a criterion or successful
methodology in all these cases that would unambiguously identify what constitutes superfluous, surplus or artificial structure. My reader will not be surprised to learn that, given the above,
I do not think that such a criterion can be delivered at least in the first two cases. If the epistemological stance that one adopts on what constitutes a good physical theory is the ultimate
judge of what is relevant structure and what is not, then it comes with no surprise that no unique
and neutral criterion can be delivered. Yet, as we have seen earlier, strategies to choose over
rival theories seems to presuppose that such an unequivocal criterion not only can be found,
but be applied to decide which theory should be privileged over another. My first two chapters explore the consequences of appealing to such strategies, that of theoretical equivalence
and of theoretical virtues, without making explicit why the criterion of physical significance
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adopted should also be considered as relevant by the rival side. This does not mean, however,
that these strategies should be abandoned altogether. On the contrary, they can still be of great
help to elucidate the structure of scientific theories, if one puts aside the question of theory
choice. I am more optimistic that a methodology can be developed to diagnose artifacts within
scientific theories, mainly because of successful examples of such methodologies in the context of cosmological simulations. However, the development of such methodologies require
first to provide solid grounds for dismissing the overwhelmingly used methodology of robustness analysis; second, to formalize and generalize such methods; and thirdly, in order to think
about other applications for such a method, to list the conditions under which it can succeed in
separating the reliable from the unreliable. This is the task undertaken by my third chapter.

1.3
1.3.1

Outline of the thesis
Theoretical equivalence, Realism and the Structure of Scientific
Theories

Chapter 1 exploits the case study of paraparticles to analyze the presuppositions upon which
the theoretical equivalence strategy depends. In this chapter, I argue that using theoretical
equivalence as a way to escape the underdetermination problem, i.e., as a way to pair theory
as notational variants of one and the same theory, presupposes that we have a self-standing
vocabulary to elucidate the structure of one of the theories that can also be applied to the other
without distorting or miscontructing its content. In other words, it presupposes that everything
that the theory says and assumes about the world can be read off its formalism, without having to consider any of the philosophical beliefs that contributed to shape its development. In
many cases however, such an assumption is not practical: we do not have in practice a way to
formulate claims of equivalence that are not parochial and thus do not favor one of the theory
while giving an impoverished version of the second. As a result, proofs of equivalence that
rely on the assumption that a criterion of physical significance can be formulated in a neutral
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way may be established at the cost of dismissing as physically insignificant fruitful parts of
the rival theory. One of the most recent examples of the theoretical equivalence strategy is the
alleged proof of theoretical equivalence between a parafield theory and a theory with ordinary
bosons and fermions. Such a proof, however, is formulated in a theoretical context, that of
Algebraic Quantum Field Theory, that is already based on the dismissal of large parts of the
structure of conventional Quantum Field Theories as superfluous. Moreover, it is motivated by
a strong operationalism that greatly contributes to shaping its own structure and vocabulary,
especially when it comes to the notion of equivalence upon which it is based, and does not
appear as compatible with the use of theoretical equivalence as a realist strategy. Eventually,
Algebraic Quantum Field Theory does not seem to have the resources to model precisely what
was interesting about parafield theories, i.e., what allowed to turn them into experimental programs playing a crucial role in confirming Pauli’s exclusion principle. This case study raises
interesting questions tackled in this chapter, notably the following ones:
• Can we impose a realist grid on a theory explicitly grounded in operationalism? Can we
simply ignore the philosophical beliefs that motivated the construction of a given theory,
and analyze its structure from another viewpoint? Does it even make sense to interpret
the structure of such a theory realistically?
• Is there a vocabulary that could be used to compare the experimental parafield program
as developed in the 1980’s with AQFT formulations of ordinary and parafield theories
that would be neutral, not already tainted with one’s epistemological stance on what is
the aim of a theory and the determination of its corresponding resources?
• How can a proof of equivalence that convinces both sides be formulated if framed in a
vocabulary that favor one of the opponents, in the sense that it includes all the content
of one while dismissing significant parts of the other theory as dispensable? How does
one reach an agreement on the equivalence of two theories when one of the theory includes additional structure that is not superfluous from their point of view but might be
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according to the other?
Finally, I conclude the chapter by suggesting another use for theoretical equivalence, still related though to elucidating the structure of the theories under comparison. I suggest to redefine
the theoretical equivalence strategy as a strategy consisting of first identifying the maximal degree of equivalence that can be established between rival theories in a given vocabulary, then
determining under which conditions this maximal result holds, and finally assessing the extent
to which these conditions can be stretched. By analyzing where exactly the equivalence breaks
down, i.e., which loosening of the equivalence conditions is crucial in breaking the maximal
degree of equivalence, one can hope to define where the interesting differences between the
competitors lie, and which parts of the theory are really responsible for its observational consequences and their differences.

1.3.2

Easier said than unsaid: Artifacts in Quantum Theories

Chapter 2 focuses on the use of theoretical virtues to decide between rival theories, especially
in these cases where it is claimed that a theory has greater explanatory power than its rivals
because it demonstrates the impossibility of some physical states that the other dismisses as
surplus structure. Again, I use paraparticles as a case study. More specifically, I evaluate
the recent claim made by defenders of Bohmian Mechanics that their interpretation should be
preferred over rival interpretations because they can successfully exclude states corresponding
to paraparticles. On one hand, the lack of clear criterion for identifying paraparticles as surplus structure should undermine the idea that the non-observation of paraparticles has never
been a problem to begin with. On the other hand, a careful examination of the assumptions
needed to establish the explanatory power of Bohmian Mechanics shows that their topological
approach of the configuration space can eliminate states corresponding to paraparticles only
under the same assumptions that they had deemed ad hoc in standard Quantum Mechanics.
Thus, not only their explanatory power strategy seems doomed to fail to convince the rival
sides, but it raises an important question: could the apparent inevitability of parastastistics in
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both frameworks indicates that they are artifacts of some ineliminable assumptions made by
both theories?
The second part of the chapter explores this hypothesis, and how it relates to the idea that
the epistemological standpoint one adopts on what a good theory is when developing a new
interpretation of Quantum Mechanics determines its resources. I make the hypothesis that
paraparticles are artifacts of the implementation of quantum indiscernibility through permutation invariance. The concept of permutation invariance is both the assertion that there are two
distinct states, and that these states can be considered one and the same inasmuch as permuting
them makes no difference. Standard Quantum Mechanics, however, has no resources to ground
such a distinction: a distinction between these two states cannot be justified by any of the properties of quantum particles that this interpretation accepts as relevant. It seems thus natural that
standard Quantum Mechanics would need an extra postulate to neutralize the consequences
of such an assumption, whereas other interpretations accepting more structure and thus in a
position to ground this distinction would be able to dispense with such an extra postulate. I
test this hypothesis on Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Field Theory and conclude that the
Symmetrization Postulate should not be considered as an extra, dispensable postulate that justifies privileging a theory over another but as a mere acknowledgement of a case of referential
ambiguity. When it comes to systems of identical particles, the reference of labels to states
describing indiscernible particles is no longer uniquely defined and the consequences of these
labels must therefore be neutralized.

1.3.3

On Robustness in Cosmological Simulations

In the last chapter, I focus on whether artifacts can be eliminated by robustness analysis. I
argue that robustness analysis fails to distinguish physical predictions from numerical artifacts
in cosmological simulations. This criticism is supported by the following two arguments: first,
robustness analysis in the form of convergence studies does not deliver a sufficient criterion for
identifying trustworthy predictions; and second, artifacts can sometimes produce the conver-
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gence supposed to exclude them. Furthermore, the success of other methodologies, like code
comparisons, that pretend to identify robust predictions is undermined by a tension inherent
to these methods. Indeed, code comparisons require a common, generalized infrastructure for
comparing different codes to ensure that apples are compared to apples on one hand, but this
common infrastructure contradicts the diversity needed for robustness analysis on the other
hand. If the diversity of models is favoured, then one cannot guarantee that the simulated
systems under comparison are actually the same. But if the emphasis is put on the common
infrastucture that will provide such a guarantee, then the diversity of models, based on different
assumptions, that constitute the essential tenet of robustness analysis is lost. The last part of
this chapter suggest a new methodology for replacing robustness analysis in the diagnosis of
artifacts, based on the work of van den Bosch and Ogiya (2018) and Baushev et al. (2017). I
refer to this methodology as that of crucial simulations, meant to put the numerical or physical
origin of a prediction under a crucial test. I define a ‘crucial simulation’ as a kind of simulation
which proposes an idealized, simplified scenario where a physical hypothesis can be tested
against a numerical one, by allowing the observation of a prediction P drawn from one of the
hypotheses and absent from its rivals. The observation of the phenomena P in the outcome of
the simulation then disproves one of the alternatives, thereby confirming the other. Finally, I
assess how this methodology fares against Duhem’s famous criticisms of crucial experiments.
I suggest to re-direct the use of code comparisons such as to supply crucial simulations with
relevant alternative to test, in order to counter traditional worries about the possibility of nonconceived alternatives.

Chapter 2
Theoretical equivalence, Realism, and the
Structure of our Scientific Theories

2.1

Introduction

Imagine a cosmological theory where our universe rests on the back of four elephants, themselves standing on the back of a giant turtle, swimming in the void. This theory is constructed
in such a way that it makes exactly the same predictions as the standard cosmological model,
about all the observable phenomena. They are distinct theories, in that they deliver different
pictures of the world, but there is no observation that would allow to discriminate between these
two theories. Consider now that you are a scientific realist, i.e., that you think that a theory aims
at describing how the world truly is, including that which we cannot observe. How can you
reconcile your realism with the existence of two theories that cannot both be true yet say the
same things about what can be observed? One way to face this challenge is to deny that these
theories describe the observable world in the same way; they look equivalent only because of
limitations of the technology available to us. Another way is to show that they are variants of
one and the same theory, hidden underneath different clothing. The elephants and turtle are not
physically relevant parts of the theory, but simply an evocative image meant to help scientists
28
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represent the Universe. If you choose this identical rivals strategy1 –as many philosophers have
since the empirical equivalence argument was fully fleshed out by Van Fraassen (1980), then
you have to provide a criterion to determine what is physically relevant and what is not, apply it
to your theory, and proceed to pair together formulations sharing the same theoretical content.
The proliferation of allegedly rival theories has been mostly addressed via the latter strategy, i.e., via the development of formal tools to prove their theoretical equivalence. Many
challenges arise, however, for such a strategy. As shown by Coffey (2014), there is no agreement on an unambiguous criterion for theory equivalence, and more broadly on which theories
to pair as theoretically equivalent. Indeed, finding such a criterion requires that the two theories under comparison agree on what counts as physically significant, be it a directly observable
posit or an unobservable entity whose explanatory power warrants its inclusion in the theoretical content of the theory from a realist point of view. What appears as superfluous structure
from the point of view of a theory–e.g., the extravagant fauna that carries the universe in our
example from the point of view of our current cosmological model– might play a decisive role
within this theoretical framework. In the Huron cosmogony, for instance2 , the earth rests on
the shell of the turtle. According to a story related in Thwaites (1898, 73), solar eclipses were
explained by the Hurons by the fact that the movements of the turtle brought its shell in front of
the sun. Removing the turtles in this context would leave some natural phenomena unexplained
within their cosmogony. Given the argument developed by Magnus and Frost-Arnold suggesting that the identical rivals strategy is only appropriate in cases where a parsimonious ontology
is tenable; that is, when the structure on which the disagreement bears is superfluous and can
therefore be ‘occamized’, one can already see the difficulty in applying this strategy when rival
theories do not agree on which parts of these theories constitute superfluous structure. This,
however, does not constitute the only difficulty that the theoretical equivalence strategy faces in
its traditional use as a solution to underdetermination. In this paper, I argue that using theoreti1

This is the term used by Magnus and Frost-Arnold 2010 in their recent paper. I will refer to this strategy as
the “identical rivals” strategy or the “theoretical equivalence” strategy.
2
See the Wyandot Huron legend.
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cal equivalence in such a way presupposes that we have a self-standing vocabulary to elucidate
the structure of one of the theories that can also be applied to the other without distorting or
misconstruing its content. In many cases however, such an assumption is not practical: we do
not have in practice a way to formulate claims of equivalence that is not parochial and thus does
not favor one of the theory while giving an impoverished version of the second. Moreover, if
this is true, then claims of equivalence will often be formulated in the language of the theory
which has the thinner notion of content. Indeed, whereas one can conceive to map each physically significant quantity and theoretical terms of the thinner theory into the richer one, the
same could not be done the other way around. Such a claim of theoretical equivalence would
be asymmetric, since the bijective mapping would no longer hold if starting with the theory
with the richest content. As a result, proofs of equivalence that rely on the assumption that a
criterion of physical significance can be formulated in a neutral way may be established at the
cost of neglecting precisely what is interesting in the other, i.e., what cannot be modelled in the
rival framework and could lead to fruitful results when bringing this theory to maturity.
I will ground my criticism of the traditional use of theoretical equivalence in one of the most
recent examples of the identical rivals strategy–the alleged proof of theoretical equivalence
between a parafield theory and a theory with ordinary bosons and fermions–as an illustration of
how attempts to provide proofs of equivalence to solve an alleged underdetermination problem
tend to be based on an impoverished reconstruction of one of the theory. I start this paper by
reconstructing the history that led to the development of a paraparticle program in Quantum
Field Theory. I insist on the late developments of the program, and on what sense it has
been turned into an experimental program after the 1980’s. Section 2.3 presents the proof
of theoretical equivalence between a paraparticle theory and a theory with ordinary bosons
and fermions obtained by Baker et al. (2014)–the so-called “equivalence thesis”. Section 2.4
examines the motivations underlying the development of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory
(henceforth AQFT) and the extent to which these motivations shape its resources, its vocabulary
and the scope of the equivalence thesis. In section 2.5, I investigate what status should be
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attributed to parafield operators such that a case of underdetermination arises and whether
AQFT has the resources to describe such a case, before hinting at another way of thinking
about theoretical equivalence that leaves aside problems of underdetermination. Thinking of
equivalence, as I suggest, as the search for a restricted domain where the rival theories are
maximally equivalent is a more fruitful way to explore the structure of the theories, in that
successful and failed attempts to stretch the conditions under which this degree of equivalence
holds will provide insights into the role played by each part of the theories.

2.2

The Coloured Quark Model and the Paraquark Model:
how a mathematical construction found a physical application

In this section, I reconstruct the history behind the parastastistics3 model from the 1950’s to
the 1990’s. There are really two distinct debates about paraparticles, one focusing on the
equivalence of the quark and the paraquark model; the other focusing on how a parastatistics
program can be used to test the Pauli’s Exclusion Principle. The history of the rivalry between
the quarks and parastatistics models has been previously detailed in French (1989), French and
Krause (2006), Pickering and Cushing (1986), but their analysis is limited to the time period
between the 1960’s and the early 1970’s–i.e., to the time when the coloured quark model was
definitely accepted. It is certainly true that the parastatistics model was, by the beginning of
the 1970’s, not a genuine rival for the colour quark model. While the latter received more
and more empirical support from experimental data4 , the former could not be made gauge
invariant, and failed to propose experimental tests that could possibly confirm it. Whether
3

Particles are defined by the kind of statistics they obey. Paraparticles are those particles that obey parastatistics, as opposed to Bose-Einstein statistics (for bosons) and Fermi-Dirac statistics (for fermions).
4
See Massimi (2005), section 5.3.2 for a detailed presentation of the experimental successes of the colour
model.
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the reasons for choosing one over the others were sociological, as argued by Pickering5 , or
epistemic –such as the fruitfulness of the former–, at that time the parastatistics program could
not really compete. However, in the 1980’s, several major steps were undertaken that put this
program in a much stronger position often ignored in the literature, given that the coloured
quark model had already been adopted by a vast majority of physicists. After providing a brief
overview of the early stages of the program (section 2.2.1), I focus on the development of the
program after the 1980’s and on the efforts to indirectly observe paraparticles (section 2.2.2).
In 2.2.3, I describe three recent developments of parafield programs and the sense in which
these programs are experimental programs.

2.2.1

From the statistics problem to parafermions

In February 1964, at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (Barnes et al., 1964), the Ω− particle
was observed for the first time. This observation became quickly a remarkable challenge for
the newborn quark model, as devised by Ne’eman (1961) and Gell-Mann (2015). The Ω− , as a
baryon,6 is constituted of three quarks, each of which with a strangeness S = −1, a fractional
charge z = −1/3, and a spin −1/2. According to the spin-statistics theorem, which connects
the spin of particles to the statistics they obey, particles with half-integer spin are fermions,
obeying Fermi-Dirac statistics; while particles with integer spin are bosons, subject to BoseEinstein statistics. Ω− should therefore satisfy Pauli’s exclusion principle (hereafter PEP),
according to which no two fermions can occupy the same quantum state. This baryon however
is made of three equivalent quarks, three fermions in the same state. This was the first violation
of the PEP since its formulation by Pauli in 1925 7 and became quickly known as the “statistics
5

Pickering explained the appraisal of the quark model over the parastatistical one based on how“obscure” and
how “unfamiliar” the latter was considered (Pickering and Cushing 1986, 218-220; French and Krause 2006,
136). In other words, according to Pickering, only conservatism drove this choice. For a criticism of this thesis,
see French (1995).
6
Baryons are those composite particles composed of a triplet of (anti)quarks; and quarks themselves come in
three different “flavours”–up(u), down(d) and strange(s).
7
For a detailed history of how Pauli’s initial Ausschliessungregel became the exclusion principle, see Massimi
(2005), chapters 2-4.

2.2. The Coloured Quark Model

33

problem”.

Physicists explored two ways of meeting this challenge. One was to retain the exclusion
principle and to develop a model that could reconcile this principle with the data–this was the
road taken by the coloured quark model, whose strategy relied on the addition of a gauge degree of freedom –the “colour”– to quarks. The other way was to revoke the strict validity of the
PEP and to generalize statistics to include intermediate statistics, between Bose-Einstein and
Fermi-Dirac statistics. In this case, fermions would still obey the PEP, but particles obeying
generalized statistics would not–they would satisfy instead a generalized version of it. Greenberg and Messiah were the major defenders of this so-called “parastatistics”8 program, initiated
by Green back in 1953. Green was focusing on generalized statistics as a way of relaxing what
he described as the “rigid structure of field theories”. The generalization of the methods for
quantizing fields, departing from the Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac quantizing scheme, was
the path he chose to achieve this goal of ‘loosening’ the mathematical structure of Quantum
Field Theory. In Quantum Field Theory, creation and annihilation operators have to satisfy the
following bilinear commutation relations:

{a(k), a(l)} = 0
1
{a(k)† , a(l)} = δkl
2

[a(k), a(l)] = 0
h
i 1
a(k)† , a(l) = δkl
2

for fermions,

for bosons.

(2.1)

Following-up on Wigner’s remark that the equations of motion do not uniquely determine the
commutation rules, Green noticed that trilinear commutation rules such as the following would

8

The term ”parastatistics” first appeared in Dell’Antonio et al. (1964).
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also satisfy the equations of motion:

[a(k), [a(l), a(m)]] = 0
n
oi 1
h
a(k), a(l)† , a(m) = pδkl a(m)
2

[a(k), [a(l), a(m)]] = 0
h
h
ii 1
a(k), a(l)† , a(m) = pδkl a(m)
2

(2.2)

A representation of the creation and annihilation operators obeying these rules can be given
through Green’s ansatz:
ak =

p
X

a(a)
k

(2.3)

α=1

where operators with equal values of α (or “Green index”) obey the usual (anti)commutation
rules and operators with different values of Green index obey abnormal (anti)commutation
relations. This generalized quantization procedure, however, was then “a solution in search
of a problem” (Pickering and Cushing, 1986), i.e., a mathematical possibility with no known
application. No particles had ever been observed that satisfied these relations. It took actually
an entire decade for somebody to follow up on Green’s proposal and to apply these trilinear
commutation relations to the statistics problem.
In 1964, Messiah and Greenberg published two decisive papers for the paraparticle model;
one in non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics (Messiah and Greenberg, 1964), the other in Quantum Field Theory (Greenberg, 1964). In the first paper, they showed that Dirac’s requirement
that the wavefunction describing systems of indiscernible particles be either symmetric or antisymmetric is stronger than required by the mere indistinguishability of those particles. Indeed,
they argued, indistinguishability only requires the observables to be permutation invariant.
However, more particles than the ones accepted at that time potentially satisfy this weaker requirement. These particles includes bosons, obeying fully symmetric statistics; fermions, obeying fully antisymmetric statistics; but also paraparticles, obeying more complicated, partially
symmetric, statistics. In the second paper, they extended this result to relativistic Quantum
Mechanics, using the trilinear commutation rules suggested by Green to represent respectively
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para-Fermi particles (2.2, left side) and para-Bose particles (2.2, right side) of order p—“p”
is the maximum number of particles possibly occupying an antisymmetric state in the case
of para-bosons, the maximum number of particles occupying a symmetric state in the case of
para-fermions. Paraparticles of order p=1 correspond to usual statistics, which turns bosons
and fermions into special cases of the generalized paraparticle model. As soon as the Ω− was
discovered and the statistics problem emphasized, Greenberg connected this violation of PEP
with the parastatistics program he had been developing, thus suggesting to solve the statistics
problem by considering quarks as parafermions of order 3 (Greenberg 1964, 599-600).

2.2.2

Can a paraparticle be observed?

The parastatistics model was thus immediately associated with the search for violations of
Pauli’s principle. At first sight, such a violation should be easily observed, at least for parafermions of order 2, such as, e.g., electrons: changing the electronic configuration of atoms
by allowing double occupancy of a quantum state would change the chemical properties of
atoms. No model for exploring such violations, however, were available, for a reason made
explicit by Greenberg and Mohapatra in 1987. What considerably slowed down experimental
research on PEP’s violations was Messiah and Greenberg’s demonstration that superselection
rules forbid transitions from states with bosons or fermions and at most one non-bosonic or
fermionic particles to states with more than one non-bosonic or fermionic particles. This superselection rule provides severe restrictions on the possibility of observing paraparticles and
is pretty straightforward in the context of non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics. Remember that
quantum particles are indistinguishable, i.e, that they share properties such as charge, mass, and
spin. If two particles are strictly indiscernible, then it cannot make any difference whether they
are permuted or not. Therefore, the observables for a system of N indistinguishable particles
must be permutation invariant and so must commute with the permutation operator:
[Â, P̂] = 0

(2.4)
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for all observables Â and all permutation operators P̂ belonging to the permutation group S n .
In particular, the Hamiltonian must be invariant under the permutation of two particles and
thus cannot change the permutation symmetry of the wave-function: as stated in Amado and
Primakoff (1980), once a boson (fermion), always a boson (fermion)!9 This argument rules out
any possible transition from a normal state to an anomalous state violating the PEP, or from an
anomalous state to a normal state. It constitutes a serious obstacle for turning the parastatistics program into an experimental program. It took actually almost two decades to overcome
the no-mixing statistics argument. Only in 1987, Ignatiev and V.A.Kuzmin succeeded in constructing a single oscillator model allowing for the double occupancy of quantum states that
Greenberg and Mohapatra immediately analyzed as consistent with parafermions of order 2.
This model was the starting point of every experiment conducted after 1990 to test Pauli’s exclusion principle (i.e., Ramberg and Snow 1990, Deilamian et al. 1995, VIolations of Pauli’s
principle experiments VIP1 and VIP2 still happening at the Laboratory Nationali del Gran
Sasso, etc.).
In Ignatiev and Kuzmin’s (hereafter IK) single oscillator model, a β parameter is introduced
such that, when β=0, the PEP is satisfied and when β ,0, then violations of the PEP are possible
but suppressed by some power of β.10 Greenberg and Mohapatra’s insight was to use Green’s
ansatz to turn the IK model into a local quantum field theory of parafermions, where a can be
9

This means that violations of the PEP need to be introduced more subtly than by considering the Hamiltonian as the sum of a statistics-conserving term and a statistics-violating term as is the case for parity or charge
violations.
10
The model is defined as follows:
α† |0i = |1i ,

α |0i = 0,

α |1i = β |2i ,

α |1i = |0i ,

α† |2i = 0,

α |2i = β |1i ,

†

(2.5)

which gives the following trilinear commutation relations:

ααα† + β2 α† αα = β ∗ a,
ααα† + β4 α† α α = β2 αα† α,
ααα = 0.

(2.6)
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read as a parafermi operator of order 2 modified by a factor 1− N0 , with N the number operator,
to prevent double occupancy; and then equipped with the term βN0 , allowing double occupancy
proportional to β. In other words, from 2.2.6 it follows that β = 1 acts as a parafermi operator
of order 2 would, while β = 0 acts like a normal Fermi operator. Given the 1 − N0 mechanism,
Greenberg and Mohapatra call this construction a “hindered parafermion of order 2”–for short,
a “paron”. Such a construction allows for two possible kinds of experiments searching for
anomalous to anomalous transitions, in order to put bounds on β :
• Exciting atoms and observing their spectra. The normal configuration of a helium atom
in its ground state is 1s2 . If such an atom exhibits paronic electrons, then it could be
in the anomalous state 1s3 . Thus, it would behave chemically like a Z − 1 atom–here,
hydrogen–in that it would accept another electron in its K shell, but would exhibit spin 1,
unlike hydrogen which has a spin 21 . Given the symmetric wavefunction of the anomalous
helium, its energy level would be shifted11 , thus allowing to detect anomalous spectral
lines by spectroscopy.
• The second kind of experiments involves bringing slow electrons in contact with an atom
and look for photons emitted with probability β2 from the transition of an electron in a
high PEP-violating state to a low-lying such state.
The two kinds of experiments listed above identify possible observations of a parafermion
of order 2. However, there is no corresponding model for parafermions theories applied to
quarks, since the baryon spectroscopy predicted by this theory and predicted by Greenberg is
observationally equivalent to a colour model–in both cases, the baryon states are symmetric
with respect to their observable degrees of freedom (spin, flavor) but antisymmetric with reFinally, an analogue of the the no-particle and the single-particle states for Fock-representations are defined by
α |0i = 0

(2.7)

αα† |0i = |0i

(2.8)

and
for IK oscillators.
11
The amount by which it would be shifted as been calculated by Drake in 1989.
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Figure 2.1: Deilamian et al.’s experiment: fluorescence spectrum of helium over the region of
interest, where paronic spectral lines were predicted.
spect to an unobservable internal degree of freedom. It is only in their respective extensions,
as we will see in 2.2.3, that these theories empirically differ.

2.2.3

Testing the empirical adequacy of parafield theories

Parafermions theories of order 2: parastatistics applied to electrons
Experiments of the first type were performed by Deilamian et al. (1995). Using Drake’s predictions for an anomalous helium atom’s energy level shifts, they irradiated a beam of helium
atoms by photons and focused on the anomalous spectral lines. No such lines were detected
(See Figure 2.1).
The second kind of experiment, this time focusing on detecting forbidden transitions, was
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performed in 1990 by Ramberg and Snow. The idea was to focus on the x-rays that would
be emitted if an electron was cascading down to a 1s state already doubly occupied, using
Greenberg and Mohapatra’s β’s parametrization for anomalous states. The experiment, run at
Fermilab during two months, consisted in detecting the eventual shift of x-rays when external
electrons were supplied to a strip of copper–i.e., when electrical current was passing through
the copper strip. It did not yield any positive result for the paronic program, but instead reduced
the limit put by Greenberg and Mohapatra on “the probability that a new electron added to an
antisymmetric collection of N electrons to form a mixed symmetry state rather than a totally
antisymmetric state” (Ramberg and Snow 1990, 438) from 6 109 to 6 10−26 . This was not the
end of the paronic program, still used in two ways: one is to further reduce the bound on the
β parameter and thus strengthen the experimental justification of Pauli’s principle. This is for
instance done in the V IP1 and V IP2 experiments, currently underway in Europe at the LNGS
(Shi et al., 2016). The other extension of the program consists in introducing infinite statistics
that interpolates between para-Bose and para-Fermi statistics, using a q-mutator going from
1 to -1 that averages over Bose and Fermi statistics. Such a program, usually referred to as
“quon-statistics”, is still connected to the initial parastatistics program, inasmuch as the paraFermion and para-Bose algebras are recovered for q = −1 and q = 1 respectively (Meljanac
et al., 1996), but it cannot be made relativistic (Greenberg, 2000), (Greenberg and Mohapatra,
1989).

Instead of a confirmation of the para-Fermion and paronic program, experiments carried
out to test possible violations of Pauli’s principle after the 1980’s turned into a confirmation of
the PEP. By itself, it constitutes an interesting result, since no quantitative test of the principle
could have been done without the rival parastatistics program. However, this interesting result
should not make us forget that what it showed is the empirical inadequacy of the parastatistics
program as an experimental program.
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Parafermions of order 3: Parastatistics applied to Quarks
For our review of the further developments of the parastatistics program to be complete, a
last attempt at formulating a proper rival to the colour model must be considered: the locally
gauge-invariant formulation of parastatistics given first by Greenberg and Macrae (1983), then
Govorkov (1982) and Govorkov (1991). Remember that it is sometimes suggested that the
paraquark model was eventually abandoned because, although equivalent to the colour, it was
sufficiently “obscure”, “unfamiliar” (Pickering and Cushing 1986, 218-220) and “disagreeable” (Hartle and Taylor 1969, 178) to discourage physicists to pursue it. Historically however,
the interest in parastatistics only faded away after the SU(3) theory was gauged, while the
paraquark model could not be. As stated in French (1995), the paraquark model was eventually dismissed precisely because it could not be made gauge-invariant:
What is important from our point of view is that the colour model was able to be
gauged whereas the parastatistics theory was not. This fact is acknowledged by
Greenberg himself (...): ‘The SU(3) colour theory became more popular that the
parastatistics version because (a) the former is more familiar and easy to use, and
(b) up to now nobody has been able to gauge the parastatistics theory, while the
gauging of the SU(3) colour gives quantum chromodynamics. Let me be explicit,
the two theories are equivalent quantum mechanically, but they are apparently not
equivalent from the standpoint of quantum field theory’(private correspondence).
It is left open as to which factor carried more weight (1995, 103).
Why was the gauging of the SU(3) colour quark model such a decisive factor for the success of the coloured quark model? Gauging the SU(3) was crucial in unifying the colour quark
model with the strong force. Like Greenberg’s proposal to consider quarks as parafermions of
order 3, the model proposed by Han and Nambu (1965) consisted in adding an extra degree
of freedom to quarks, to antisymmetrize their states. Unlike Greenberg’s model though, this
extra degree of freedom was conceived as a gauge degree of freedom: their colour model was
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an ordinary field system with global symmetry. This toy model became Quantum Chromodynamics (henceforth QCD) only when the global gauge symmetry U(3) was replaced by a local
SU(3) one: the colour now had a dynamical role to play since the local colour charge couples
with the strong force. Such a coupling requires eight “colours”, i.e., eight types of gluons12 ,
given that the number of generators of a SU(3) group is N 2 − 1. As noticed by Greenberg13 ,
Freund and Govorkov, only an SO(3) group can be gauged using Green’s ansatz, and if SO(3)
is understood as the basis of gauge colour, then only three gluons14 , or types of colors, would
be allowed.15 Furthermore, as demonstrated by Ohnuki and Kamefuchi (1982, chapter 11),
the kinematical properties of paraquarks gauged that way cannot explain the mechanism of
quark confinement. An attempt to circumvent the limitations of Green’s parafield formulation
by using a complex Clifford algebra instead can be found in Greenberg and Macrae (1983). It
leads to interesting restrictions on the number of antiparticles physically possible, and thus to
a matter-dominated universe due to this particle-antiparticle asymmetry in initial states.16

A summary of the parafield theories ménagerie
When the history of the parastatistics is reviewed in the literature, the conclusion drawn is very
often that the parastatistics program was eventually given up because this program was equivalent to the coloured quark model, but way more disconcerting. The question of which parafield
theories are accurately described in such a way is very often left vague or not addressed. As
a way to fill this gap, I summarize in this section which parafield theories are possible, which
parafield theories have found interesting applications, and what are the possibilities left for
12

It seems at first that, given the three possible color charges, nine type of gluons should obtain by combination
of them. However (and in rough terms), the linear combination of red/anti-red +blue/antiblue+green/anti-green
would give a “white” gluon, i.e., a color singlet gluon not interacting with other gluons and therefore behaving
like a free particle. Since such a gluon is not observed, one of the nine combinations must be discarded and only
eight gluons accepted.
13
See the added note in Freund (1976).
14
The dimension and number of generators of an SO(n) group is n(n−1)
2 .
15
The colour-gauge field that couples with the Green index a of the quark fields must belong to the same family
as the latter: this means that the gauge field must be a paraboson of order 3 whose internal degrees of freedom
take on three possible values.
16
For a detailed analysis of this asymetry, see Govorkov (1991).
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developing interesting parastatistics program.
Roughly speaking, a parafield theory is a theory that generalizes the framework of canonical quantum field theory by extending commutation rules to trilinear commutation rules. Since
the statistics that particles obey are defined through commutation rules, a parafield theory also
corresponds to a generalization of statistics, that recovers Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics for the special case p=1. In order for these generalized commutation rules to be imported
within Quantum Field Theory, one must find a way to represent the operators obeying these
commutation rules, i.e. the parafield operators that will act on the vacuum state and create
the units of charge that can at least naively be interpreted as particles. One way to do this,
and the most used one historically, is the Green ansatz that gives a Fock-like representation of
parafield operators. The Green ansatz, although sufficient for describing parastatistics of order
p, is not necessary–when the limitations of Green paraquantization where demonstrated for
gauging parafield theories, Greenberg and Macrae indeed suggested other possible choices of
operators within the context of a Clifford algebra.
When developed by Green in 1953, the parastatistics program was simply a mathematical
framework with no known application. The discovery of the Ω− in 1964 offered to this program
its first possible application: if quarks were not fermions, but para-fermions of order 3, then
the statistics problem could be easily solved: quarks states could be symmetrized with respect
to their visible degrees of freedom, but antisymmetrized with respect to an extra unobservable
degree of freedom taking the form of a three-valued charge. Although this program was crucial
in developing the idea of a colour degree of freedom, the impossibility of gauging a parafield
theory in the context of Green’s quantization was an insurmontable obstacle compared to the
gauged colour quark model. After the SU(3) gauge symmetry model and strong interactions
were unified, two reactions were possible with respect to the parastatistics program:
• One possible reaction was to focus only on the resolution of the statistics problem
through a hidden degree of freedom, and hence on their equivalence. From this point of
view, i.e., the possibility of symmetrizing baryon states, the two hypotheses, and hence
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the two potential theories that can be developed on their basis, are equivalent in their predictions: they predict the same spectrum for excited states of baryons, and can equally
account for phenomena whose effects depends on the numbers of colors only–the neutral
pion decay rate for instance, or the ratio of the cross-section of electron-positron annihilation to hadrons to the cross-section for annihilations to muons pair (see Greenberg
1993, 11-12). Notice however that the predictive equivalence holds only for a restricted
domain of phenomena, and ignores part of the known phenomenology of quarks. The
proof of equivalence given by Drühl et al. (1970) is formulated in this context, i.e., with
a global gauge group and not a local one.
• Another possible reaction was to focus on their differences and consider the paraquark
theory refuted, given the impossibility to gauge it except for the special case of SO(3).
The basis of QCD, indeed, is the coupling of the extra degree of freedom to the local
SU(3) color symmetry and its eight gluons, mediating the strong interactions like photons
mediate the electromagnetic force. Freund (1976) for instance, seems to suggest such a
reading:
Unfortunately, not all eight components of the color current are among the
Green components of the color of (the paraboson of order three) j(+)
µ [...], so
that no “clever” coupling of j(+)
µ to gauge fields can lead to an SU(3)-color
gauge theory. In view of the present confidence in color gauge theory this
looks fatal to the paraquark model (1976, 2323).
Although “refuted” seems to be a strong word in this context, one has to remember that
many phenomena that were decisive for the acceptance of the quark hypothesis and for
an explication of their phenomenology (for instance, the reason why no free quark had
been observed) depend on the dynamical role played by the colour degree of freedom. A
model such as the global SU(3) symmetry initially suggested by Han and Nambu does
not properly account for the quark phenomenology: as shown by Govorkov (1982), if
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SO(3) is the basis of the color symmetry, then the number of quarks species would be
restricted to two. Such a theory would be hard to reconcile with the observation of six
flavors of quarks and would impose severe restrictions on quarks/gluons interactions.
Likewise, a SO(3) gauged-theory would admit as singlet states not only mesons (a pair
quark/antiquark qq̄) and baryons (qqq) but also diquarks qq , anomalous baryons qqq̄ and
quark-gluons qg.
A second possible application was found for the Green’s paraquantization with Ignatiev and

Kuzmin model. Previously inhibited by the superselection rules constraining the Hamiltonian
of a system of N identical particles, possible models for observing violations of the PEP were
finally developed in the form of hindered parafermions of order 2 and quons algebra. This
program was both an amazing success, in the sense that it provided the first possible test of the
PEP, but also a complete failure; for no gross violations of the PEP were observed and models
with small violations were quickly shown to be inconsistent. This program still continues
nowadays, not because a parafield theory of order 2 is seriously pursued as the empirically
adequate or true theory, but because it provides the only model thanks to which high-precisions
tests of the PEP can be run. In sum, paraparticle theories of order 2 were interesting and fruitful
as a way to justify the PEP inasmuch as they are not equivalent to ordinary particles theories.
I pause here to insist on the fact that the Green’s ansatz implies a very specific interpretation
of parastatistics, that finds its origin in the initial context where parastatistics were developed.
Parastatistics can be interpreted as describing cases of exact degeneracy with respect to a internal coordinate, where indiscernible particles obey parastatistics of order corresponding to
the degeneracy number. This is somewhat the interpretation forced upon parastatistics by the
use of Green’s ansatz. Green’s ansatz is a convenient way to give a Fock-like representation
of parafield operators, since the parafield operators are represented in the form of the direct
sum of operators of ordinary Fermi or Bose fields satisfying anomalous commutation rules,
usually referred to as the “Green components”. Given that indices of these components are in
principle unobservable, it is easy to think about parafield operators as equivalent to ordinary
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operators with a hidden additional degree of freedom. But there are several things that must
not be forgotten. First, an interpretation of parastatistics as degenerate states is not necessary,
and it was actually rejected by Greenberg and Messiah in their 1965 paper17 . Second, even
if this interpretation is adopted, such an equivalence is a restricted equivalence, as parafields
impose very strong restrictions which are precisely what makes the parafield representation
useful heuristically. As we have seen for instance, a gauge-invariant parafield theory only be
gauged up to SO(3) using Green ansatz, as the state space thus obtained is not rich enough to
model the eight components needed for the colour current, required by the eight-dimensional
vector space of SU(3). The Green ansatz representation, that facilitates the importation of
trilinear commutation rules into the usual framework of Quantum Field theory, restricts the
original state space of Green fields to a Fock space, that contains less states than the former.
The Fock representation is only one of infinitely many possible irreducible representations of
the commutation rules, singled out notably by the choice of a vacuum state |0i such that this
ket is annihilated by all the annihilation operators αk . Therefore, the Fock-like representation
of parafields contains only one state α∗ (k) |0i, whereas the Green fields state space contains
p : α∗1 (k) |0i , ..., α∗p (k) |0i–this is actually why Greenberg and Messiah rejected the degeneracy interpretation. Moreover, the exact degeneracy could be a first approximation of a broken
symmetry–and indeed, Green-gauged parafield theories are incomplete, as SU(3) is in this
context a broken symmetry. Finally, the Green paraquantization is sufficient to describe parastatistics of order p, but is not necessary; and other locally-gauged invariant parafield theories
have been built on different paraquantization schemes.

2.2.4

To be equivalent or not to be

Given the above assessment of the parastatistics program, it seems surprising that Baker et
al. were able, in 2015, to prove the theoretical equivalence of every parafield theory with an
ordinary field one. If the real scope of the equivalence thesis is the non-gauged paraquark
17

See footnote 7 of this paper and its discussion in Govorkov 1984, section 5.
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model, the proof of equivalence would not achieve much, as this theory might be shown to
be equivalent only to a toy model of ordinary fermions and bosons, that does not have the
resources to account for the strong interaction in terms of the coupling of the colour charge
and gluons. We do not have any reason to think that this theory is the most likely to be true,
and thus to be realist about it. Its equivalence with a para-field theory does not, if so, create
any difficulty for the realist–two distinct theories cannot be true together, but they can certainly
both be false. Why then construct the rivalry between the two potential theories, not even fully
developed, as a case of underdetermination, when the mature theories are not even empirically
equivalent?

If the scope of the equivalence thesis is really as general as claimed, and if every interesting
and fruitful aspects of the parafield program is captured by the proof of the equivalence, then
Baker et al. would have shown that, given a particular interpretation of a parafield theory, theories that are demonstrably empirically inequivalent are yet theoretically equivalent. Escaping
such an inconsistency would hint at a very impoverished definition of the theoretical content
of a theory. And indeed, the challenge created by paraparticles is extremely interesting to gain
insight into different degrees of equivalence between theories, insamuch as what made these
programs worth pursuing was both their equivalence, as hypotheses providing an answer to the
statistics probem and the basis for developing new theories, and their predictive inequivalence
as providing the first experimental way of testing of the PEP. One can see already how difficult
it is to offer a notion of theoretical equivalence that would solve a possible underdetermination problem for the parafermions of order 3 theories while at the same time preserving the
fruitfulness of the parafermionic theory of order 2.
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Putting theoretical equivalence to work

The physical equivalence18 of ordinary quantum field theory and para-quantum field theory
was accepted by a large part of the community by the end of the 1970’s, despite no rigorous
proof provided, based on their predictive equivalence for the baryon spectroscopy and quark
properties that only depend on the number of colors. As early as 1961, Araki tried to show
that the Green field algebra of a parafield theory could be re-parameterized such as to be made
equivalent to an ordinary field algebra–the Green components of the parafield operators can
be decomposed into ordinary bosons and fermions operators, but with anomalous commutation relations. Drühl et al. (1970) further extended this work, by showing that, given some
global gauge group, both the algebra of observables and the superselection structure could
be recovered. Doplicher and Roberts (1990) used their Reconstruction Theorem to show the
equivalence of any local field theory with a complete19 parafield theory on their algebra of
observables, observables outside the local algebra and the superselection structure of the field
system. More recently, Baker et al. have tried to extend this result to show the theoretical
equivalence between complete parafield theories and ordinary field theories and exclude incomplete parafield theories as not physically admissible. As they put it,
a proof of the full theoretical equivalence of paraparticle theories with certain theories of bosons and fermions would be the holy grail from the standpoint of the
scientific realist. There would be no mystery as to why the latter appear adequate
by themselves to describe nature (2014, 938).
In other words, they take it that the availability of both paraparticles and ordinary particles
constitute a classic case of underdetermination, in that the theories are predictively equivalent
but offer different ontologies, and as such, a threat for scientific realism. Thus, they offer what
18

We leave the term equivalence unqualified on purpose here, since the equivalence claimed by Haag and
Kastler mentioned below is physical equivalence. Given that part of our task is to situate this notion of equivalence
in the hierarchy of possible equivalence relationships, we leave open what “physical” amounts to in this section.
19
‘Complete’ means, roughly speaking, that the field system must include all the DHR states and only DHR
states, i.e., not exclude any of the DHR states but not include any non-DHR states. In other words, complete
theories must be local in sense defined by DHR states. I go back to this notion in more details later in this section.
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they think is the “holy grail” for the scientific realist: a proof that these two theories are not only
predictively equivalent, but also theoretically equivalent–that is to say, that they are notational
variants of one and the same theory.
The reasoning underlying their proof is grounded in three steps, that can be formulated as
follows:
• The technical notion of quasi-equivalence provides a sufficient condition for theoretical
equivalence.
• The DR reconstruction theorem proves that complete (para)field systems are quasi-equivalent
to ordinary field systems.
• Only complete field and parafield systems are physically admissible, for incomplete
fields do not satisfy the Charge Recombination Principle.
• Conclusion: Therefore, any physically admissible parafield theory is quasi-equivalent to
a theory with ordinary statistics.
In 3.1, I start by analyzing the notion of quasi-equivalence on which relies Baker et al.’s argument. 3.2 presents the Doplicher-Roberts theorem and Baker et al.’s conclusion.

2.3.1

Quasi-equivalence

First, let us consider what is involved in the notion of quasi-equivalence. As stressed by the
authors, theoretical equivalence is usually taken by scientific realists to be a stronger relation
than empirical equivalence, insofar as two theoretically equivalent theories not only make the
same observable predictions (as empirically equivalent theories do), but also posit the same
unobservable entities. Theoretical equivalence is what is required for the realist to escape the
underdetermination argument: since a realist is entitled to the reality of both observables and
unobservable entities postulated by the theory she is a realist about, two theories that posit
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equivalent observables but disagree on the unobservable reality they admit cannot have the
same theoretical content.
Does quasi-equivalence meet this condition in the context of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory (hereafter AQFT) within which Baker et al. present their proof? The motto behind AQFT
is that the whole physical content of the theory is encapsulated in the abstract C*-algebra of
observables A, a collection of operators whose self-adjoint elements denote physical quantities. Two theories sharing their abstract algebra of observables are predictively equivalent, in
the sense that the states they accept assign the same expectation values to corresponding observables. Theoretical equivalence, however, requires more than that, since the collection of
observables refer only to measurable physical quantities. Baker et al. thus strengthen their notion of equivalence by including some observables outside the abstract algebra of observables:
two theoretically equivalent theories must also agree, they say, on which states are physically
possible and on the expectation values they assign to operators outside the algebra of observables, the so-called parochial observables.20
Since quasi-equivalence is defined as a *-isomorphism between the algebras containing
the parochial observables–the Von Neumann algebra that corresponds to a concrete representation of a C*-algebra closed under the weakest topology of the space of bounded operators
on a Hilbert space, or weak closure π(A)− o f (A)–that preserves the structure of the algebra
of observables A, two quasi-equivalent theories will agree on the expectation values for all
observables and all parochial observables. Hence, quasi-equivalence is taken to be a sufficient condition for the theoretical equivalence of field theories by the authors, inasmuch as
it includes both the quantities considered physically relevant by the defenders of AQFT and
the global “parochial” properties associated with the concrete representation of the canonical
commutation relations.
Mathematically speaking, a concrete representation of the abstract algebra of observables
20

It has been shown (see for instance 2011, 134) that some physically significant quantities are defined in
the von Neumann algebra affiliated to a concrete representation (H,π) of A that have no correlate in A. These
quantities are referred to as “parochial observables”.
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A is a Hilbert space H associated with a *-homorphism π from A into B(A), the collection of
bounded operators for this Hilbert space. Quasi-equivalence can thus be defined as follows:
Representations π and π0 of A are quasi-equivalent iff there is a *-isomorphism α
from (πA) onto π0 (A) and α (π(A)) = π0 (A) for all A belonging to the algebra of
observables A (945).

2.3.2

The Doplicher-Roberts Reconstruction Theorem and the equivalence of field algebras

The Doplicher-Roberts Reconstruction theorem (henceforth DR theorem) is usually taken to
prove that complete parafield theories are quasi-equivalent to complete ordinary field systems.
I provide here a simplified version of the DR Reconstruction theorem based on Baker et al.
(2014), Halvorson and Müger (2006) and Doplicher and Roberts (1990). Baker et al. take
this theorem as a starting point, to which they add a physical principle ruling out incomplete
parafield theories. With the addition of this principle, deemed the Charge Recombination Principle, they consider the DR theorem as becoming a proof of the quasi-equivalence of any
physically admissible parafield theory.
The two basic notions of AQFT are a C*-algebra of observables, understood as a collection
of operators denoting physical quantities, and a state of that algebra. States assign expectation values to corresponding quantities. Once the algebra of observables is defined, relativistic
restrictions are added on those tools by defining a subalgebra A(O) of A for every region O
of Minkowski space-time. The collection of local subalgebras A(O) is called a net of observables. The main goal of the DR reconstruction theorem, and, more broadly speaking, of the
Dophicher-Haag-Robert analysis of the superselection structure of the theory upon which the
DR theorem depends, is to show that all the structure of Quantum Field Theory–field systems
and gauge groups included–can be obtained from the mere algebra of observables, granted that
this algebra is associated with a privileged representation. In other words, the goal is to show

52

Chapter 2. Equivalence, Realism, and the Structure

that the superselection sectors of the theory can be derived based on the axioms of AQFT and
on the DHR analysis, instead of merely posited.
The DHR analysis starts by suggesting a criterion to determine which representations are
physically admissible representations. The idea is to choose a net of observables A endowed
with a privileged vacuum state ω0 and its representation (H0 , π0 ). In order to satisfy the DHR
selection criterion, any representation (H, π) of A has to be unitarily equivalent21 to π0 and
must have finite statistics. Roughly speaking, this means that the representations deemed as
physical are those whose states -the DHR states- are “localized”, i.e., differ from the privileged
vacuum state only locally.22
Here begins the DR reconstruction theorem properly speaking. What this theorems shows
is that, for any net of observables (A, ω0 ), a unique complete23 field system (F , H, π, G)–with
G its gauge group–can be reconstructed that has normal commutation relations. In other words,
for a given field algebra F1 , it is always possible to extract a net of observables such that a field
algebra F2 can be reconstructed that has normal commutations relation and is quasi-equivalent
to the former. In technical terms, for two complete fields systems satisfying the DHR condition
(F1 , H1 , π1 , G1 ) and (F2 , H2 , π2 , G2 ) for (A, ω0 ), the representations (H1 , π1 ) and (H2 , π2 ) are
quasi-equivalent:
• If a field system (F , H, π, G) is complete, then the folium24 of (F , H) is constituted of
all and only DHR states.
• Since (F1 , H1 , π1 , G1 ) and (F2 , H2 , π2 , G2 ) are complete, the folium of (H1 , π1 ) is equal
to the folium of (H2 , π2 ).
0

0

Unitary equivalence requires a unitary map U:H → H such that U −1 Ôi U = Ôi for all i. In other words,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sets of observables associated with the two representations, and
another one-to-one correspondence between the sets of state.
22
Note that, at this stage, non-local field theories such as theory with quon statistiscs and other field theories
with infinite statistics are already excluded.
23
A field system is complete iff every DHR representation of A is a subrepresentation of π and every subrepresentation of π is a DHR representation
24
The folium of a state ω is the set of states that can be expressed as density matrices on the GNS representation
associated with this state
21
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• If the folium of (H1 , π1 ) and the folium of (H2 , π2 ) are equal, then the Von Neumann
algebras affiliated with the DHR states are isomorphic, which is tantamount to saying
that there is an *-isomorphism between the weak closure algebras of π1 (A)− and π2 (A)− .
• (H1 , π1 ) and (H2 , π2 ) are quasi-equivalent.
Hence, Baker et al. consider that the DR theorem can be accepted as a proof of the equivalence
thesis, with the restriction that only complete parafield theories are considered: any complete
parafield theory satisfying the DHR selection criterion is quasi-equivalent to a complete normal
field theory. Baker et al. aim to bring the final stone to this edifice by extending the proof to
incomplete field systems. They do so by dismissing, as physically inadmissible, any incomplete
(para)field theory, via what they call the Charge Recombination Principle. This principle states
that we should always prefer a theory that does not violate Charge Recombination:
given that Q is a physically possible value for the charge of a region, we should
prefer (as better motivated or less ad hoc) theories according to which it is physically possible for Q to be the total charge of the whole universe (2014, 954).
This result allegedly proves that any physically admissible parafield theory is quasi-equivalent
to any ordinary theory with an additional hidden charge degree of freedom with internal gauge
symmetry.
Note that this principle rules out a gauge-invariant parafield theory using Green’s ansatz,
since it only recovers SO(3) as the basis of color symmetry and therefore constitute an incomplete parafield theory. SU(3) is a broken symmetry for a Green-gauged theory, which means
that there are states in the DHR sector of charge Q that are admissible according to the DHR
selection criterion but are not contained in the Hilbert space associated with this parafield theory.
It should also be noticed that the Charge Recombination Principle is not the only thing
added to Doplicher and Roberts’s proof by Baker et al. An important twist is also made by the
move from physical equivalence, as understood by Doplicher, Haag, Roberts and other advo-
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cates of AQFT, to theoretical equivalence. In the next section I will analyze the consequences
of such a twist in terms of what a realist interpretation of AQFT amounts to.
I contend that, in the version of AQFT they defend, and despite their efforts to extend the
physical core of the theory to parochial observables, there is no difference between Baker et al.’s
realism about parafield theories and an instrumentalist interpretation of them–no difference that
makes a difference, mostly due to the fact that the operationalist motivations that led to AQFT
to begin with shaped the structure of the theory in such a way that determining which notions
of equivalence can play the role of empirical and theoretical equivalence respectively becomes
extremely difficult.

2.4

The resources of AQFT

The idea underlying the use of the theoretical equivalence strategy is to escape the threat of
underdetermination by 1) giving a criterion of physical significance that captures everything
physically relevant in both theories under comparison, 2) assuming that a vocabulary exists
where a proof that every element or aspect of Theory 1 that satisfies this criterion can be
mapped into another element or aspect of Theory 2 in a way that preserves the meaning25
and structure of 1 and 2, and 3) proving that such an isomorphism holds. Let us consider
these respective assumptions in the context of AQFT and of the Doplicher-Roberts theorem in
particular.

2.4.1

The motivations for AQFT

The core tenet of an algebraic approach to QFT is that all the physical content of the theory
is contained in the abstract local observable algebra A, as opposed to the affiliated concrete
representation in Hilbert space. Both in the early paper of 1964 and in the later book Local
25

Sklar has convincingly shown that a formal commonality of form is not sufficient to ground theoretical equivalence, as the meaning of the terms mapped to each other is crucial to questions of equivalence. See the details of
the argument in (Sklar 1982,93).
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Quantum Physics, Haag and Kaastler emphasize two different motivations for justifying the
algebraic canon26 : on one hand, avoiding the problem created by unitary inequivalent representations. This explains the choice to locate the physical content of the theory in the abstract
algebra of observables instead of locating it in the concrete C*-algebra of observables. On the
other hand, the algebraic interpretation is supported by a strong operationalism27 , according
to which the physically significant concepts of the theory are the ones analyzable in terms of
“operations”, i.e., in terms of possible experiments. Both motivations converge into a similar
result: a thinner notion of physical content than other quantum field theories, and the embedding of the theory into an operationalist framework upon which it becomes difficult to impose
a realist grid.
Segal (1947), who Haag cites as the pioneer of this algebraic approach, suggested that
a focus on the abstract algebra of observables could help circumventing the problem arising
with the breakdown of the Stone-von Neumann theorem in QFT. In Quantum Mechanics, this
uniqueness theorem guarantees that, for any system with a finite number of degrees of freedom,
all irreducible representations of the canonical commutation relations (henceforth CCRs) are
unitarily equivalent. Schrödinger’s and Heisenberg’s representations constitute a famous case
of competing theories that finally have been proved equivalent thanks to this theorem. But this
uniqueness theorem fails in QFT, wherein systems have an infinite number of degrees of freedom. As a consequence, QFT features uncountably many unitary inequivalent representations
of the CCRs. Why is this a potential problem for a consistent interpretation of QFT? Unitary
equivalence insures that there is a bijective map between the sets of observables associated
with the two representations, and another one between the sets of state, so that two unitary
equivalent representations associate the same values with corresponding observables. For this
reason, they are said to be physically equivalent: they are “simply and unalarmingly different
ways of expressing the same (...) kinematics” (Ruetsche 2011, 14). Conversely, many take that
26

Philosophers tend to insist on another motivation, that of putting quantum field theories on firmer mathematical grounds free of the inconsistencies forcing renormalization procedure upon QFT. See for instance the
introduction of Halvorson and Müger (2006).
27
For a more careful definition of “operationalism”, see Bridgman (1927).

56

Chapter 2. Equivalence, Realism, and the Structure

representations that are *not* unitarily equivalent are also *not* physically equivalent. Now if
unitarily inequivalence implies physical inequivalence, as many authors claim it does, then the
choice between two inequivalent representations is not a matter of convention anymore–since
two representations which disagree cannot be correct at the same time, then it seems that a
representation must be chosen over the others28 . It is not clear though on which grounds–if
any–such a choice could be made. Nevertheless, if the whole physical content of the theory
is considered to be encapsulated in the abstract C*-algebra of observables, i.e., if nothing of
physical importance is located in the CCRs representation, then the problem of unitarily inequivalent representations vanishes altogether. Since UIRs share their algebra of observables,
or, in other words, share everything of genuine physical importance according to the AQFT
credo, unitary inequivalence is not really a problem for proponents of AQFT. Unitary inequivalent representations have no bearing on the physical content of the theory:
The relevant object is the abstract algebra and not the representation. The selection
of a particular (faithful) representation is a matter of convenience without physical
implications. It may provide a more or less handy analytical apparatus (Haag and
Kastler 1964, 851-852).
[T]he specification of a special representation is physically irrelevant, all the physical information being contained in the algebraic structure of the abstract algebra A alone...It [interpreting weak equivalence as physical equivalence] shows
indeed that the physically relevant object is not a concrete realization of A but
the algebra A itself, since any two different concrete realizations (i.e., faithful *representations, or representations with zero kernel) will be physically equivalent
(Kaastler 1964, 180-181).
Thus, one of the most important consequences of locating the physical content of the theory in
the net of observables is the formulation of a Quantum Field Theory in a mathematically con28

As mentioned in the introduction, representations disagree only to the extent that one considers absolutely
precise states.
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sistent framework where the problem of UIRs does not appear. Haag and Kaastler’s dismissal
of part of the structure of the theory as superfluous dissolves the problem altogether.
The limiting of the physical content of the theory to A is also intimately related to what
they consider to be the goal of a physical theory, namely, accounting for possible observations
and for the outcomes of experiments. This goal is made very clear in Haag and Kastler (1964),
where states and observables are defined only in terms of possible experiments:

We are concerned with two categories of objects: “states” and “operations”. The
term “state” is used for a statistical ensemble of physical systems, the term “operations” for a physical apparatus which may act on the systems of an ensemble
during a limited amount of time producing a transformation from an initial state
to a final state. (...) We may say that we have a complete theory if we are able in
principle to compute such probabilities for every state and every operation when
the state and the operation are defined in terms of laboratory procedures (1964,
850).

As a result, the parts of the theory that do not play any direct or indirect role into computing
probabilities, i.e., into generating empirical predictions, are also superfluous–a theory is ‘complete’ even when dispensing with these theoretical terms. AQFT is thus a theoretical framework
where the problem arising with the UIRs is solved by limiting the resources of the theory and
adopting a thinner notion of content than that traditionally adopted. Moreover, the theory is
motivated by a strong operationalism that not only contribute to the adoption of thinner notion
of content, but also taints the entire vocabulary of AQFT. As an example of this operationalist
flavour that underlies AQFT, I focus in the next subsection on the concept of equivalence as understood by Haag and Kaastler and their successors, and on how equivalence can be interpreted
in realist terms in such a framework.
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2.4.2

Equivalence in AQFT

Haag and Kaastler adopt weak equivalence as the appropriate encoding of physical equivalence. Given their operationalism, no distinction is made between theoretical equivalence
and empirical equivalence, for no element of the theory that is not accounted for in terms of
measurements or results of measurements, i.e., in terms of its observational consequences, is
considered physically relevant. Hence, physical equivalence is the only notion of equivalence
that really matters to them.
Weak equivalence was first introduced in Fell’s theorem and is intimately related to the
finite accuracy of an experiment. Indeed, given any state associated with the representation
(H,π), there is always a state associated with (H 0 ,π’), such that (H 0 ,π’) is unitarily inequivalent to (H,π) and both states have the same expectation values, up to some degree of error
 > 0. Since the finite accuracy of the experiments does not allow to differentiate between the
expectation values corresponding to those representations, then (H 0 ,π’) and (H,π) should be
considered as physically equivalent for Haag and Kaastler29 , given their explicit operationalism. As mentioned in section 2.3 however, Baker et al. have extended the notion of physical
equivalence of Haag and Kaastler such as to include parochial observables, i.e., properties that
can only be defined relative to a concrete representation. Whereas Haag and Kaastler consider that weak equivalence is sufficient for physical equivalence, Baker et al. (2014) require
a stronger condition, that of quasi-equivalence. If weak equivalence can be interpreted as empirical equivalence, then the stronger degree of equivalence that quasi-equivalence constitutes
may include enough content to be a possible candidate for theoretical equivalence. So, is an
extension of Haag and Kasstler’s notion of equivalence enough to qualify as theoretical equivalence?
Note first how tricky it is to answer this question and how ill-posed it appears in the context
of AQFT. Theoretical equivalence collapses into empirical equivalence within AQFT, for the
epistemological stance that shapes the theory denies the relevance of such a distinction. Can we
29

For a similar analysis of Fell’s result, see Wallace (2011), 54 and Lupher (2016), 5.
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thus reintroduce it consistently within this framework, and, if so, what would be the appropriate
encoding of theoretical equivalence? In other words, given the very thin notion of content
to which Haag and Kaastler restrict themselves, can weak equivalence really be accepted as
empirical equivalence and quasi-equivalence as theoretical equivalence?
Consider first the case of empirical equivalence. Lupher (2016) has already shown that
1) weak equivalence between concrete representations fails to capture cases of observational
equivalence, and that 2) some representations that are obviously not physically equivalent yet
qualify as weakly equivalent representations. On one hand, physically equivalent representations–
in the sense suggested by Haag and Kaastler themselves– do not always meet the condition of
weak equivalence. Consider for instance two KMS states whose temperatures differ, but by
such a small amount that it cannot be distinguished by any experiment–note how similar this
case is to the one underlying the adoption of weak equivalence based on Fell’s theorem. The
representations induced by these two states fail to meet the conditions of weak equivalence,
despite their physical equivalence from an operationalist point of view. On the other hand,
weak equivalence deems as physically equivalent theories that are obviously not so. Unitarily
inequivalent representations such as those of a free and an interacting system in QFT meet the
condition of weak equivalence, thereby qualifying as physically equivalent!30 My point here
is not to rigorously demonstrate that weak equivalence is not sufficient for empirical equivalence, but to emphasize that weak equivalence seems too poor of a notion of physical content
to satisfy even an operationalist–yet alone a realist.
As we have seen however, Baker et al. extend their notion of equivalence to include more
physical quantities than weak equivalence gives access to–notably the parochial observables
mentioned in section 2.3. This move seems at first glance well-justified: if quasi-equivalence
is stronger than weak equivalence and includes those quantities that a Hilbert space conservative would consider as significant, then quasi-equivalence is a good candidate for theoretical
equivalence. Put differently, if one includes in their notion of equivalence more quantities than
30

Details of the argument can be found in Lupher (2016), sections 5-7.
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required by empirical equivalence, then one can be confident that their concept of equivalence
captures more than the predictions made by the theory–it captures part of its theoretical content
as well.

Such a stance is however problematic, given the strong role they attribute to their equivalence proof, i.e., that of pairing parafield theories and theories with ordinary bosons and
fermions as one and the same theory. As I mentioned above with the case of free and interacting QFTs, weak equivalence is already too weak to qualify for empirical equivalence,
since it pairs as empirically equivalent representations that are obviously not, even from the
most radical instrumentalist point of view. Therefore, demanding more than weak equivalence
by no means guarantees that the strengthened relation of equivalence offers a solid basis for
theoretical equivalence. More importantly, although content has been added to the theoretical
content considered by requiring quasi-equivalence, it does not mean that the relevant content
has been included. Indeed, quasi-equivalence still fails in delivering a degree of equivalence
that would hold at the level of the field systems where parastatistics are defined. Yet, if a
genuine case of underdetermination is at stake, field operators should be taken seriously31 and
included in the scope of equivalence, especially given that a notion of equivalence holding at
this level is available in the context of the DR theorem.

The Doplicher-Roberts theorem states that, given a net of observables (A, ω0 ), there exists a
field system with gauge symmetry (F , H, π, G) that is complete and has normal commutation
relations, and that any complete and normal field system for (A, ω0 ) will be equivalent to it
up to DR-equivalence. DR-equivalence is a very strong condition, since it requires a unitary

31

See section 2.5.2.for a detailed analysis of what should be the status of parafield operators for a case of
underdetermination to arise.
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operator W:H∞ → H∈ such that:

Wπ1 (A) = π2 (A)W, ∀A ∈ A,

(2.9)

WU(G1 ) = U(G2 )W,
WF∞ (O) = F∈ (O)W.
Note that the last two conditions require an isomorphism between the gauge groups and between the field algebras. This degree of DR-equivalence is how Halvorson and Müger (2006)
define theoretical equivalence in their introduction to AQFT (see 11.3.1-11.3.2), as this condition not only requires an isomorphism between the net of observables such that the structure of
these nets is preserved, but also requires unitary equivalence, i.e., a bijective mapping, between
the field algebras F1 and F2 . This equivalence condition is only met by theories with normal
commutation relations. If F∞ is a parafield algebra, then from it a net of observables can be
extracted and a field algebra F∈ reconstructed that will have normal commutation relations.
F∈ is then quasi-equivalent to F∞ , a condition that does not demand equivalence between the
local field systems–and indeed, such a an equivalence would not hold. What is interesting here
is that the initial aim of the Doplicher-Roberts theorem was to prove that nothing of physical
importance that is not already included in the net of observables can be found in the fields and
gauge groups, which therefore constitutes superfluous structure whose utility is at best heuristic. Given a net of observables for a privileged vacuum state, a field algebra can be uniquely
reconstructed from the net up to DR-equivalence with any complete field system with normal
commutation rules. In other words, the argument goes as follows: if the fields and gauge
groups can be fully derived from the net of observables, then they are dispensable structure,
inasmuch as they are already ‘hidden’ in the net of observables and one can be an eliminativist about them. Such a reasoning requires that the reconstructed field algebra is unique,
i.e., that field systems and gauge groups reconstructed from the net via the DR theorem are
equivalent in such a way that they can be paired as one and the same. Yet, when it comes to
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parafield theories, Baker et al. (2014) lower the standards of the DHR analysis and insist that
quasi-equivalence is enough to pair parafield and ordinary field theories as one and the same.
How could quasi-equivalence play this role when it ignores part of the theoretical content that
obviously mattered for the proof of uniqueness of the field systems?

2.4.3

Equivalent...to what?

Consider now what the conjunction of the previous two subsections, i.e., the conjunction of
the resources of AQFT and the consequence of the adoption of quasi-equivalence as a plausible candidate for theoretical equivalence entails for the scope of the equivalence proof. As
emphasized by Halvorson and Müger (2006) and Wallace (2011), very often one motivates
their choice of working within the context of AQFT by stressing the mathematical rigor of this
framework. But this rigor comes at a cost, that of not being in a position to describe any quantum field theories that could exist in nature. Indeed, there is no known algebraic formulation
of any interacting quantum field theories in four dimensions, although we do live in a world in
four dimensions where no system is in complete isolation and thus free of interactions. But let
us leave aside the oddity of formulating a proof of theoretical equivalence in this context for
the sake of the argument. Knowing that the chosen context of the proof is AQFT and, within
AQFT, the DHR analysis, what does the claim “any parafield theory is equivalent to an ordinary
field system” really mean?
The parafield theories that have been historically developed are para-Fermi theories. Remember that our para-Fermi field ménagerie comprehended parastatistics of finite order, deformations statistics (the paronic program) and parastatistics of infinite order. Parastatistics of
infinite order include the infinite statistics superselection sectors in AQFT, which do not have a
known realization in terms of infinite field operators and are therefore not addressed. The quon
theory constitutes a very interesting case, because it is the best theory for exploring small violations of PEP so far, but it fails to satisfy the Haag and Kastler axioms. Quon statistics satisfies
the CPT theorem, do have a relativist kinematics for free fields, and obey locality principles
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such as the cluster decomposition principle. However, they violate the spacelike commutativity
of observables required by Haag-Kaastler axioms32 , and are therefore left aside given the context of the proof. The paronic program is also not considered, for the DHR analysis explores
para-bose and para-Fermi statistics only of positive integer order.
Only parastatistics of finite, integer order are thus left from the entire possibility space
of parafield theories. This leaves us with: para-fermions theory of order 2, which provided
the basis for the search of anomalous-to-anomalous transitions in Goldhaber and Deilhamian’s
experiments; para-fermions or order 3, including the non-gauged paraquark model, the gaugeinvariant paraquark model based on Green’s ansatz, the gauge-invariant paraquark model based
on Clifford algebra, and non-gauged (and -gaugeable) para-Fermi theories of higher order.
However, the proof of equivalence only bears on non-gauged parafield theories and excludes
gauge-invariant paraquark models.
This already considerably restricted possibility space is then further narrowed down by
the adding of two other criteria of physical significance: only theories that are local in a very
specific sense, that of the DHR criterion, are addressed. According to the DHR analysis of
AQFT, only those states whose charge is localized, i.e., which differ from the vacuum only
within some finite region, are admissible states. This criterion excludes perfectly admissible
theories with long-range forces such as electromagnetism. Eventually, Baker et al. (2014)
top this list of criteria of physical admissibility with a new one, the Charge Recombination
Principle, whose role is to exclude incomplete parafield theories.
Now, what about the other side of the debate, that of ordinary field theories? What kind of
quantum field theories with bosonic and fermionic commutation rules fall within the scope of
the proof? As we have seen already, there are no known algebraic formulations of interacting
QFTs in four dimensions, and, as acknowledged by the authors themselves (2014, 962), it is
not clear how their proof would extend to interacting systems. Among the free-field QFTs,
QED is dismissed by the DHR criterion, as well as QCD which requires a local gauge group
32

Quon theories suggest interesting connections between the way locality is implemented in QFT and the
apparition of parastatistics. I will return to this point in Chapter 2.
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and not a global one. Gauged-invariant models developed after the 1980’s are also left aside
So, what the equivalence really reads is the following: any non-interacting, local in Haag and
Kaastler’s sense and localized in the DHR criterion’s sense, non-gauged parafield theory of
finite and integer order that can be given an algebraic formulation is quasi-equivalent to an
ordinary field theory with global gauge group that satisfy the same desiderata.
Two things should strike us at the end of this analysis. The problem of underdetermination
allegedly arises because the world seems to accomodate both a description in terms of paraparticles and a description with only bosons and fermions. In other words, both descriptions,
although incompatible from a realist point of view given that they deliver two different stories
about what the world we live in is made of, capture equally well what we know about the world.
But do the theories that survive the criterion of physical significance upon which the proof of
equivalence is based really present such an underdetermination problem? Given how restricted
the resources of AQFT are, and the added requirements of the DHR analysis, can we construct
in this context a rivalry between a parafield and an ordinary theory that could pretend at successfully describing the world? This question is all the more important that claiming that this
equivalence solves the underdetermination problem means that nothing physically interesting
or relevant has been left aside in the proof. Yet, we have seen in section 2.2 that para-Fermi
theories of order 2 have been developed into an experimental program looking for anomalousto-anomalous states transitions or accumulation in anomalous states–like an electron cascading
down to an already occupied state. How come then, if this program is not empirically equivalent to an ordinary theory of fermions satisfying the PEP, that Baker et al. could show the
theoretical equivalence of the two programs? In sum, the following two questions emerge
from our analysis of the resources and the vocabulary of AQFT:
• What should be the status of the parafield operators that introduce parastatistics in AQFT
for a case of underdetermination to arise? Is AQFT compatible with such a status, i.e.,
is AQFT a legitimate framework for constructing and addressing a threat to realism?
This question can be rephrased in terms of what the scope of the equivalence should be:
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among all the notions of equivalence in AQFT, which one is a reasonable notion of theoretical equivalence that can both play its role of pairing the rival theories as one and the
same while being compatible with the idea that parastatistics create an underdetermination problem?
• Are the interesting features of the parafield program preserved in an algebraic formulation of a parafield theory? Or does the proof of equivalence ignore what made this
program worth pursuing?
I tackle these two questions in the coming section.

2.5

Underdetermination undermined

In this section33 , I start by identifying the general conditions that must be satisfied for an underdetermination problem to be a threat to scientific realism, before defining more specifically
what a realist take on paraparticles amounts to. More precisely, I explain what being a realist
about bosons or fermions commit oneself to and extend this analysis to paraparticles, before
showing that these commitments are negated by the equivalence strategy. I then proceed to analyzing whether AQFT can capture theories satisfying these commitments and suggest another
way out of underdetermination in the case of paraparticles, à la Laudan and Leplin (1991).

2.5.1

Let’s be real!

The common take on Van Fraassen’s argument from underdetermination (1980) consider this
problem as a a weapon against scientific realism.34 This argument states that the existence
of empirically equivalent rival theories equally supported by data suggest that we should not
believe one of these theories to be true, but rather revise our ambitions and accept both of them
33
34

The title of this section is a reference to that of chapter 8 of Psillos (2005a).
See Van Dyck (2007) for another reading of Van Fraassen’s argument.
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as empirically adequate. It seems reasonable to require, for a case of underdetermination to
constitute a genuine threat to scientific realism, that the following conditions are met:
1. The theories must be empirically equivalent theories, in that they make the same actual
and possible predictions. Weak cases of underdetermination are no threat to realism, for
a scientific realist can simply decide to suspend their judgment about which of the two is
true until further evidence is collected.
2. The theories must be empirically successful: the rival candidates must compete for the
title of true theory for a threat to arise. A realist has no difficulties to accept both theories
as false.
3. The alleged rivals must disagree on the unobservable reality they posit, i.e., offer two
incompatible pictures of what the world is like.
4. The unobservable reality upon which they disagree must have a theoretical role to play,
i.e., constitute more than descriptive fluff or superfluous structure. In other words, if a
realist accepts as (approximately) true a given theory, and some irrelevant fluff is added to
this theory that makes no difference whatsoever either for its observational consequences
or for the picture of the world it delivers, then the realist can maintain their belief in the
truth of both theories without contradiction.
According to condition 4, paraparticles or parastatistics must have some role to play, i.e., not be
mere superfluous structure with no explanatory power for a case of underdetermination to arise.
So, what does it mean to be realist about bosons, fermions or parabosons and parafermions?
In non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics, this question is easy to answer: it means that the
theoretical terms “bosons”, “fermions”, or “para-bosons and -fermions” refer to something in
the world, whose behavior is successfully captured by the mathematical description the theory
provides. Since particles are defined by the kind of statistics they obey, “being a boson” means
“obeying bosonic statistics”, i.e., “being invariant under permutation”. Particles are bosons if
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the wave-function describing them is symmetric under permutation. Thus, being a realist about
bosons commits oneself to believing that there is, in the mind-independent world described by
the physical theory, a particle or structure that actually exhibits such a behavior.
The reasoning in non-algebraic QFT is similar. Since a “particle”35 in QFT is nothing
but the excitation of a quantum field, defined over spacetime, the statistics apply this time
to creation and annihilation field operators and are determined by their commutation rules.
Consider the action of a bosonic creation operator α∗ acting on the vacuum state and generating
a system with two momentum states i and j. The creation operator is bosonic if it does not
matter in which order you are putting a particle in state i or j. Since bosons are symmetric
under permutation of particles, creating one before the other or vice-versa must not have any
observable consequences. In other words, the creation operators commute:
h † †i
αi , α j = α†i α†j − α†j α†i = 0

(2.10)

Similarly, a creation operator is fermionic because changing the order in which particles
are created will only affect the sign of the state. The fermionic operators c† anticommute, such
that:
h † †i
ci , c j = c†i c†j + c†j c†i = 0

(2.11)

In both cases, bosons and fermions are defined through their behavior under permutation–
permuting two bosons leaves all the observable values and the field operators values invariant;
whereas permuting two fermions leaves the observable values invariant but change the value
assigned to field operators. The difference between bosons and fermions is really expressed in
the behavior of field operators under permutation.
Now, as we have seen in section 2.2, there is another difference between bosons and
fermions: the former can be put up to any number into the same quantum state, while no
35

We leave aside the discussion about whether QFT can be interpreted in terms of particles or not, since the
argument stays the same whether we are talking about bosonic particles or bosonic fields. Likewise, the same
argument applies whether we talk about some entities referred to as “particles” or to some structure instantiating
bosonic or fermionic statistics.
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two fermions can occupy the same quantum state. This difference is also expressed in the expectation values of creation operators for a given state. A bosonic creation field operator for a
system of N particles will give:
α∗i |n1 ...nN i =

p
nN + 1 |n1 ...nN + 1i ,

(2.12)

when a fermionic creation operator gives:
c∗i |n1 ...nN i = (−1)

P

N

|n1 ...nN + 1...i .

(2.13)

Again, the same state will assign different expectation values to bosonic and to fermionic
operators (and, likewise, to parafield operators). Hence, it seems reasonable to think that being
realist about paraparticles or parastatistics commits oneself to grant some theoretical significance to creation and annihilation field operators, even if they do not correspond to observables.
Do the parafield theories under scrutiny in the Doplicher-Roberts theorem attribute some physical significance to these field operators?

2.5.2

The status of parafield operators in AQFT

According to the AQFT credo, all that and only that which belongs to the net of observables is
physically relevant. Nothing of physical importance can be found in the concrete representation
of the abstract C ∗ -algebra that was not already present there. Where does this leave us with
respect to parastatistiscs? Are they physically significant, or, in other words, are they the kind
of things a realist should think of as genuinely referring within this framework?
Recall that, in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory, one has to define subalgebras A(O) of A
for every region O, the collection of which is called a net of observables. Then, in order to introduce parastatistical commutation relations within this framework, the algebra of observables
A is made a subalgebra of the field algebra F , containing the unobservable field operators representing the parastatistical commutation relations along with the observables of A. The field

2.5. Underdetermination undermined

69

algebra is then equipped with a gauge group G, such that A is the subalgebra invariant under G.
At first sight, the distinction between the observable algebra A and the field algebra F seems
to fully capture the traditional distinction between the observational terms of a theory and its
theoretical terms–i,e., between the terms to which the instrumentalists restrain the content of
the theory and the unobservable entities that the realist accept as real. Thus, a realist interpretation of a parafield theory should consider that not only the elements of A are real, but also the
unobservable fields–or at least those unobservable fields operators that introduce parastatistics
into the theory. Parafield operators must be among those theoretical terms that make a difference for the theory in the case of an underdetermination problem, and, as such, included in its
theoretical content. Yet, Baker et al. explicitly denies this attitude with respect to unobservable
fields:
What about operators in F that are not elements of A? For purposes of adjudicating
this question, the term standardly used to refer to these quantities is unfortunate.
“Unobservable fields” sound like exactly the sort of thing a scientific realist should
be a realist about. But when their theoretical role is taken into account, it becomes
far from clear that anyone should accept realism about operators living in F but
not in A (Baker et al., 943).
Their main motivation for denying the physical significance of unobservable fields living outside of A relies on the fact that those unobservable fields are not gauge-invariant. If a transformation under the internal group of symmetries defined as a gauge group of F is comparable
to a mere coordinate transformations and if unobservable fields are changed by these gauge
transformations, then unobservable fields should not be considered as physically significant
quantities. My point, here, is not to go against this argument. Rather, it is to show that such an
argument does not allow any form of realism about paraparticles, and hence seems to undermine the idea that paraparticle theories create an underdetermination problem to begin with.
If you deem only those quantities that are gauge-invariant as physically significant, and if in
the framework you chose field operators describing parastatistics are not, then you are not a
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realist about paraparticles–you do not think that ‘paraparticle’ is a theoretical term that makes
a difference within your theory and genuinely refers.
The proof of theoretical equivalence is thus obtained at a very high cost. First, it holds only
because the domain considered is extremely restricted, actually too restricted to account for the
phenomelogy of quarks as we know it nowadays. As a result, the theories under comparison in
the proof looks like toy theories rather than fully developed theories brought to maturity about
which a realist can be realist about. Finally, the dismissal of parts of the possibility space of
parafield theories at each step of the proof leads to losing the capacity to model the interesting
features of parafield programs that made them fruitful programs to develop. Is this cost worth
it, when a safer and simpler strategy is available: to bet that their empirical equivalence will
eventually break down?.

2.5.3

Escaping the underdetermination à la Laudan and Leplin

Be it from the point of view of the status of parafield operators or from the point of view of
how the degree of equivalence that quasi-equivalence constitutes, parastatistics have never been
included in the physically significant quantities or theoretically useful terms of the theory in
the context of the proof of equivalence. The identical rivals strategy pairs parafield theories
and theories with ordinary bosons and fermions as one and the same inasmuch as statistics are
considered as descriptive fluff. Appealing to this strategy is thus tantamount to denying that
the availability of a paraparticle theory creates a serious case of underdetermination. In other
words, the theoretical equivalence strategy is successful to the extent that the ontological or
physical significance of the terms upon which the disagreement bear is denied, and the case of
underdetermination undermined.
In what remains, I want to insist on the fact that there are no good reasons for a realist to
dismiss parastatistics as superfluous structure, and that doing so comes at a significant cost.
More precisely, I want to insist on the fact that at least some of the parafield theories were
developed into experimental programs and that this point is totally missed by the equivalence
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proof. Such a fact hints at how impoverished the notion of content used in this proof really is.

According to Magnus and Frost-Arnold (2010), two conditions can help in deciding whether
a disagreement on the unobservable reality posited by rival theories is an ontological disagreement or a mere verbal difference. One is the future discriminability condition, according to
which the identical rivals strategy is untenable “ if future developments will allow for scientists
to observationally distinguish between the rival theories” (2010, 5.1). The second is that of
heuristic utility, which states that the identical rivals response is inappropriate “when the peculiar posits of a theory are heuristically useful and guide scientists in developing the theory”
(ibid, 5.2). None of these conditions is satisfied in the case of paraparticle theories. Although
at the time when the non-gauged paraquark theory and the colour quark model with a global
gauge group were true rivals, i.e., competing for the title of the ‘correct’ theory, paraparticle
theories had yet to be turned into an experimental program, the experiments of Goldhaber and
Ramberg and Snow, followed by the discovery of the IK oscillator model in 1987 and its further use by Greenberg and Mohapatra (1987) changed the situation. Not only were experiments
designed to observe anomalous-to-anomalous transitions within the theoretical framework of
para-fermi theories of order 2, but these experiments–and their negative results–were instrumental in the eventual confirmation of Pauli’s exclusion principle. The confirmation of Pauli’s
exclusion principle could not be accounted for if one were to claim that para-Fermi statistics
do not make any physical difference compared to fermionic ones.

Likewise, after 1983, two ways of gauging a parafield theory were suggested, based respectively on the Green and Clifford algebras, that gave birth to gauge-invariant paraparticle
theories not empirically equivalent to QCD. Remember that QCD was born from the unification of quarks and the strong force, and that such a unification required the coupling of the extra
‘colour’ degree of freedom with the gluons. Since the Green-based gauge invariant formulation
of a parafield theory of order 3 has a SO(3) instead of a SU(3) symmetry, the theory predicts
only three gluons, which means that if a full coupling is required to preserve the property of
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asymptotic freedom, then the numbers of species of quarks must be limited to two.36 However,
six flavors of quarks have been observed to this day, the last one in 1995.37 The Clifford-based
parafield theory does recover this full phenomenology, but violates the C-symmetry and predicts an imbalance between matter and antimatter. In sum, the paraquark toy model developed
in the 1960’s is no longer empirically adequate, for it only accounts for a restricted number of
phenomena compared to the phenomenology of quarks presently known. The parafield theories that eventually superseded this initial program are demonstrably not empirically equivalent
to their ordinary field rivals: para-fermionic theories of order 2 and the Green formulation of
gauge-invariant parafield theories of order 3 are actually empirically inadequate.
Rather than asserting that parastatistics introduce superfluous structure in the theory as a
way out of an underdetermination dilemma, a safer bet and more obvious strategy to escape the
underdetermination is thus to deny the empirical adequacy of paraparticle theories. Not only
we have good reasons to attribute physical significance to parastatistics and to reject their ‘occamization’, but the experimental triumph of one of the most important principles in Quantum
Mechanics, the Exclusion Principle, would be a mystery if paraparticles made no observational difference compared to a theory of ordinary bosons and fermions. However, AQFT does
not seem in a position to model these experimentally and empirically interesting features of
para-field programs.

2.6

Concluding remarks

In the previous section, I have argued that the proof of equivalence provided by Baker et al.
(2014) can be interpreted as a proof of theoretical equivalence only at the cost of dismissing
parastatistics as superfluous structure, given that the unobservable field operators that introduce parastatistics within the theory are not considered physically significant quantities, and
the equivalence deemed theoretical equivalence does not hold between the field systems. I have
36
37

Govorkov (1982), 1131-1132.
See Carithers and Grannis (1995).
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also argued that the dismissal of parastatistics as superfluous is not justified, for parafield programs with interesting experimental consequences can be developed that cannot be accounted
for by the impoverished notion of physical content upon which AQFT is based. Furthermore,
it is not clear how to reconstruct appropriate notions of empirical and theoretical equivalence
within a theory so obviously shaped by the operationalism of its founding fathers. As a result,
it seems that one can only accept the proof of theoretical equivalence at the cost of denying the
existence of a case of underdetermination and thereby the interesting features of the parafield
theories.
The history of paraparticle theories is especially telling with respect to the cost of the theoretical equivalence strategy. As made obvious by the later developments of the paraparticle
program, even a program that found its first application in the addition of an unobservable degree of freedom can eventually be developed into a theory no longer predictively equivalent to
its initial rivals. In the first steps of their history, the paraquark model and the colour-gauge
quark model, both based on the adding of an extra degree of freedom to quarks, seemed to
constitute trivially interconvertible theories, and as such ideal candidates for the appeal to the
identical rivals strategy. However, twenty years later, the subsequent developments of the program into gauge-invariant formulations of parafield theories and a ‘paronic’ theory challenged
this status and backed up Laudan and Leplin’s thesis that there could never be empirically
equivalent theories, and that to this extent the identical rivals strategy is never appropriate.
But then, what can be the role of theoretical equivalence if not to solve cases of underdetermination? Is this concept a useless one? Before addressing this question, I want to pause
and remind the reader of the context within which the proof of equivalence was reached. First,
the proof has been developed within the theoretical framework of AQFT, which was originally
motivated partially based on the need to dismiss unitary inequivalent representations as superfluous structure to avoid inconsistencies. AQFT was thus built on an very restricted notion of
physical content, with a strong operationalist flavour. The Doplicher-Roberts theorem requires
an even stronger stance on what counts as physically significant, that Baker et al. (2014) top
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with a third one, excluding incomplete field theories. So, one way to read their result is the
following: the maximal degree of equivalence that may be established between a parafield
theory and theory with normal commutation relations is that of quasi-equivalence, and such
a degree of equivalence holds only for complete theories localized in a specific way, i.e., for
very unrealistic assumptions given that we know already that long-range forces theories such
as electromagnetism violate the DHR criterion. In other words, it provides the degree of equivalence that can be reached and under which conditions. Thus, the equivalence proof can be
considered as a test-case that delivers insight into what needs to be better understood before
the differences between the two theories can be fully elucidated. More precisely, it defines a
program of research that sets the basis for improving our understanding of parastatistics, by
inviting us to test which of these conditions can be stretched and which one would not resist
any attempt to generalize the scope of the equivalence result:
• Complete vs. incomplete parafield theories: the Doplicher-Roberts theorem is partially
based on Drühl et al. (1970)’s insight that incomplete theories are somehow pathological theories, in a sense that is not yet defined. This theorem therefore invites further
research on finding a physical justification for why incomplete parafield theories should
be excluded, a challenge taken by Baker et al. (2014).
• Short-range vs. long-range forces: the DHR analysis of the superselection structure only
holds for short-range forces. Charges whose effects propagate arbitrarily far, such as
charged states in electromagnetism, are excluded by the DHR criterion. Since we know
already that this condition is unrealistic, but that two of the most spectacular results
obtained within AQFT–a full analysis of the superselection structure, derived from the
net of observables; and the equivalence thesis–only holds if this criterion is meant, the
Doplicher-Roberts theorem invites researchers to generalize their result by testing how
much the DHR criterion can be loosened before the proof breaks. Such a task has been
undertaken in Buchholz and Fredenhagen (1982), where the DHR analysis was successfully extended to charges localized in a single space-like cone, and further developed in
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Buchholz and Roberts (2014).
• Locality and parastatistics: the proof of equivalence and the examination of different
parafield theories that do not fall within its scope reveals an interesting characteristic of
parafield theories. Violation of statistics seem to be connected to violation of locality, but
the nature of the locality principle that would be violated is not fully elucidated. Quon
theories for instance are local in the cluster decomposition principle’s sense, but not in
the sense of spacelike commutativity of observables. Theories where the spin-statistics
theorem is not stipulated but derived automatically exclude parastatistics. An interesting
question to tackle in the future is thus to pin down in what sense exactly paraparticles are
non-local.
I therefore suggest to regard theoretical equivalence as a tool for exploring the structure
of competing theories, instead of as a tool to explore the structure of reality. The theoretical
equivalence strategy can be redefined as the strategy consisting of first identifying the maximal
degree of equivalence that can be established between rival theories, then determining under
which conditions this maximal result holds, and finally assessing the extent to which these
conditions can be stretched. In the case study I examined for instance, the maximal degree of
equivalence that obtains is that of quasi-equivalence, under the conditions that one excludes
incomplete theories, accepts the DHR locality criterion, thereby restraining the scope of the
equivalence to short-range forces, and focuses on field theory with a global gauge group only.
These conditions allow one to define where the structure of these theories needs to be clarified:
can the claim of quasi-equivalence be generalized to long-range forces? Can we consider
incomplete theories as pathological and if so, why? What kind of locality condition exactly
is violated by paraparticles? In that sense, the concept of theoretical equivalence is better
conceived as a regulative ideal–i.e., not as the assertion that there is a equivalence relation
that can be found both each pair of rival theories such that it captures everything physically
significant in rival theoretical structures and allow for a fair comparison, but as the principle
governing the search for such an equivalence relation, with no guarantee that a mathematical
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mapping can be found that will actually be able to play this role. In other words, the role of
the theoretical equivalence strategy should consist in determining the conditions under which
a bijective mapping with maximal scope can be found, i.e., a one-to-one mapping between
a maximal amount of physical quantities and relations between them than the rival theories
admit. Inasmuch as the mapping that could capture everything considered as relevant by both
parties is in practice extremely difficult to determine, I contend that the theoretical equivalence
strategy should be conceived as a tool for clarifying the structure of rival theories, as a way
to learn more about their respective structures, rather than as a claim that such a strategy can
legitimately determine when competing theories are “one and the same” theory. By analyzing
where exactly the equivalence breaks down, i.e., which loosening of the equivalence conditions
is crucial in breaking the maximal degree of equivalence, one can hope to define where the
interesting differences between the competitors lie, and which parts of the theory are really
responsible for its observational consequences and their differences. Pinning down in what
sense exactly parafield theories are non-local could be one of the insights provided by such a
use of theoretical equivalence.

Chapter 3
Easier said than unsaid: Artifacts in
Quantum Theories
3.1

Introduction

The role of theoretical virtues in privileging a theory over its empirically equivalent rivals has
been a central topic in discussions of underdetermination.1 The fact that two theories account
equally well for empirical data, i.e., that no empirical evidence can be used to justify the choice
of one over the other, does not entail that this choice is eventually a matter of subjective or
pragmatic preferences that has nothing to do with what the world is really like — or so the
realist defense of theoretical virtues goes. Precisely how a body of data relates to (or is entailed
by) a set of axioms or principles might differ from a theory to its rivals. Such contrasts might
provide non-empirical yet epistemic justification for why a given theory is more likely to be
true than its empirically equivalent competitors. In particular, it has been argued that, ceteris
paribus, the greater simplicity or the greater explanatory power of a theory constitutes indirect
evidence that should play a role in theory appraisal.
The criterion of simplicity has been notoriously difficult both to use and to justify. Bunge
1

See for instance McMullin (1987), Boyd (1973), Boyd (1980), Boyd (1984), Salmon (1970), Salmon (1985),
Salmon (1990),Churchland (1985), Glymour (1980), Psillos (2000), Psillos (2005b).
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(1961), for instance, has shown how ambiguous the concept of simplicity is–under one single concept are subsumed many kinds of simplicity that are not necessarily compatible with
each other. A theory could be simpler in an economic sense, in that it entails the same body
of evidence with a smaller number of axioms or principles required. But it could also be ontologically simpler, as postulating a more parsimonious ontology; or experimentally simpler,
being easier to test than its rivals; or simpler in terms of its intelligibility. More problematically, considering simplicity as a factor of truth instead of a mere pragmatical virtue requires
an extra assumption- that the world we are describing through scientific theories itself is simple. Yet, we have no reason to believe such a claim a priori-actually, the universe described
at very small scale by quantum theories is anything but simple, and is even stranger at very
large scale, if considering the geometry of spacetime of a universe dominated by a positive
cosmological constant like ours. The role that explanatory power plays in confirming a theory,
however, seems at first sight easier to justify for grounding the choice of a theory. Suppose
that you have a body of evidence ei (i=1,...,N) and two theories T and T’. Suppose now that
the entire set ei can be deduced from the set of axioms–and the subsequent laws derived from
them–that T postulates, while in T’ a subset (e3 , e4 ) requires the addition of an extra-postulate.
This extra assumption is introduced as an ad hoc patch, whose only purpose and justification
are to recover e3 , e4 . Although T and T’ both account for ei 2 , T seems to be in a stronger epistemic position than T’: it gets for free what T’ only obtains by hand. For such a strategy to be
successful though, rival theories have to agree on what requires an explanation, and to some
extent on what counts as an explanation.3 Imagine a case where T’ introduces more structure
than T as a way to make T’ more intelligible. Suppose now that the extra assumption needed to
recover empirical adequacy is simply the acknowledgment of this extra structure and its local
removal to get (e3 , e4 ) back. Would we still have the same epistemic grounds for privileging T
2

By “account”, here, I mean that their scope is equivalent and that neither T nor T’ is contradicted by any e ∈

ei .
3

Given that our focus is on explanatory power as a possible way for realism to escape the underdetermination
threat, we will ignore non-realist accounts of explanation aiming to disconnect the concept of “explanation” from
that of “truth” like that defended by Van Fraassen (1980).
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over T’ in that case? Would we still consider that (e3 , e4 ) are explained in T, but not in T’?
In this paper, I evaluate the appeal to this strategy in order to privilege interpretations of
Quantum Mechanics that pretend to derive the Symmetrization Postulate instead of merely
postulating it. Recently, Brown et al. (1999), Bacciagaluppi (2003), Dürr et al. (2006), and
Sebens (2016) have argued that any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that can offer a nogo theorem against paraparticles possesses an explanatory advantage over other interpretations
and should, as such, other things being equal, be favored over others. Given that a system of
paraparticles is described by partially symmetric states, providing a no-go theorem for them
amounts to deriving the Symmetrization Postulate, which only allows fully (anti)symmetric
states for describing systems of identical particles.4 De Broglie-Bohm mechanics provides
such a no-go theorem, Brown et al. and Dürr et al.5 argue, as the topological approach of
the configuration space predicts the non-existence of paraparticles and is particularly natural
in the Bohmian framework. The vast majority of physicists and philosophers, however, do not
consider paraparticles as a problem — as something whose absence should be explained — and
either dismiss them as mere surplus structure, a mathematical possibility with no counterpart in
the physical world, or consider a paraparticle theory as theoretically equivalent to a theory with
ordinary bosons and fermions. The explanatory advantage strategy thus seems to have little
to no impact on physicists and philosophers, inasmuch as they consider the Symmetrization
Postulate as simply removing superfluous structure from the formalism. The success of the
explanatory strategy requires that the rival interpretations all treat paraparticles as not merely
surplus structure.
In this paper, I evaluate the strength of the arguments on both sides of the debate. More
4

As we will see below, the Symmetrization Postulate imposes a superselection rule on physically admissible states: states describing a system of identical particles must be fully (anti)symmetric, excluding partially
(anti)symmetric states. Since the Indistinguishability Postulate already excludes non-symmetric states, I consider
the question of justifying the Symmetrization Postulate as logically equivalent to ruling out paraparticles. Sebens
does not agree with this reading of the Symmetrization Postulate, and considers that justifying “the symmetry dichotomy” amounts to explaining why identical particles behave differently than non-identical ones (Sebens 2016,
49).
5
Bacciagaluppi does not make use of the topological approach and instead uses the extra structure added by
Bohmian Mechanics to the standard axioms of Quantum Mechanics.
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specifically, I identify what is required to explain the Symmetrization Postulate and show that
the topological approach fails to meet these requirements. In parallel, I argue that the dismissal
of paraparticles on the basis that they constitute surplus structure relies on a misapplication of
this concept. Given the failure of these two strategies to solve the problem and to provide a
compelling resolution of the debate, I suggest a shift in focus. I hypothesize that paraparticles
are actually artifacts, and show how this hypothesis sheds light on how the distinct resources
of standard Quantum Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics affect the way they construct the
explanatory target. I argue that one’s epistemological stance on what constitutes a good scientific theory ultimately shapes the structure of the theory, in that it determines what counts as
physically relevant structure and as superfluous structure. Furthermore, it determines what is
a fact requiring explanation, the nature of the explanandum and the structural resources available within the theory for providing an explanans. This case study therefore illustrates why
the appeal to the explanatory power of a given interpretation of Quantum Mechanics cannot
be an effective strategy for privileging one interpretation over another; but also why such a
strategy is very likely to fail, especially to convince the rival side. Given that what requires an
explanation, what constitutes a relevant explanation and the resources available for providing
one are determined within a given theory, a comparison of distinct theories in terms of their
explanatory power is not neutral enough to be persuasive.
In Section 3.2, I detail the consequences of quantum particles’ indiscernibility and how
they have been addressed through the Indistinguishability and the Symmetrization Postulate.
I then proceed to present in what sense the topological approach of the configuration space
can derive the Symmetrization Postulate while in standard Quantum Mechanics, by contrast,
this postulate does not receive any theoretical justification. In section 3.3, I criticize the explanatory dimension of the topological approach and the application of the concept of “surplus
structure” to paraparticles: if surplus structure corresponds to different mathematical representations available to describe one and the same physical system, then scrutinizing the properties
of paraparticles shows that parabosons (parafermions) cannot represent the same physical sys-
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tem as bosons (fermions). Finally, I defend the hypothesis that partially symmetric states —
paraparticles — are merely artifacts of creating distinctions between states that the theory has
no resources to handle, and re-define on this basis what an explanation of the symmetry requirement imposed in the Symmetrization Postulate should be, both in Bohmian Mechanics
and in standard Quantum Mechanics.

3.2

Why does the Symmetrization Postulate need to be justified?

3.2.1

From identical particles to the Symmetrization Postulate

Imagine that two identical quantum particles, arbitrarily labelled 1 and 2, collide. After the
collision, a particle is detected in the region A, whereas the other one is detected in B. The
system can be described by the state |ψ(rA , rB )i = |ψ1 (rA )i |ψ2 (rB )i. Now, since the particles are identical, the labels could be permuted and the system described by a different
state:|ψ(rA , rB )i = |ψ2 (rA )i |ψ1 (rB )i. The actual state of the system is unchanged by this permutation but there are at least two mathematical vectors that are not along the same ray and yet
suitable for that state. This ambiguity already generates difficulties, since one needs to know
the vector describing the final state of the system to calculate the probability of this result.
These two states represent mutually exclusive results and yet there is no possible measurement
that could help to distinguish one from the other. This already bad result gets even worse when
considering which kets are suitable kets to represent the initial state of the system. Consider
a system of two particles — again, say 1 and 2 — with spin 12 . To each particle is associated
a state space, respectively H 1 and H 2 , along with observables acting on this state space. If
A1 constitutes a complete set of commuting observables in H 1 and the particles are identical,
then there is an observable A2 whose components also constitute a complete set of commuting
observables in H 2 . The common eigenvectors |1 : ai , 2 : a j i of A1 and A2 span a common ba-
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sis such that an observable A can be defined for the two-particles system. As in our previous
example, there is no possible measurement of either A1 or A2 , but only of A for each of the
particles. Thus, the ket |1 : ai , 2 : a j i could as well be |2 : ai , 1 : a j i. By the superposition principle, any normalized vector belonging to the two-dimensional subspace spanned by these two
vectors could be used. That is to say, any state of the form b |1 : ai , 2 : a j i + c |2 : ai , 1 : a j i,
where b and c are complex numbers, is a possible description of the state: there is an infinity of
different descriptions available to represent the physical state. This problem is one of exchange
degeneracy: the specification of the complete set of observables’ eigenvalues does not uniquely
determine one corresponding state.

One can alleviate this difficulty by rejecting some of the possible mathematical descriptions
of the state as physically meaningless. Since particles are by definition indistinguishable, then
a natural requirement seems to be that of permutation symmetry — if the particles have exactly
the same properties, then it should not make any difference whether they are permuted or not.
This requirement, usually referred to as the “Indistinguishability Postulate”, is a restriction on
the observables that qualify as physically admissible: the states representing systems of identical particles have to be permutation invariant, in the sense that any observable must commute
with the permutation operator. Roughly speaking, this means that the eigenvalue assigned to
an observable must be exactly the same whether it applies to the permuted or the non-permuted
system.

Consider a system of three identical particles for instance. In that case, the permutation
group contains one trivial and five non-trivial elements, that are represented by unitary operators acting on the Hilbert space Hn = Hi ⊗ H j ⊗ Hk , where Hi is the one-particle Hilbert space
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for particle i, in the following way:
I = i → i, j → j, k → k ⇒ Iˆ |ψi jk i = |ψi jk i

(3.1)

Pi j = i → j, j → i, k → k ⇒ P̂i j |ψi jk i = |ψ jik i

(3.2)

Pik = i → k, j → j, k → i ⇒ P̂ik |ψi jk i = |ψk ji i

(3.3)

P jk = i → i, j → k, k → j ⇒ P̂ jk |ψi jk i = |ψik j i

(3.4)

Pi jk = i → j, j → k, k → i ⇒ P̂i jk |ψi jk i = |ψ jki i

(3.5)

Pk ji = i → k, j → i, k → j ⇒ P̂k ji |ψi jk i = |ψki j i

(3.6)

The Indistinguishability Postulate dismisses all observables that do not commute with the
representation of the permutation group thus defined. The kets obtained by permutation span a
six-dimensional state space with four subspaces:
√
• the symmetric one: |i jki = (|i jki + |ik ji + | jkii + | jiki + |ki ji + |k jii)/ 6
√
• the anti-symmetric one: |i jki = (|i jki − |ik ji + | jkii − | jiki + |ki ji − |k jii)/ 6
• a partially symmetric one, spanned by two mutually orthogonal vectors : |αi1 = 2 |i jki +
2 | jiki − |ik ji − |k jii − |ki ji − | jkii) and |αi2 = |k jii + |ki ji − |ik ji − | jkii
• another partially symmetric one, also spanned by mutually orthogonal vectors: |βi1 =
|k jii − |ki ji − |ik ji − | jkii and |βi2 = 2 |i jki − 2 | jiki + |ik ji + |k jii − |ki ji − | jkii).
Notice that the first two subspaces are one-dimensional, while the last two are two-dimensional.
The Symmetrization Postulate states that only the first two are physically relevant: that only
fully symmetric states (for identical particles of integer spin, or bosons) and antisymmetric
states (for identical particles of half-integer spin, or fermions) are admissible, or, equivalently,
that states should correspond to unique rays in a Hilbert space. As stressed by Messiah and
Greenberg (1964), this extra selection rule does not strictly follow from the Indistinguishability
Postulate. The condition imposed on the possible states is stronger than required by the mere
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indistinguishability of quantum particles, as symmetric and antisymmetric states do not exhaust
the possibilities left open by the mere invariance under permutation.By definition, irreducible
subspaces are associated with different types of permutation symmetries. Since irreducible
subspaces of the Hilbert space correspond to irreducible representations of the permutation
group, and different irreducible representations correspond to different particles, we can conclude that to these partially symmetric multi-dimensional subspaces should correspond a type
of particles distinct from bosons or fermions — the so-called “paraparticles”. In the case of
parabosons of order p for instance, the state vector describing the system can be antisymmetric
up to p paraparticles and symmetric for the remaining parabosons.
Although the Symmetrization Postulate agrees with empirical facts, as no paraparticles
have ever been observed, it could be interpreted as a mere stipulation that paraparticles do not
exist; as an ad hoc clause added to the theory in order to restrain possible states and to recover
empirical adequacy. As a result, an interpretation of Quantum Mechanics able to derive the
Symmetrization Postulate could be favored as possessing a greater explanatory power over its
rival; one could then explain using its resources why only bosons and fermions are observed,
whereas rivals could only take note that paraparticles are not observed in nature and fix their
interpretation consequently. This is precisely the project defended by Brown et al. (1999),
Bacciagaluppi (2003) and Dürr et al. (2006):
Some implications of this topological approach to the treatment of identical particles within the framework of the de Broglie-Bohm ‘pilot-wave’ formulation of
quantum theory have recently been studied. The purpose of the present paper is
principally to stress one point not emphasized in [Sjöqvist and Carlsen, 1995],
namely that the multiple connectedness of the reduced configuration space, which
seems somewhat ad hoc in the standard formulation of the topological approach,
receives a natural justification within de Broglie-Bohm theory (Brown et al. 1999,
230).
It is the purpose of this paper to give a natural proof that parastatistics are excluded
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and a derivation of the three known symmetry types in the framework of two pilotwave theories, namely de Broglie-Bohm theory and Nelsons stochastic mechanics
(Bacciagaluppi 2003, 2).

The topological factors we derive are equally relevant and applicable in orthodox quantum mechanics, or any other version of quantum mechanics. Bohmian
mechanics, however, provides a sharp mathematical justification of the dynamics
with these topological factors that is absent in the orthodox framework (Dürr et al.
2006, 791).

Note that this is also how authors criticizing this approach interpret their work:
Even those who think that the absence of paraparticles does not pose a deep problem for standard QM generally agree that a version of quantum theory that successfully predicts the impossibility of paraparticles would possess an explanatory
advantage over the basic theory. A number of interpretations, including Bohmian
mechanics, stochastic mechanics, and modal interpretations, have offered no-go
theorems for paraparticles (see Baciagaluppi ([2003]), Drr et al. ([2006]), Nelson
([1985]), and Kochen ([unpublished]) (Baker et al. 2014, 932).

3.2.2

Topological approach to configuration space

Let us now examine how this explanatory advantage would work. The topological approach
has been developed notably by Leinaas and Myrheim (1977), in their influential paper On
the theory of identical particles, by Girardeau (1965) and continued by Bourdeau and Sorkin
(1992). The starting point of Leinaas and Myrrheim’s reasoning is that, once the Symmetrization Postulate is added, the formalism of Quantum Mechanics presents a redundancy that could
be avoided by adopting the correct approach of permutation invariance–namely, by applying
permutation invariance to the configuration space instead of applying it to observables. Once
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the topology of a quantum system of identical particles is properly understood, the symmetry
requirement emerges, without requiring anything more than the Indistinguishability Postulate:
Since the indistinguishability of the particles is taken into account in the definition
of the configuration space, no additional restriction, corresponding to the symmetrization postulate, is added on the state functions (1977, 3).
The topological strategy rests on three steps. First, it requires moving from a full configuration space to a “reduced space”. Taking the classical limit of the indiscernibility of quantum
particles as a model, the reduced configuration space proposed as the classical solution to Gibbs
paradox is transferred to the quantum state space. The configuration space of N quantum particles is therefore not a Cartesian product of the single-particle spaces, but a multi-connected
space. Imagine N identical particles moving in a X-coordinates space, knowing that to each
particle corresponds a Hilbert space H1 ,H2 ,...,HN and that the full configuration space is given
by the tensor product of these single-particle state spaces: Hi = H1 ⊗ H2 ⊗ ... ⊗ HN . Since
particles are identical, points in the full configuration space differ only by the ordering of their
coordinates. Therefore, the appropriate configuration space should not be XN , but

XN
,
SN

obtained

by the action of the permutation symmetry group S N on the configuration space. The second
step is then to remove from

XN
SN

all singular points corresponding to several particles occupying

the same spatial position at the same time6 . The appropriate configuration space thus becomes
a multi-connected set Q=

XN
∆,
SN

with ∆ the set of coincidence points, and naturally satisfies the

following symmetry condition:
ψ(XP−1 1 , XP−1 2 , ..., XP−1 N ) = eiγ ψ(X1 , X2 , ..., XN )

(3.7)

where N is the number of particles, P any permutation on the set 1,2,...,N, and eiγ the phase
factor. Since in three dimensions the phase factor is necessarily either +1 or -1, the permutation
invariance applied to the configuration leaves only bosons and fermions as possible solutions.
6

This step solves the difficulties associated with the definition of a Hamiltonian at singular points and with the
violation of Fermi-Dirac statistics induced by the existence of such points.
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The Symmetrization Postulate is therefore not an extra postulate anymore, but a way of formulating explicitly what was already implicitly present in the topology of a system of quantum
identical particles.
This topological approach is not exclusively related to Bohmian Mechanics. In fact, it
could be applied to any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. However, the removal of the
singular points ∆ would be completely ad hoc in standard Quantum Mechanics, as it would
be grounded in the assumption that indistinguishable particles are also impenetrable. This
assumption, which might be verified for fermions, is yet non-justified. More importantly, it
certainly does not hold for bosons, which can be accumulated in the same state. By contrast, this assumption is fully justified — or so the authors argue — in Bohmian Mechanics. In the Bohmian framework, an ensemble of N particles is described by a pilot-wave, its
wavefunction, which is a complex-valued function defined on the configuration space q of the
system: ψ(q, t) ∈ C, q = (q1 , ..., qN ) ∈ R3N . The configuration space variable is given by
Q = (Q1 , ..., QN ) ∈ R3N , where Qk ∈ R3 is the actual position of kth particle. Two equations
give then the evolution of ψ(q, t) and of Q(t):
= Hψ;
• the Schrödinger equation for the former: i~ ∂ψ
∂t
• the guidance equation for the latter:

dQk
dt

=

ψ ∗ ∂k ψ
~
(Q1 , ...QN )
Im
mk
ψ∗ ψ

with mk the mass of the kth particle, Im(z) the imaginary part b of a complex number z = a + ib,
and ∂k the gradient with respect to the generic coordinates qk = (xk , yk , zk ) of the kth particle.
The wave-function determines the instantaneous velocities of the corpuscles by inducing a
velocity-vector field, whose integral curves are the trajectories of the particles. Given that
the guidance equation is a first-order equation, the trajectories are known once the positions
q1 ,...,qN of the particles are specified. It is then easy to explain the removal of the coincidence
points: since the wave-function is a single-valued differentiable function of the position and
since the past and future trajectory of a particle is determined entirely by the wave-function
and the position of the particle at t, Bohmian trajectories cannot cross in configuration space.
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Therefore, coincidence points are inaccessible from non-coincidence points. As a consequence,
Brown et al. claim that:
within the topological approach to identical particles the removal of the set ∆ of
coincidence points from the reduced configuration space RNd /S N thus follows naturally from de Broglie-Bohm dynamics as it is defined in the full space RNd (1999,
7).

3.3

Explanatory power and surplus structure

There are two distinct ways to understand the claim made by the Bohmians. The claim may
be a general claim, according to which Bohmian Mechanics should be preferred over standard
Quantum Mechanics given that they can explain the dichotomy bosons/fermions — i.e., that
only bosons and fermions are physically admissible particles. It could also be of a narrower
scope, and simply asserts that the topological approach of the configuration space can be naturally implemented in Bohmian Mechanics, while it would be ad hoc in standard Quantum
Mechanics. In that case, the claim could be the basis of theory choice only if the standard
implementation of permutation invariance is shown to be inherently flawed and that the topological approach does not suffer from this flaw. Note that no conclusion could be drawn from
the narrow claim without this supplementary addition, other than acknowledging that there are
different ways of implementing the indiscernibility of quantum particles, and that permutation
invariance applied to configuration space suits better the Bohmian approach than the standard
one. In this section, we will thus focus on the general claim, hoping to gain some insights about
the logic of the narrower one by doing so.

3.3.1

What counts as an explanation?

The first thing to elucidate is what exactly needs to be explained. The controversy about paraparticles has persisted for four decades and yet, the nature of the issue itself is still not clear:
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some authors formulate the problem of paraparticles in terms of whether they exist or not, some
other authors in terms of whether a justification of the Symmetrization Postulate is required,
while some others focus on why paraparticles are not observed (Nelson et al. (2013), Nelson
et al. (2016)). This confusion stems from the fact that nobody agrees on the status that should
be granted to paraparticles. The aim of this section is to clear up what should be explained to
begin with.
There is a range of questions that I take to be equivalent, given the introduction to paraparticles above:
• Why are fully (anti)symmetric states the only states admissible, when the Indistinguishable Postulate admits more?
• Why should the eigenvalues of permutation operators be only ±1?
These three questions all assume that only bosons and fermions are possible, and that what
needs to be explained is the reason why paraparticles are not physically admissible states. This,
I argue, is what is subsumed under the broader question: “How do we justify the Symmetrization Postulate?” The question “Why do paraparticles not exist?” can be taken to be a close
equivalent, but only granted that you adopt a realist attitude towards scientific theories. On the
other hand, asking “Why are paraparticles not observed?” is a logically very different request:
unlike the first four questions, it assumes that paraparticles are actually a physical possibility,
presumably following the idea that to every irreducible representation of the permutation group
corresponds a possible type of particles and that every possibility is realized. If one endorses
the idea that what can exist should exist, i.e, that to every mathematical quantity is associated
a physical entity7 , then paraparticles should indeed be observed in the absence of a law prohibiting their existence. So, what is asked here is: given that paraparticles should exist, what is
preventing us from observing them?
7

This “principle of plenitude” was defined as follows by Lovejoy in 1936: “[T]here is a fullness of realization
of conceptual possibility in actuality” and can often be seen at play in arguments to the existence of the magnetic
monopole, positron, tachyons or even the ether. See Kragh (1990), pp. 270-274.
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To answer the latter question, what I will call the observation problem, we need to make

explicit the conditions under which a paraparticle would be observed.8 There is a well-known
obstacle to observing paraparticles. Given the requirement imposed by the indiscernibility
of particles on the Hamiltonian, transitions from normal states to anomalous states or from
anomalous states to normal states are forbidden: if the Hamiltonian must be invariant under the
permutation of two particles, then it cannot change the sign of the wavefunction of the system.
Thus, an observation of paraparticles cannot be a transition from a bosonic (fermionic) state to
a para-bosonic (-fermionic) one. Hence, if one wants to test Pauli’s exclusion principle against
paraparticle violation — since having several parafermions occupying the same state amounts
to violating this principle, one would have to either come up with a model slightly modifying
the original paraparticle theory to overcome this difficulty, or to design an experiment allowing
for the observation of anomalous to anomalous transition. Furthermore, such a violation should
have direct observational consequences, in particular in the chemical behavior of atoms with
anomalous electronic configuration. Despite models built explicitly to overcome the above
objection, no such violations have ever been observed.9
An answer to the first kind of worries may take two different forms. First, one can accept
that these questions do require an explanation. Then, one would have to show that symmetric
and anti-symmetric states are the only possible states and exhibit the physical law that paraparticles violate. The Bohmian topological approach is meant to be such an explanation: the
conjunction of permutation invariance properly implemented — i.e., applied to the configuration space instead to the observables — and of the dynamical laws of Bohmian Mechanics forbid all non-symmetric and partially (anti)symmetric states and this conjunction, the Bohmian
8

Another possible answer could be the following: paraparticles are a physical possibility from the point of
view of the irreducible representation argument, but their existence would violate a physical law and is therefore
prohibited. The very early literature on paraparticles indeed focused on whether they violate the locality requirement expressed by the cluster decomposition principle. I will not tackle this possible answer here, since whether
paraparticles violate this principle is still an open and controversial question. See Steinmann (1966) and Vo-Dai
(1972) for arguments to the conclusion that paraparticles violate the cluster property, and Hartle and Taylor (1969)
and French (1987) for a criticism of this line of argument.
9
See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2 for a detailed overview of attempts to violate Pauli’s exclusion principle by either
modifying the paraparticle theory or by designing experiment to observe transitions from anomalous to anomalous
states.
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defenders argue, constitutes an explanation properly speaking. In other words, the conclusion
that permutation operators can only take ±1 as values follows necessarily from this conjunction and the set of covering laws and definitions admitted by Bohmian Mechanics. Second,
one could dismiss the relevance of these questions and argue that they are not the kind of questions that require an explanation: partially symmetric states are not the kind of possibility to
which the principle of plenitude applies, but merely surplus structure that should be ignored
and removed whenever necessary. In the remainder of section 3.3, I show that none of these
strategies is an appropriate response to the explanation demand formulated in 3.1.

3.3.2

What the topological approach is hiding under the rug

It seems, at first sight, that the topological approach embedded within Bohmian Mechanics
constitutes a proper deductive-nomological explanation of why the eigenvalues of permutation
operators can only be ±1, and thereby of the Symmetrization Postulate. The explanandum, i.e.,
that the phase factor can only be ±1 in equation 2.2.1, is logically deduced from the explanans,
the axioms of Quantum Mechanics retained in Bohmian Mechanics in conjunction with its
dynamical laws, granted that the indiscernibility of quantum particles is taken into account
by applying the permutation invariance requirement to the configuration space instead of the
observables. The axioms and laws of Bohmian Mechanics qualify as general covering laws,
and the permutation invariance requirement as an initial condition, inasmuch as it follows from
the fact that quantum particles are indiscernible. By contrast, in standard Quantum Mechanics
the explanation would fail, because the assertion made in the conclusion would contradict
a consequence of the premises, since the set of coincidence points that appear in the multiconnected topological space violates Fermi-Dirac statistics.
This is not the end of the story, however. As our reader might recall, the statement that the
eigenvalues of permutation operators should be ±1 is usually enforced in standard Quantum
Mechanics by imposing that unique rays in a Hilbert space are the only physically admissible
states. The very problem of the Symmetrization Postulate, indeed, is that it rules out by fiat
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those states that correspond to generalized rays, i.e., to collection of vectors satisfying the Indistinguishability Postulate. If the reduced configuration space was by itself restricting the possible values of the phase factor to ±1, then indeed one could consider the topological approach
as a better way to understand permutation invariance, if not as an explanation of the symmetry
requirements imposed on many-particle systems of identical particles. However, the reduced
space does not give you that alone. One has to decide how to quantize the multiply-connected
space obtained after the removal of singularities. As stressed by French and Krause (2006)
already, this quantization, and not the reduced space approach, is doing all the work in deriving the appropriate phase factor for excluding paraparticles, since the quantization procedure
actually imposes the same unique rays that we saw at play in standard quantum mechanics:
First, we introduce for each point x in the configuration space a corresponding onedimensional complex Hilbert space h x .[...] And we assume the state of the system
to be described by a continuum of vectors Ψ(x) ∈ h x [...]. That is, Ψ is assumed
to be a single-valued function over the configuration space, whose function value
Ψ(x) at the point x is a vector in h x (Leinaas and Myrheim 1977, 13).
What’s doing all the work here in the derivation of bosons and fermions statistics is the same assumption that was deemed ad hoc in the standard approach. Leinaas and Myrheim themselves
acknowledge this point when defining the permutation operator P̂ x in the reduced space: if the
vector h x is one-dimensional, P̂ x is just the phase factor P̂ x = eiγ , and γ will either be equal to
0 or to π. For a three-dimensional configuration space, one even needs an extra assumption,
that of enforcing the hermiticity of permutation operators — since the configuration space is
doubly connected for three dimensions, the one-dimensional quantization does not necessarily
yield the desired eigenvalues for permutation operators. In order to do that, one needs to guarantee that γ is independent of the point x, such that P x = P0x = P(x0 , x)P x P(x0 , x)−1 = eiγ10 ,
and imposing the hermiticity of P gives you exactly this result. The hermiticity of permutaP(x0 , x) is the linear operator that transports parallely the vectors of the one-dimensional Hilbert space h x into
H , along some curve joining x to x’.
10

x0
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tion operators in the topological approach guarantees their independence with respect to the
particles’ coordinates. Without these two extra-assumptions, not only parastatistics are back in
the formalism, but even more exotic statistics make an apparition -ambistatistics and fractional
ambistatistics (Imbo et al. 199011 ).
If the Symmetrization Postulate could not be an explanation of the symmetry dichotomy,
then it is hard to see how the topological approach, that relies on exactly the same assumptions,
could be one. The topological approach may have its own merits as a way to implement the requirement of permutation invariance, but cannot be an explanation to the questions formulated
above.
There is still an important lesson to be drawn from the topological approach. Leinaas
and Myrheim explicitly state that they want to provide a theoretical justification for the Symmetrization Postulate (1977, 1). But they also conceive the topological approach as a conceptually simpler way of formulating the problem, that is very much needed in order to find a
justification. Indeed, the authors insist that the “introduction of particles indices [...] brings
elements of nonobservable character into the theory and tends, therefore to make the discussion more obscure”(1977, 2). According to them, the redundancy appearing in the formalism
when one accepts states such as |ψ(p(x1 , ..., xN )|2 = |ψ(x1 , ..., xN )|2 is the root of the problem,
as it creates a distinction between two states while at the same time asserting some kind of
identity between them. In section 3.4, we will follow up on this idea that particle indices could
be symptomatic of a deeper conceptual problem.

3.3.3

Can the surplus structure strategy work?

Paraparticles are often described in the literature as superfluous structure, in two different
senses. In the physics literature, very often one sees the term “paraparticle” taken as just
another way of saying “bosons (fermions) with an extra hidden degree of freedom”. In other
11

Imbo et al. distinguishes three inequivalent statistics for three-dimensional configuration spaces: Bose, Fermi,
and ‘half-Bose half-Fermi’ statistics. The term ‘ambistatistics’ refers to the latter.
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words, a paraparticle theory and an ordinary particle theory are considered as equivalent theories that can both adequately describe the furniture of the world. We have criticized this use of
theoretical equivalence in chapter 1, since the notion of theoretical equivalence is an empty one
when not embodied in a fully fleshed out epistemological package, bringing together “a theory
of meaning, of evidence, of ontology, of truth, of explanation and of equivalence itself”12 into
a consistent whole. There is, however, another sense in which paraparticles could constitute
superfluous structure that we examine below.
In fact, we can consider that labelling identical particles introduces a redundancy in the formalism, as Leinaas and Myrrheim emphasized, since it confers a physical meaning to particle
permutation. However, if quantum particles are genuinely indiscernible, then there is no matter
of fact whether two particles are permuted or not. Thus, the Symmetrization Postulate would
simply be removing from the formalism the surplus structure created by these labels. In this
case, paraparticles would be a mere mathematical possibility induced by an arbitrary labeling,
and the Symmetrization Postulate would not require any theoretical justification. The concept
of surplus structure that underlies this reasoning is drawn from Redheads conceptualization
of surplus structure, that can be found in Redhead (1975). In this paper, Redhead analyzes
the mathematical formalization of a physical theory as an operation of embedding a physical
theory in a mathematical model: a theory T can be embedded in a mathematical structure M if
and only if there exists an isomorphism — a one-to-one structure preserving correspondence
— between T and a substructure M of M. Thus, when embedded, the physical theory inherits
a surplus structure from the complement of M in M, which allows many-to-one relations between the elements of the model in M and the states described by T. This surplus structure is
illustrated in Figure 1 below.
From the possibility of many-to-one relations between the mathematical elements and the
physical ones has been derived the idea that surplus structure manifests itself by the emergence
of multiple representations available for a unique physical state. Remember that the reason
12

See Sklar (1982), p. 90.
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Figure 3.1: Redhead’s representation of surplus structure. The theory T isomorphic to the
substructure M is embedded in the bigger model M’. Both the surplus structure elements —
black crosses — and the relations between these elements — green arrows — are inherited
from the surplus structure in M’.
traditionally offered for considering paraparticles as surplus structure is that the arbitrary labelling of indiscernible particles introduces a redundancy in the formalism. In the example
given in section 3.2 for instance, the mathematical state obtained by permuting particles differs
from the former only in a difference of labels – the physical system itself is left unchanged.
Thus, the state and the permuted state describe one and the same physical state, and differ only
in the choice of labels imposed on the subsystems. Choosing between these two states is only
a matter of convenience, and each of these states could be qualified as surplus structure. Such
an account of paraparticles can be found in Massimi (2005):

Thus, permutation invariance is itself playing a systematizing role in the quantum
mechanics framework in the sense of making the already known quantum statistics (Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein) follow from a more general group-theoretical
prescription that also discloses new symmetry types. This is an example of surplus
structure, to use Redheads terminology: a physical structure P (e.g. the quantum
statistical behaviour of an ensemble of indistinguishable particles) is not represented by the mathematical structure M (e.g. Fermi-Dirac an Bose-Einstein statistics) with a one-one structure-preserving map between P and M. Rather, P is repre-
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sented by a larger mathematical structure M (e.g. permutation invariance), hence a
surplus structure M-m (e.g. generalized rays) in the representation of P by means
of M (2005, 178).13

Despite its popularity, there are several issues with this account of non-symmetric and partially
symmetric states as surplus structure. In the definition of surplus structure seen above, the
main criterion to diagnose whether mathematical representations constitute surplus or not is
whether there are multiple ways to mathematically represent one and the same physical situation. However, there is no sense in which non-symmetric states and symmetric ones, or
partially symmetric states and fully symmetric ones can be considered as referring to one and
the same physical situation. As we saw in section 3.2.1, the Indistinguishability Postulate rules
out observables that do not commute with permutation operators precisely because these observables would admit states that are non-symmetric under permutation. In other words, it
would make a difference whether particle 1 is in state φ and particle 2 in state ψ or particle 1
in state ψ and particle 2 in state φ, thereby contradicting the very idea that these particles are
qualitatively identical. Non-symmetric states are those which make an observable difference,
and are therefore excluded as meaningless, or maybe even inconsistent, states. If particles are
indeed indiscernible, then those states should not be admitted as physically relevant states, or
then particles would not actually be indiscernible.
Now the problem becomes more subtle when it comes to partially-symmetric states, as
these states do satisfy the Indistinguishability Postulate. As a consequence of the theoretical
equivalence between paraparticles and bosons or fermions entertained in the Algebraic Quantum Field Theory literature, one can very often read the claim that a paraparticle state could be
as well replaced by a bosonic or fermionic state with an extra hidden degree of freedom, a claim
that keeps entertaining the idea that the mathematical representations for paraparticles and for
ordinary states correspond to one and the same physical situation. This claim, however, should
come as a shock when one remembers what paraparticle states allow, i.e., a violation of Pauli’s
13

One can find an equivalent account in French and Krause (2006) or French and Rickles (2003).
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principle. Two parafermions can occupy the same state, and such a fact has immediate physical consequences. If two electrons behave as parafermions instead of fermions for instance,
then the electronic configuration of the atoms to which they belong would differ dramatically,
along with its chemical properties. How could we then consider them as describing one and
the same physical state and the availability of two distinct mathematical representations as a
mere embarrassment of riches?
There are, to my eyes, two possible reasons that underlie such a claim, neither of which is
convincing. The first reason stems from the fact that proofs of equivalence were developed in
the context of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory (hereafter AQFT), as a way to prove the equivalence of the colour quark model and the parastatistics model. Since the motto of AQFT14 is
that the physical content of the theory is located in the abstract algebra of observables, and
that nothing of physical importance can be added by defining concrete operators on a Hilbert
space, statistics of all kinds were already dismissed as not belonging to the physical content of
the theory, but as some kind of redundancy merely making explicit what was already present
in the algebra of observables. This line of thought was even more prevalent after the publication of the Doplicher-Roberts theorem, whose aim was to show that the field algebra where
statistics are defined can be uniquely reconstructed from the algebra of observables. Thus,
proofs of equivalence were already based on the fact that parastatistics, and hence paraparticles obeying them, had no physical significance, and from this initial statement, were aiming at
deriving the conclusion that a bosonic/fermionic representation is merely a notational variant
of a parabosonic/fermionic one. Not only is this statement made in a very specific context, that
of Algebraic Quantum Field, whose tools are not easily transferable to any other models that
cannot be treated within AQFT, but it was based on the implicit premise that statistics have
no genuine physical significance and are superfluous once an algebra of observables is given.
Appealing to proofs of theoretical equivalence to argue that paraparticles describe the same
physical state as ordinary particles, and hence constitute surplus structure, is therefore begging
14

At least, the motto of the founding fathers of AQFT, i.e., Haag and Kaastler.
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the question.

Another reason that could explain why physicists are so eager to accept that paraparticles
are surplus structure could be that violations of Pauli’s principle such as the ones described
above have never been observed, despite experiments run at very high precision. If the only
way to observe a paraparticle is by observing a violation of Pauli’s principle, and such a violation does not happen, then it is easy to see why dismissing paraparticles has having no physical
significance would feel so natural. This conclusion yet would rely on a confusion between
the observation problem and the Symmetrization Postulate problem. If one takes paraparticles
seriously, i.e., as a physical possibility, and consequently attempts to observe them, the failure
to observe the consequences derived from the paraparticle hypothesis does not constitute evidence that paraparticles constitue surplus, but that the paraparticles program is refuted. One
cannot accept at the same time that paraparticles are surplus structure, given that they have
never been observed, and that paraparticles describe exactly the same state as ordinary particles. It would actually worsen the ‘ad hocness’ of the Symmetrization Postulate: the main
motivation for considering paraparticles as a physical possibility — and thus taking the observation problem seriously — is the argument that the conjunction of the formalism of Standard
Quantum Theory, complemented with the Indistinguishability Postulate and the plenitude principle, predict the existence of paraparticles. If the existence of paraparticles is then refuted, and
one had already committed themselves to these three premises, then there is something fundamentally wrong with the fact that partially symmetric states describing paraparticles appear so
naturally in the formalism, something that cannot be solved by simply adding the Symmetrization Postulate and justifying its introduction by the removal of surplus structure. Hence, the
theoretical equivalence developed in AQFT and the non-observation of paraparticles do not
constitute compelling reasons to consider partially symmetric states as surplus structure, and
the very definition of surplus structure furthermore excludes the possibility that non-symmetric
states describe the same physical situation as fully or partially symmetric ones.

3.4. Explaining or Unsaying?
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Explaining or Unsaying?

In section 3.3, I have detailed why I deny that the topological approach and the surplus structure strategy provide an explanation to the Symmetrization Postulate. In this section, I explore
a third hypothesis: that paraparticles in Standard Quantum Mechanics are neither surplus structure in the technical sense nor a physical (im)possibility, but an artifact of creating distinctions
between states that the theory has no resources to handle. In Quantum Mechanics, these artificial distinctions appear through the use of labels and their failure to uniquely fix a reference,
but labels only contingently signal a deeper conceptual problem — that of implementing the
indiscernibility of quantum particles through permutation invariance, i.e., that of requiring that
these states are distinct enough that talking about permuting them make sense while at the same
time asserting their qualitative identity. In section 4.1., I unpack the claim made in the Indistinguishability and the Symmetrization Postulates and evaluate how my hypothesis elucidates
the apparent logical gap between them, before reviewing in section 4.2. two possibilities for
what an appropriate answer to the questions created by the Symmetrization Postulate could be
on this basis. In section 3.4.3, I test my hypothesis in the context of Quantum Field Theory,
where no labels are used.

3.4.1

Paraparticles as artifacts

Imposing the Symmetrization Postulate, as we saw above, amounts to requiring that applying a
permutation operator twice gives you back the state you started with. From a conceptual point
of view yet, it comes as a surprise that such a requirement should be enforced: if one assumes
as a starting point that quantum particles are indiscernible, how could exchanging any number
of them possibly make a difference? A concrete example can help us elucidating this point.
Take three black marbles with exactly the same properties, on which you put a red, green
and blue sticker respectively, and place them in a jar. Thanks to the stickers, you can unambiguously describe the state you have — for instance, the red marble is on the left side, the green one
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in the upper middle, the blue one on the right. You know, however, that these stickers should
not make any physical difference when describing the properties of the marbles. Thus, after
shaking your jar and shuffling the marbles, you make sure to take into account this rule when
writing down the new state of your system: the marbles’ stickers are not a relevant physical
property, and any physical difference that seems to arise on the paper when you exchange two
particles is ultimately a result of you having put these stickers. In other words, what your rule
says is that, for all physical purposes, your marbles really are black. From a more formal point
of view, this means that any observable whose expectation values differ depending on whether
it is measured on the initial system or the shuffled one is not really a physical observable, but
an artificial construction built up from the colours you added.
Your rule, however, still maintains that there is a meaningful distinction to be drawn between a state in which marble X is on the left and marble Y on the right or vice-versa. These
states correspond to two distinct states in the possibility space that your configuration space
represents, but permutation invariance asserts that they are somehow one and the same state.
Because we can associate these marbles with a trajectory, and picture in our mind what a
permutation of two black marbles would look like, we can qualify more accurately what this
“somehow one and the same state” means in our example: these states are synchronically
identical but diachronically distinguishable. If one has access to the history of the states, and
follows the marbles’ trajectories, one can maintain the claim that these two states correspond
to two distinct possibilities despite their not making any measurable difference. If the initial
and final states are the only information one has access to both in fact and in principle, then the
distinction maintained in the permutation invariance requirement has no grounds anymore.
This is, I contend, the role of the Symmetrization Postulate: cancelling the distinction maintained in the permutation invariance requirement, based on the facts that when considering a
system of identical particles, the theory has no resources to handle this distinction. First, they
do not have a definite trajectory but randomly jump from a state to another. Second, particles
are not localized in the same sense as marbles. They do not occupy a definite region of space-
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time. Instead, the wave-function ψ x assigns a probability
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|ψ x |2 dx of finding the particle in

a given interval between x and dx, and these wave-packets can overlap. In our example, one
way to understand the Symmetrization Postulate is to assert that our three marbles are better
conceived as three drops of black ink: the number of drops is known — maybe a graduated
pipette was used to pour the drops in the jar, but once put in the jar, there is no point in considering the black ink it contains as a system with distinguishable parts that can be individually
referred to. Within our theory, there is no individuating property or individuating causal relation that allows to unambiguously determine the referent of these labels in this context. As a
consequence, labels should be momentarily neutralized.15
In sum, the need for two distinct postulates to implement the indiscernibility of quantum
particles is a mere acknowledgement of the fact that labelling an object is really making two
distinct assumptions:
• That of attaching a specific label to a particle. The Indistinguishability Postulate states
that, whatever the labels imposed on particles are, they should not make any physical
difference when systems of only identical particles are under study.
• That of asserting that particles are the kind of things that can be labelled. Note that this
assumption is not necessarily a metaphysical one, as argued by Redhead and Teller. It
is a claim about what your theory has the resources to handle or not. The Symmetrization Postulate is a statement that standard Quantum Mechanics does not have enough
structure to give a meaning to the distinction maintained in the permutation invariance
requirement, and that, as a consequence, from the point of view of its resources, two
states that only differ by a permutation of their indices are one and the same possibility.
Hence, the Symmetrization Postulate asserts that the indices i, j, k, that index the oneparticle state spaces Hi , H j , Hk from which the Hilbert space of the system as a whole
15

I am not arguing here that something went wrong in the construction of the Hilbert space that could have
been avoided. I am arguing, rather, that the size of the Hilbert space depends on an assumption that cannot be
dispensed with given the resources of Quantum Mechanics. I will show, in section 3.4.3, that switching to a
occupancy number representation faces exactly the same difficulty as long as the particle ontology is considered.
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has been built refer to one and the same possibility space.

Two remarks should be made before concluding this subsection. First, asserting that i =
j = k is making a claim about the state space of your system, not about the particles themselves. The cardinality of the system remains unaffected by such a claim. Since the state space
represents all possible states your system can be in, you are asserting that from the point of
view of your theory, points in Hi that only differ from points in H j by their indices constitutes
one unique possibility. This is not tantamount to saying that your system is not a two-particles
system.16 Consider our previous example of the three marbles with coloured stickers. Imposing the Indistinguishability Postulate on your system guarantees that colour cannot be used as
a physical observable, or be the basis of physical distinctions. However, you can still consider the three marbles as permutable entities, and list all the different states you can obtain by
permuting or transposing the marbles. Two transpositions will always give you the state your
started with back. But two permutations will not. If your permutation involves exchanging both
the red and the blue, and the blue and the green marbles, applying the same permutation twice
will not give you back your initial state. Starting with the initial state (red1 , blue2 , green3 ), and
applying the permutation operator P̂312 twice will give you (blue1 , green2 , red3 ) instead. The
Symmetrization Postulate does not state that there is only one particle in your system, but that
there is only one vector in the Hilbert space HN that can describe your state: the one that gives
your initial state back if you apply your permutation operator twice.
Second, our hypothesis is that paraparticles are a mere artifact of creating distinctions when
modelling one-particle states or many-particle states where particles are of different kinds in
a way that cannot be accounted for anymore when considering many-particle systems where
particles belong to the same family. In standard Quantum Mechanics, labels/indices are a
16

Imagine a story, told by a narrator now dead, about two soldiers. We know that the story involves two soldiers,
but they are only referred to using the pronoun ‘he’. The story relates what happened to these two soldiers after
their paths split, but does not give any information to differentiate who is the referential target of ‘he’ at any point.
Soldier A could as well be the hero of one part of the story, and soldier B of the other, or the other way around.
You can with no contradiction accept both the claim that there are indeed two soldiers and that, with no more
information available, the story in which A is responsible for x and B for y is not a distinct story from the one
where A is responsible for y and B for x.
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symptom of these artificial distinctions, but are not necessary for our hypothesis to be true.
Since this point is difficult to see in non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics, I will discuss in
section 3.4.3 the consequences of our hypothesis in Quantum Field Theory, where labels are
dispensed to begin with.

3.4.2

What does an explanation of the Symmetrization Postulate look
like?

In this subsection, I examine what a justification of the Symmetrization Postulate could be,
given our hypothesis. First, one could justify this postulate by adding extra structure to the
theory, in order to provide grounds for distinguishing permuted states. This answer, as we will
see, is not so much an explanation as a dissolution of the problem. Second, one can accept
that the Symmetrization Postulate is a mere acknowledgment that what we have said when
labelling one-particle state spaces must be unsaid in some specific contexts — in other words,
that it expresses a connection among the structure of a physical theory, its resources, and how
systems can be represented using these resources.
Let us consider first how supplementing the theory with some additional structure can adequately address the questions raised in 3.1. If my hypothesis is correct, then the Symmetrization
Postulate should no longer be needed in the extended theory. Granted that its role is merely
to deny that the distinction between two permuted states is a relevant one with respect to the
resources of the theory, then the adding of extra structure, precisely meant to provide such
resources, should make the Symmetrization Postulate dispensable, while at the same time not
reintroducing paraparticles. Such a strategy is exemplified by Bacciagaluppi’s derivation of the
postulate. Roughly speaking, his derivation consists of extending the Indistinguishability Postulate such that Bohmian trajectories fall within its scope, and showing that the added structure
of particles trajectories is enough to recover the symmetry requirements that the Symmetrization Postulate imposed by hand:
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Since pilot-wave theories include more structure than the standard formulation of
quantum mechanics, namely particle trajectories, it is now possible to formulate
stronger conditions of indistinguishability than merely requiring (2), and this will
allow us to derive all the standard symmetry properties for wavefunction (Bacciagaluppi 2003, 5).

Start with a wave-function defined in terms of its amplitude R and its phase S such that |ψi =
ReiS /~ . Since we know already from the Indistinguishability Postulate that the Hamiltonian
must be symmetric, the proof must show that S and R are symmetric at a given instant. If
the permutation invariance requirement is extended to the velocities of particles, such that the
velocity of particle 1 is equal to that of particle 2 when exchanged, then one obtains:
∇[S (x, y, t) − S (y, x, t)] = 0.

(3.8)

From 4.2.1 it follows that, except for the cases where S is undefined -i.e., when R=0-, if x=y,
then
S (x, y, t) = S (y, x, t) + γ(mod2π)

(3.9)

and γ=0 or π for all t. Bacciagaluppi then demonstrates (2003, 7) that from .9 the symmetry of
R follows, such that:
R(x, y, t) = R(y, x, t),

(3.10)

and then generalizes his proof to spinors.
We find ourselves here in the same case as with the three black marbles. The Indistinguishability Postulate guarantees that the labels attached to particles are not interpreted in such
a way that some properties could be built up from them and differentiate them. All physical
observables, including the well-defined position and velocities of these particles in Bohmian
mechanics, must commute with the permutation operator. But the Symmetrization Postulate
is not needed, because Bohmian mechanics has the resources to account for the distinction
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between the permuted states: even though these two states are indistinguishable from a synchronic point of view, they are not from a diachronic one, and there is an individuating property
that now uniquely fixes the reference of the labels. In a nutshell, the extension of the Indistinguishabilibility Postulate to velocities and positions guarantees that generalized rays would not
satisfy this postulate anymore.
Although this strategy is a perfectly sound one, it should not be taken as an explanation of
the fact that states representing identical particles must be fully (anti)symmetric under permutation. What this strategy does actually is to deny that particles are indiscernible. This helps
us realize what the deeper conceptual problem is with the topological approach presented in
section 3.2: it aims at solving a problem that Bohmian Mechanics does not have, with tools that
are not theirs. Bohmian Mechanics does not have a problem to begin with in explaining why
symmetric states are the only admissible, while the Indistinguishability postulate admits more
— the Indistinguishability Postulate does not admit more, when adequately extended such as
to include the extra structure postulated by Bohmian Mechanics. If Bacciagaluppi is right, then
partially symmetric states do not even arise in the formalism, without any need to appeal to the
topological approach. However, using the same tools as standard Quantum Mechanics, i.e.,
ruling out paraparticles through the standard quantization procedure, is ad hoc in the context
of Bohmian Mechanics, for Bohmian Mechanics already has enough structure to dispense with
such a requirement. Bohmian Mechanics simply cannot assert that the distinction made in the
permutation invariance is groundless and needs to be neutralized.
As a result, defenders of Bohmian Mechanics cannot argue that their theory has a greater
explanatory power than standard Quantum Mechanics based on their explanation of the Symmetrization Postulate only. At best, defenders of Bohmian Mechanics can claim that the Symmetrization Postulate is not necessary in this specific theoretical framework, and make explicit
the relationship between the structure of the theory, the observables it admits, and the consequences of modifying the scope of the Indistinguishability Postulate. Furthermore, the addition
of extra structure will not find any justification within physics, but either in a metaphysical
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claim about the individuality of quantum particles or about their point-like nature, or in an
philosophical claim about what a physical theory should be like — for instance, that the theory
should be complete in a sense satisfying the EPR argument.
Another way to address the problem of justifying the Symmetrization Postulate is to simply
admit that, given the structure of standard Quantum Mechanics, consequences of labels must be
locally removed when the theory does not provide any individuating condition uniquely fixing
their reference. This denial can be understood in two ways: either as a metaphysical assumption
that particles are not the kind of things that can bear a name, or — and more interestingly to
my eyes — as a linguistic statement. In that case, the postulate is simply stating that we do not
have any theory of reference that can allow the use of labels when studying systems of identical
particles, for no individuating condition is available that could unambiguously fix the reference
of these labels. Thus, the Symmetrization Postulate simply is a way to circumscribe the use
of labels to situations where the differentiation operated by labels can be accounted for, and
to deny their use when it becomes illegitimate. From that point of view, the Symmetrization
Postulate is not ad hoc: it is a mere acknowledgement of the structure of standard Quantum
Mechanics, of its resources, and of when some distinctions that have been introduced become
meaningless. In other words, the Symmetrization Postulate is an acknowledgment of which
systems can be represented using labels or indices and which cannot, based on the structure of
the theory itself — the physical quantities it admits and the relations among them.

3.4.3

Proof-of-the-case: how paraparticles arise in Quantum Field Theory

In section 3.4, I have argued that paraparticles in standard Quantum Mechanics are artifacts,
only appearing in the formalism because of the lack of resources to distinguish between permuted states within the theory. Since paraparticles arise not only in Quantum Mechanics, but
also in Quantum Field Theory, the latter gives us a good opportunity to test our hypothesis. If
paraparticles are indeed artifacts of how systems are modelled in quantum theories, we should
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be able to trace back the origin of paraparticles in Quantum Field Theory in a similar manner.
In Quantum Field Theory (hereafter QFT), statistics can be encoded in two ways: either by
encoding them in creation and annihilation operators, or by encoding them in field operators.17
These two ways of encoding statistics differ in what they consider to be the bearer of statistics.
In the first case, clearly, particles do this job, as statistics are encoded in the operators that
create and annihilate particle-states. In the second case, no reference to particles is made or
needed: fields bear statistics and are either bosonic or fermionic, depending on whether they
commute or anti-commute at space-like separation. I will argue that introducing statistics in
Quantum Field Theory through creation and annihilation operators leads to exactly the same
situation as in Quantum Mechanics: given that Quantum Field Theory has no resources to
distinguish between particles-states created or annihilated by these operators, maintaining a
distinction between them through permutation invariance generates artificial statistics in the
form of trilinear commutation rules.
Let us consider first the role of creation and annihilation operators. At the energy scale described by Quantum Field Theory, the number of particles considered does not remain constant
— particles can be created and annihilated. Thus, one has to define creation and annihilation
operators â†k and âk that will act on the vacuum state |0i so as to create or annihilate particles
with momentum k. Introducing operators in Quantum Field Theory amounts to providing a
representation of observables that satisfy Heisenberg equations of motion
δµ φ(x) = i[Pµ , φ(x)],

(3.11)

where Pµ is the total energy-momentum 4-vector for the field φ(x); and allows for the expansion
of fields in terms of positive and negative frequencies components:
φ(x) =

X

a(+k)φ+ (x) + a† (−k)φ− (x)

(3.12)

k
17

For a more detailed introduction to statistics in Quantum Field Theory, see the first chapter of Bain (2016)
and Greenberg (1998), by which this section is inspired.
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where φ ± (x) represents a complete set of orthonormal functions with positive and negativefrequency components. The relativistic 4-momentum is expressed in terms of creation and
annihilation operators in the following way:
Pµ =

X

Pµk [a† (k), a(k)].18

(3.13)

k

The scheme of quantization, i.e., the commutation rules, guarantees that the proper relations
hold between the terms φ(x), a(p), a† (p) and Pµ . Commutation rules must satisfy the equations of motion while at the same time making sure that creation and annihilation operators
respect the symmetry requirement defined for bosons and fermions; i.e., that creation and annihilation operators that (anti)commute will create or annihilate many-particle states that are
(anti)symmetric under the permutation of single-particle substates; and that the order in which
particles are put in states (k) or (k’) does not make any difference. This is what is achieved by
the ordinary bilinear commutation rules imposed on creation and annihilation operators:

1
{a(k) , a(l)} = δkl
2

[a(k), a(l)] = 0
h
i 1
a(k)† , a(l) = δkl
2

for fermions,

for bosons.

{a(k), a(l)} = 0
†

(3.14)

Here is the problem however. As shown by Green (1953), these commutation rules can be
generalized into trilinear commutation rules that also satisfy Heisenberg equations of motion:

[a(k), [a(l), a(m)]] = 0
h
h
ii 1
a(k), a(l)† , a(m) = pδkl a(m)
2

18

[a(k), [a(l), a(m)]] = 0
n
oi 1
h
a(k), a(l)† , a(m) = pδkl a(m).
2

This relation holds for bosons. Commutators must be replaced by anticommutators for fermions.

(3.15)
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As was the case in non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics, these commutation rules correspond
to a para-statistical behavior that is not observed in nature, but should be if one accepts the
principle of plenitude. The imposition of bilinear commutation rules, therefore, seems as ad
hoc as the Symmetrization Postulate appeared at first sight. Notice that again, distinctions are
made that the theory has no resources to handle: the “particles” that are created and annihilated are quanta of excitation in fields, i.e., chunks of energy ~ωk that are indistinguishable
in the same way that quantum particles were indistinguishable. In other words, there is no
predicate or quality that can account for the distinction between a(k) and a(l) when k = l,
as is the case when considering identical particles. The distinction maintained between those
two annihilation operators in the commutator that defines them does not rely on any physical
grounds. Generalized vectors were obtained in standard Quantum Mechanics by combining
vectors describing states that the theory has no resource to distinguish. Likewise, generalized
commutation rules obtain from combining operators describing the creation or annihilation of
particles that Quantum Field Theory has no resource to distinguish. Hence, the equations of
motions could equally well be satisfied by fermionic creation and annihilation operators such
as the following

â†i â†j + â†j â†i = 0

(3.16)

âi â†j + â†j âi = δi j
or, as shown by Green (1953), by parafermionic operators as defined below:

â†i â†j â†k + â†k â†j â†i = 0
â†i â j âk

+

âk â j â†i

(3.17)

= δi j ak

âi â†j âk + âk â†j âi = δi j ak + δk j ai .

Now contrast this case with the second way of encoding statistics in field operators, that
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which can be seen at play in Wightman’s axiomatic Quantum Field theory. Field operators
φ† (x) and φ(x) are constructed from a linear combination of operators and act on the real
space: they create and annihilate particles localized at particular spatial locations. In that
case, quanta are not only defined by their momentum as they were above, but also by their
coordinates. Thus, encoding statistics in field operators guarantees that particle-states created
by field operators are always given a unique description in terms of their coordinates that
distinguish them from other particle-states. It does so through a locality principle, according
to which fields either commute or anti-commute, depending on whether they are bosonic or
fermionic:
[φ(x), φ† (y)]∓ = 0, for spacelike (x-y).

(3.18)

The commutativity of fields at spacelike separated points makes the theory relativistic, in that
it implements the prohibition of superluminal signals. 3.18 is slightly stronger than mere local
commutativity, in that it also acts as a definition: fields that commute are bosonic, and fields
that anti-commute are fermionic–although nothing is said about a possible relation between
spin and statistics. Now, the equation 3.14 that was excluding parastatistics by hand in the
first approach follows from this statistics-locality assumption, once a Fock space is given, and
paraparticles are naturally excluded.19
Does it follow from this that Wightman’s approach has a greater explanatory power than,
say, Weinberg’s or the Lagrangian approach, as it excludes paraparticles? The reader will
probably anticipate my answer here: the two approaches do not address the same problem.
In the latter, equation 3.14 introduces bilinear commutation rules among creation and annihilation operators as a way to implement the permutation invariance of single-particle states
within many-particles states. By contrast, Wightman’s approach dispenses with any reference
to particles and introduces statistics for fields operators, where statistics do not refer to the
behavior of particles under permutation; but to the independence of fields that are spacelike
separated. 3.18, therefore, is genuinely a locality principle, as it follows from the restrained
19

See Bain (2016), chapter 1.
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Lorentz invariance of time-ordered functions and of Wightman’s functions. 3.14, by contrast,
becomes a locality principle — usually referred to as a “causality” principle — only when
bilinear observables are constructed from the creation and annihilation operators. As emphasized by Greenberg (1998), the spin-theorems that can be built from these assumptions are also
distinct theorems and distinct ontological claims:
I have two purposes in this note. The first is to make clear the difference between
the spin-statistics theorem: particles that obey Bose statistics must have integer
spin and particles that obey Fermi statistics must have odd half-integer spin, and
what I suggest should be called the spin-locality theorem: fields that commute at
spacelike separation must have integer spin and fields that anti-commute at spacelike separation must have odd half-integer spin (Greenberg 1998, 144).

3.5

Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined arguments to the effect that Bohmian mechanics should be privileged over its empirically equivalent rivals based on its ability to explain the Symmetrization
Postulate. Neither this strategy nor its denial, based on the claim that paraparticles are surplus structure, were found to be satisfactory answers to the question of why states describing
systems of identical particles should be fully symmetric or antisymmetric. As a result, I have
suggested to change our perspective on the problem and to ask instead how can systems be
represented given the resources offered by the structure of Quantum Mechanics. More specifically, I have argued that the Symmetrization Postulate should be understood as the statement
that, when it comes to systems of identical particles, Quantum Mechanics lacks the resources
needed to unambiguously determine the reference of a label, and that the distinction between
two distinct states maintained in the very idea of permutation invariance must be erased. Similarly, in Quantum Field Theory, particle states are abstract entities that the theory has no
resource to distinguish, therefore generating artificial relationships among particle creating
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operators than cannot be uniquely determined. From the point of view of the structure of the
theory, we can now understand 1) why the explanatory strategy in this case is neither genuinely
explanatory nor in a position to convince rival approaches, as committed to additional structure
whose introduction can only be justified by metaphysical or philosophical assumptions; 2) how
paraparticles artificially emerge from an implicit assumption made in the permutation invariance requirement, i.e., that a distinction can be maintained between two states only differing
by a permutation of labels, 3) that the Symmetrization Postulate is a mere acknowledgement
of this referential ambiguity: when it comes to systems of identical particles, the reference of
labels is no longer uniquely defined and the consequences of these labels must therefore be
neutralized.

Chapter 4
On Robustness in Cosmological
Simulations
4.1

Introduction

The standard ΛCDM cosmological model describes a very nearly homogeneous early universe,
where very small density inhomogeneities evolve with time through gravitational collapse to
form the large-scale structures we now observe. An essential component of this cosmological
model is a rather mysterious kind of matter called ‘dark matter’, that only interacts gravitationally. Whereas the collapsing of ordinary, baryonic matter is opposed by the outward radiation
pressure of photons, dark matter is not opposed by such a force and starts collapsing in dark
matter haloes earlier than ordinary matter, thus providing the scaffolding where stars can merge
with gas and form galaxies, cluster of galaxies, and all the large-scale structures of the universe.
Properties of dark matter are mostly unknown, beyond the fact that it must be dissipationless1 and that it cannot be hot. Hot dark matter is made of particles moving at relativistic speed,
whose speed would permit their escaping from the small density inhomogeneities and to wash
1

If dark matter were to convert its kinetic energy in photons radiation, then the same radiation pressure that
prevents the collapse of baryonic matter would halt its collapsing and structure formation would happen way later
than observed.
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any small scales fluctuations out. In such a scenario, only the bigger lumps would survive and
the large-scale structures would form earlier than galaxies, born from the fragmentation of the
latter, in contradiction with our observations of the universe. Cold dark matter, on the other
hand, is made of more massive particles, whose non-relativistic speed is compatible with the
survival of lumps at small scales. Such a scenario, based on cold dark matter, predicts with
great accuracy the statistics of hierarchical clustering: mass function and clustering of dark
matter haloes, their evolution with redshift, the non-linear evolution of the dark matter power
spectrum, correlation functions, or the topological properties of large-scale structures. However, while the Cold Dark Matter (hereafter CDM) model is well supported by evidence on
large scales, it does not fare as well on small scales, where simulations fail to reproduce the
observed abundance and demographics of dark matter haloes structure. Since different models
of dark matter such as cold, warm, or self-interacting dark matter agree on large-scale, but differ precisely on their predictions about the structure of dark matter haloes, understanding how
mass is distributed in the haloes is crucial for determining the nature of dark matter. At such a
scale though, only numerical approaches to determining what a hypothesis implies for haloes’
mass distribution are possible. Non-linear effects related to star formation and gas dynamics
make it impossible to determine the halo mass distribution analytically. Hence, numerical simulations are needed to determine the mass distribution; and these simulations are a crucial part
of evaluating the CDM model and various rival hypotheses.
Understanding in which case a simulation can succeed in (dis)confirming a model is, however, still a challenge in cosmology. As mentioned, dark matter models differ on their predictions with respect to the haloes’ structure. On small scales, the CDM model seems to do worse
than its rivals: simulations predict, for instance, much more substructure within dark matter
haloes than is actually observed. Prior to 1998, however, the problem was the exact inverse;
simulated dark matter haloes did not present enough substructure compared to observations.
When a model has been shown to be so sensitive to modelling assumptions, what is the conclusion that should be drawn from a mismatch between simulation outcomes and observations?
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How can we assess whether the missing satellite problem stems from numerical artifacts or
constitutes a genuine failed prediction?

In biology and climate science, evaluation of when evidence confirms a model and in what
sense this confirmation must be understood has been based on robustness analysis (Levins
1966; Wimsatt 1981/2012; Weisberg 2006 and Weisberg 2012). In cosmology, astrophysicists
have been relying on a methodology similar to robustness analysis, in which results that resist a
change of values of the numerical parameters or the use of different codes are considered trustworthy. In this paper, I will argue that robustness is not a sufficient criterion for determining
when a prediction is reliable in N-body simulations, for simulations can be made to converge
on mutually exclusive sets of results. Even more worrying, numerical artifacts can generate
robustness, inasmuch as they can turn a specific result into an attractor solution, on which all
simulations, regardless of coding choices, will unavoidably converge. As a result, I propose
another methodology, that of crucial simulations, meant to put the numerical or physical origin
of a prediction under a crucial test.

In 4.2, I introduce the reader to the fundamentals of N-body simulations and to the way
robustness analysis is used to assess the physical significance of their outcomes. Section 4.3
offers two arguments against a first kind of robustness analysis that astrophysicists have dubbed
‘convergence studies’, which consists of looking for a region in the parameter space where
outcomes of simulations are independent from the value assigned to numerical parameters.
Section 4.4 extends this criticism to a possible other instance of robustness analysis, based on
the search for robust predictions across different codes. Finally, in section 4.5, I present the
methodology of crucial simulations and suggest to re-direct the use of code comparisons, in
order to extract from them hypotheses to test in crucial simulations.
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Robustness and Convergence Studies

In this section, I introduce the methodology used by astrophysicists for evaluating the trustworthiness of a simulation outcome and justify the subsumption of these so-called ‘convergence
studies’ under the broader concept of robustness analysis. Based on the work of van den Bosch
and Ogiya and Baushev et al., I highlight the limits of convergence and its failure to deliver
what it is supposed to: a reliable indicator of when predictions can be trusted to be physical
predictions, as opposed to numerical artifacts.

4.2.1

The methodology of N-body simulations in cosmology

N-body simulations have first been used in the 1970’s in order to study whether gravity alone
could be responsible for the formation of clusters of galaxies. The simulation of the gravitational collapse of a cloud of 300 particles detailed in Peebles 1970 was considered the first
realistic simulation of cosmic structure formation. N-body simulations can be used to represent the temporal evolution of cosmic structure at large-scale–the so-called ‘cosmological
simulations’–2 or the evolution of individual dark matter haloes–or ‘zoom-in’ simulations–,
with initial conditions generated in accordance with the parameters defining the ΛCDM model.
The distribution of particles depends on the problem to solve. If the simulation is a cosmological one, then the distribution of particles will be nearly homogeneous and particles will have
the same mass. If the intent is to simulate a smaller region with higher resolution, then many
small particles will be distributed in the region of interest, with a few large ones in the rest of
the volume. The evolution of the distribution of particles is then treated using a conjunction
of the collisionless Boltzmann equations for dark matter particles and the Poisson equation for
the gravitational potential.
The way gravitational forces are calculated differ from one code to another. In Peebles
1970, these forces were calculated using direct summation, i.e., by summing up all contribu2

See for instance the Millenium, the Bolshoi or Illustris simulations.
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tions from all particles. These codes are sometimes called Particle-Particle codes. This technique is almost abandoned nowadays, given its computational cost–the number of operations
needed to calculate the forces scales as N 2 . One can, instead of summing the contributions of
all particles, appeal to a Particle-Mesh code using a three-dimensional mesh covering the cubic
domain of the simulation. The idea is simple: calculate the density field for every node of the
mesh, using a technique called Cloud-in-Cell density assignment3 ; solve the Poisson equation
for the gravitational potential; advance velocities, coordinates and time and repeat for every
time step. This code not only discretizes the time but also the space by covering the domain
of the simulation with a mesh. The advantage of Particle-Mesh methods is that the resolution
can be increased wherever needed by adapting the mesh size and placing smaller cubic cells
in the regions of interest. This technique is known as ‘Adaptative Mesh Refinement’. Another
popular way of calculating gravitational forces resides in tree-codes, that do not calculate the
contribution of individual particles or the field density but instead group particles hierarchically and replace individual contributions with a single multipole force for the whole group.
An oct tree algorithm is used to group particles, based on a given threshold per cell–e.g., if the
threshold is one particle per cell, and the number of particles in a cell exceeds this number then
the cell will split into smaller cubic cells, and so on until each cell contains only one particle.
Once the tree is constructed and the information relative to mass distribution stored in each
cell, forces are found by testing, for each cell of size l, whether the opening angle θ = l/d is
greater than a specified threshold. In this case the force contributions from the cell are ignored
and the cell ‘opens’, so that the opening angles of the cell’s children are tested instead (see
figure 1). The force contribution from the cell is accepted once the opening angle is smaller
than the specified threshold. The idea is to treat individually only the nearest particles, while
the distant ones are treated collectively, as a group, to diminish the overall computational cost.
For each of these codes, there are essentially four purely numerical parameters that need to
3

The rough idea of the Cloud-in-Cell technique is to calculate the distance between the center of the mesh
cells and the particle and to assign, based on this distance, a weighted fraction of the total particle mass to the
nearest 2, 4 or 8 mesh cell centers.
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Figure 4.1: An example of particle grouping algorithms for TREE codes from Klypin 2017.
The red dashed lines show the opening angle θ for a particle close to the centre and a given cell
(the blue square).
be calibrated:
• The mass resolution N p , which refers to the number of particles used in the simulation;
• The time-step ∆t: the N-body problem in astrophysics consists of solving the Newtonian
equations of motions and finding the velocities and coordinates of a number N of massive
particles only interacting through Newtonian gravity, given their initial coordinates and
velocities. If ri and mi are the coordinates and masses of the particles, then the equations
of motion that must be integrated are:
r̈i = −G

N
X
m j (ri − r j )
j=1,i, j

|ri − r j |3

(4.1)

In the simplified case4 where one would use Euler integration method to find the new coordinates ri of the ith particle ri (t + ∆t) = ri (t) + ∆tvi (t), then the time-step ∆t is simply the
time step between the initial time and the later time at which coordinates and velocities
must be found.
• The force accuracy θ: the accuracy of the force computation has a distinct meaning
4

In real simulations, Euler integrator is never used because of its low accuracy. Rather, a second-order integration scheme called ‘Leapfrog’ is used. See Klypin 2017, section 4 for a detailed discussion of both integrators
and their merits.
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depending on the codes. In a tree code, it corresponds to the opening angle θ above
which force contributions are ignored. In a Particle-Mesh code, it corresponds to the size
of the grid.
• The force softening : real dark matter particles are substituted by heavy particles, which
means that gravitational forces can generate very large, unphysical accelerations when
two particles get very close to each other. Force softening is used to smooth the gravitational potential and suppress these accelerations below a typical distance–the ‘softening
length’. Like force accuracy, force softening has a different meaning for different codes:
mesh codes define softening based on the size of the cell elements, while tree codes use
a method referred to as ‘Plummer softening” and replace the distance ∆ri2j = |ri − r j | in
equation 2.1.1 with the expression (∆ri2j +  2 )1/2 .

4.2.2

What is robustness analysis?

Ever since the 1970’s, simulations based on the Cold Dark Matter model have been incredibly
successful in reproducing the observed structure of the universe at large scale. In 1982 for
instance, the remarkable match between the first extensive 3D galaxy survey and the outcomes
of large-scale simulations was considered a huge success for the CDM model and largely contributed to abandoning its hot dark matter rival (Frenk and White 2012). Almost 50 years
after this first attempt at a ‘realistic’ N-body simulation, simulations still constitute an indispensable tool in order to extract predictions from dark matter models about the distribution
and properties of clusters of galaxies. With a close difference: simulations now benefit from
faster processors, parallel-computing methods, increased computational power allowing to run
simulations exceeding 106 particles and to model dark matter but also baryonic components
such as gas, stars, supermassive black holes and their energetic feedback. As a result, it has
become more and more difficult to track the causal contributions of distinct components of
the simulations–e.g,the physical model implemented, the numerical parameters, the gravity
solver, the integration algorithm–, and to determine what conclusion should be drawn from
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mismatches between observations and simulation outcomes.
As mentioned in the introduction however, the CDM model faces a number of problems
at small scale. It predicts for instance way more substructure in a dark matter halo of the
size of the Milky Way than is actually observed. Only 59 satellite galaxies5 seem to orbit our
Milky Way, whereas several thousands of them are predicted by the CDM model–hence the
name of “missing satellite” problem. Likewise, the density profile drawn from this model by
Navarro, Frenk and White predicts a steep, cuspy profile in the central region of dark matter
haloes, with an infinite density at the center. Yet, observations favor a ‘cored’ profile, with a
more shallow, flatter density profile as the radius tends toward zero. Observations for dwarf
and low-surface-brightness galaxies are especially problematic, not only because the NavarroFrenk-White (hereafter NFW) profile is supposed to be a universal density profile, but more
importantly because these galaxies are mostly made of dark matter, which means that this discrepancy will not easily be washed away by adding more baryonic physics to the simulations.
6

Given that the predictions made by the CDM model are not drawn from first principles, but
from analytical fits to dark matter-only simulations, assessing the extent to which these two
problems challenge this model is a very difficult task to undertake. How can we assess whether
the discrepancy between the simulated systems and the observed ones stems from the physical
model at play or from an erroneous code? How can we determine whether the simulated outcome is altered by numerical artifacts or constitutes a genuine failed prediction? Astrophysicists have been heavily relying on robustness analysis in order to decide when the outcome of a
simulation is reliable. Robustness analysis has been famously suggested by Levins in 1966 as
a way to assess the trustworthiness of models in population biology in the absence of a background theory providing analytically soluble equations, while appreciating the complexity of
5

The discovery of the two dwarf galaxies Carina∼II and ∼III in January 2018 and of the low-surface-brightness
galaxy Antlia 2 in November 2018 brings the current number of observed satellite galaxies to 59. See Torrealba
et al. 2018a and Torrealba et al. 2018b.
6
In this paper, I will focus only on these two problems, given that they constitute prime discriminators for
understanding the nature of dark matter. More exhaustive reviews of all the controversies arising at small scale
for the CDM model can be found in Weinberg et al. 2015 and Bullock and Boylan-Kolchin 2017.
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the many parameters to take into account. Since models have to be simplified to get predictions to measure against nature, a method must be developed in order to evaluate the impact
of these simplifications and to determine “whether a a result depends on the essentials of the
model or on the details of the simplifying assumptions” (Levins 1966, 423). This is the role
played by robustness analysis, which consists of addressing the same problem with a diversity
of models relying on different simplifications, so as to test the agreement of these models on
their predictions and to confirm the independence of the latter from the simplifications made:
(...) [I]f these models, despite their different assumptions, lead to similar results
we have what we can call a robust theorem which is relatively free of the details of
the model. Hence our truth is the intersection of independent lies (1966, 423).
Levins’s account seems to rely on a kind of eliminative reasoning, although not explicit, that
exposes it to a famous criticism first formulated in Orzack and Sober 1993. Indeed, each of
the three models considered by Levins to assess the reliability of the proposition “In an uncertain environment species will evolve broad niches and tend toward polymorphism” excludes
a specific possibility: the first two make distinct modelling choices to represent the diversity
of environments and its relationship to fitness, but ignore the impact of genetics that the third
takes into account. According to Orzack and Sober however, the robustness reasoning will
yield valid inferences if and only if an exhaustive set of all possible models is examined, and
such an exhaustivity is excessively difficult to achieve.
In 1981, Wimsatt further strengthened the notion of robustness analysis by making explicit
the procedure underlying this analysis. According to Wimsatt, the robustness of something–
be it a property, an experimental result, or a prediction–is determined through the following
four-steps procedure:
• To analyze a variety of independent derivation, identification, or measurement processes.
• To look for and analyze things which are invariant over or identical in the
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conclusions or results of these processes.

• To determine the scope of the processes across which they are invariant and
the conditions on which their invariance depends.

• To analyze and explain any relevant failures of invariance.

This definition includes the use of different assumptions to build models deriving the same
result, but also “using different experimental procedures to verify the same empirical relationships or generate the same phenomenon”, or “using different sensory modalities to detect the
same property or entity”. According to Wimsatt, robustness analysis is defined through the
following three principles: first, it is a procedure aiming at distinguishing the “reliable from
the unreliable”, and second, it requires to show the invariance of that which reliability is scrutinized over different processes or models, in order to build confidence in their independence
from these; and finally to determine the scope of this invariance. Eliminative reasoning seems
absent from Wimsatt’s account, inasmusch as the ensemble of models is not constructed in
such a way that each of them excludes a possibility. The robustness of a property is justified
through its overdetermination by independent models, but not by the exclusion of all possible
sources of artifacts. Although this independence needs be qualified, such an account does not
require to consider all possible models; but only that models are independent ‘in an appropriate
way’. In what follows, I will consider any procedure satisfying these Wimsattian features an
instance of robustness analysis.7

7

More recently, Weisberg (2012) has been building on Levins’ account and suggested a two-step procedure
for searching robust theorems. This two steps involve, first, examining a group of similar but distinct models,
searching for a common result deemed the ‘robust property’; then finding the core structure giving rise to the
robust property. However, the lack of modularity exhibited by simulations in cosmology undermines any attempt
to find the common structure responsible for the common property, and the subsequent formulations of a robust
theorem. Such a search requires to develop a fully fleshed out methodology to gain some modularity back or
to overcome the lack thereof. For this reason, I will leave aside Weisberg’s work and focus on Wimsatt-based
definitions of robustness.
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Robustness analysis and Convergence Studies

Robustness analysis transferred into astrophysics takes the form of ‘convergence studies’.
Given that cosmological parameters such as the matter density parameter Ωm , the dark energy
density parameter Ωλ , the Hubble constant H0 , the scalar spectral index n s , and the amplitude
of the power spectrum σ8 are constrained by the observations from WMAP and the Planck
collaboration (see Dunkley et al. 2009 and Planck et al. 2014), the idea behind convergence
studies is to explore the role of the unconstrained four numerical parameters listed in 2.1.
More precisely, it is to define the conditions under which the structure of a simulated halo does
not depend on the value assigned to these purely numerical parameters and can thus be deemed
‘appropriately resolved’.
One of the most influential convergence studies is that of Power et al. 2003, which contributed to set up the parametrization of N-body simulations for the last fifteen years. Their
methodology can be summarized as follows: first, they derived scalings between numerical
parameters from analytic estimates, in order to constrain the parameter space. An example of
this scaling is the following. Artificial discreteness effects, due to the limited number N of
simulated particles, requires the number of time-steps ∆t to increase as the value of the force
softening  gets smaller. As a consequence, efforts to limit the computational power cost dictates the use of large softenings, in order to limit the number of time-steps needed. On the
other hand, large softening jeopardizes the spatial resolution of the simulations. Thus, the relationship between N, ∆t and  is such that an optimal value of  must be found to reduce
the computational cost while limiting discreteness effects and preserving the spatial resolution.
The following constraints on these parameters are drawn from this scaling analysis:
• The time-step must be shorter than the orbital timescale: tcirc (r) ≥ 15(N∆−5/6
tcirc (r200 ),
t
where ∆t is the total number of timesteps, tcirc = 2πr/Vc (r) the circular orbit timescale,
and r200 the virial radius, the radius of a sphere of mean density contrast 200. This
criterion applies under the condition that the force softening value guarantees that particle
√
discreteness effects are negligible, i.e., that  ≥ 4r200 / N200 , where N200 is the number
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of particles contained within the virial radius.

• Enough particles must be enclosed so that the average two-body relaxation timescale
within the region trelax = (r/Vc (r))N(r)/(8lnΛC ) is comparable to the age of the universe
t0 .

.
Then, they simulated a large cosmological volume with low resolution, tracking the structure growth seeded by Gaussian primordial density fluctuations up to redshift z = 0,before
zooming-in on targeted haloes and re-simulating them at much higher resolution. Once they
obtained a sample of haloes, several hundreds of simulations (typically with a resolution of 323
particles) were run, allowing to survey the reduced parameter space by systematically varying
the numerical parameters, draw preliminary convergence results, further refine the convergence
criteria and finally confirm these convergence with another series of simulation of higher mass
resolution –a series of run with 643 particles, and a few (given how expensive they are) run
with 1283 and 2563 particles. Granted that the convergence criteria guaranteeing that the mass
profile of the halo is reliably resolved are satisfied, if in this region of the parameter space the
predictions–in this case, the circular velocity as a function of the radius–remains the same despite the increased resolution, then one can be confident that they are independent of the values
assigned to the numerical parameters and thus not affected by it. As robustness was a guarantee of the independence of the property or prediction from the specifics of the experimental
techniques or models used, likewise, the convergence of the simulated profile is supposed to
warrant its independence of the numerical parameters and thus confirm that “the mass profiles
are unlikely to be affected by numerical artifacts” (Navarro 2003, 4).
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Figure 4.2: An example of converged circular velocity profiles for dark matter haloes from
Navarro 2003. The profiles are plotted for a large number of converged runs with different
resolutions and interpreted by the author as “roughly independent of the number of particles”
(p. 9, figure 3) and thus confirming the reliability of the NFW profile.
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Against Convergence
Convergence is necessary but not sufficient

Predictions extracted from the ΛCDM model via N-body simulations are taken to be reliable
when it comes to the amount of substructure that should be observed in dark matter haloes.
The main reason underlying this confidence is that, as one should expect given the above,
these predictions resist convergence studies really well above a resolution of 50-100 particles
per subhalo and seem not significantly affected by an increase on resolution above this limit.
Springel et al. 20088 for instance, followed a methodology very similar to Power et al. 2003:
starting with a simulation of halo formation with a very large periodic box, they targeted haloes
for re-simulation at higher and higher resolution, in order to assess whether the substructure
would be affected by a change of resolution. The negative answer, according to them, forces
some really strong conclusions upon us:
The results presented above demonstrate that we have created a remarkably accurate set of simulations, reaching very good convergence for the dark matter density
profile and the substructure mass function over the maximum range that could be
expected. Even the location, mass and internal structure of individual large dark
matter subhaloes reproduce well between simulations of differing resolution, a
level of convergence which exceeds anything previously reported in the literature
(2008, 1709).
As briefly mentioned in the introduction however, the amount of substructure predicted in dark
matter host haloes is extremely sensitive to modelling assumptions. Up to the close of the
last century, simulations were suffering from an ‘overmerging’ problem, in that not enough
substructure was predicted to match the observations. Several culprits had been proposed by
then, with no consensus on the exact cause of the subhaloes disruption, but with an agreement
on the numerical nature of the most likely responsible. Moore et al. 1995 and Klypin et al. 1999
8

See also Onions et al. 2012, Knebe et al. 2013, or Griffen et al. 2016.
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blamed inadequate force softening. Carlberg 1994 and van Kampen 1995, on the other hand,
argued that a low mass resolution could cause two-body heating and artificially enhance matter
disruption. Since this problem was eventually superseded by a ‘missing satellite’ problem as
the resolution of simulations increased, no definitive conclusion was drawn about what exactly
was causing the overmerging. Yet, as shown in van den Bosch et al. 2017, subhaloes disruption
is still “extremely prevalent in modern simulations, with inferred fractional disruption rates (at
z=0) of ∼ 1 percent per Gyr”, which means that “∼ 65 percent of all subhaloes accreted around
z=1 are disrupted by z=0” (2017, 2). One question that arises is thus the following: are N-body
simulations still suffering from overmerging, or can they really be considered reliable, based on
convergence studies? In other words, is the subhaloes disruption due to a physical mechanism
or the result of numerical artifacts?
This question is precisely that addressed by van den Bosch and Ogiya 2018. Their goal in
this paper is both to investigate whether N-body simulations still suffer from an overmerging
problem and to gain a better understanding of the non-linear effects of tidal stripping of dark
matter subhaloes. ‘Tidal stripping’ refers to the escape of matter due to the tidal forces exerted
by the external host halo on the subhalo. Beyond the limit known as the Roche limit, the tidal
forces exerted by the host halo overcome the gravitational force bounding the subhalo system
together, resulting in the system’s dislocation. Such tidal processes are extremely difficult to
describe, as the stripping of matter causes the subhalo remnant to fall out of virial equilibrium9 ,
and then to re-virialize by expanding, thereby provoking more stripping of matter, and to fall
out of equilibrium once again (2018, 4). No analytical theory is available to describe such
complicated processes of de- and re-virialization. Understanding such a prevalent mechanism
for matter disruption, therefore, requires to invent new ways of investigating its consequences
on the stripped subhalo’s density distribution. Given that, in the absence of a background
9

The virial theorem applied to celestial bodies states that the kinetic energy of a system is equal to half its
potential energy–here, its gravitational potential energy–, or, in other words, that its gravitational potential energy
is equal to twice its kinetic energy. If this equality does not hold, the system is either collapsing –the gravitational
potential energy exceeds the kinetic energy– or expanding. A system for which this equality applies is considered
in virial equilibrium.

128

Chapter 4. On Robustness in Cosmological Simulations

theory providing some guidance about this mechanism, only simulations can provide a window into how the density distribution of the subhalo is affected by tidal stripping, it is of the
utmost importance to disentangle what really pertains to this stripping mechanism and what
artificially results from an inadequate parametrization. In order to do so, van den Bosch and
Ogiya 2018 came up with an idealized numerical scenario where the physical hypothesis of
tidal stripping could be tested again the numerical hypothesis that matter disruption is mostly
caused by inadequate force softening. The idea is the following: consider the tidal evolution of
an isolated subhalo on a circular orbit. Its isolation permits to avoid having to consider ‘galaxy
harassment’, i.e., high-speed encounters with other subhaloes causing more matter to disrupt.
Likewise, considering a circular orbit excludes the possibility of other physical mechanisms
enhancing disruption, such as tidal heating due to the fast pericentric passage on an eccentric
orbit.10 In such a scenario, only the host halo’s tidal field and the numerical parameters can
have an impact on the disruption of subhaloes. The hope, based on this methodology, is thus
to determine whether the disruption is caused by the former or by the latter, by studying how
the bound mass of subhaloes evolve when varying systematically the strength of the tidal field,
the mass resolution, the force softening, the force accuracy and the time resolution.
The figure below shows the bound fraction of mass as a function of time and suggests that
decreasing the orbital radius, and thereby increasing the strength of the tidal field, does not lead
to the disruption of subhaloes, except when the orbital radius is chosen so that rorb /rvir,h = 0.1,
i.e., for the smallest value of the orbital radius.11 Even after 60 Gyrs, i.e, well beyond the
age of the universe, a significant bound remnant survives the tidal stripping.12 However, at
rorb /rvir,h = 0.1, the subhalo totally disrupts after ∼ 13 Gyrs. This results concords with the
results of the Millenium and the Boshoi simulations according to which rorb /rvir,h = 0.1 is the
10

A fast pericentric passage implies a rapid change in the tidal field that results in the orbiting body’s deformation, and thus to frictions and internal heating, which eventually will lead to more loss of mass.
11
rorb /rvir,h = 0.1 is the orbital radius of the subhalo expressed in units of the host halo’s virial radius, with rorb
the distance between the centres-of-mass of the host and subhalo and rvir,h the virial radius, defined as the radius
inside of which the average density is ∆vir =97 times the critical density for closure.
12
All these fiducial simulations are run with the following parameters: initial mass of subhalo m s,0 = 1, mass
of host halo Mh = 1000, concentration of subhalo c s = 10, concentration of host halo ch = 5, mass resolution
N p = 105 , time-step ∆t = 0.02, force softening  = 0.05, tree opening angle θ = 0.7.
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Figure 4.3: This figure shows the bound fraction of the subhaloes’ mass as a function of time.
Colours from blue to red correspond to values of the orbital radius ranging from 1.0, 0.9, ..., to
0.1, and the solid and dotted lines correspond to runs with different codes. See van den Bosch
and Ogiya 2018, figure 4, 4071.
typical radius at which subhaloes undergo disruption. Now, if this prediction is a physical
prediction, as it is taken to be by most astrophysicists, it should not be significantly affected by
a variation in numerical parameters.
Now, look at what happens in van den Bosch and Ogiya 2018 when examining the impact
of individually varying each numerical parameter. Runs of simulations varying the time-step
∆t and the force accuracy θ, with other parameters kept at their fiducial values, show that the
amount of mass loss is not significantly increased for any value of ∆t ≤ 0.08 and of θ ≤ 1. As a
consequence, the values assigned to ∆t and θ that will be kept fixed for exploring the effects of
the two others numerical parameters are chosen such as to be as conservative as possible, without thereby increasing the computational cost unnecessarily–∆t = 0.02 and θ = 0.7. According
to Power et al. 2003, the optimal value for force softening is that for which the maximum
stochastic acceleration caused by closed encounters with individual particles is smaller than
the minimum mean-field acceleration in the halo. This criteria, along with other criteria that
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can be found in the literature13 , suggests an optimal softening ranging between 0.02 and 0.06.
Since a force softening too large usually results in a too small density distribution at small
radii and less dense systems are more exposed to tidal stripping, it seems natural to predict
that a force softening larger than the optimal value would enhance stripping and, subsequently,
increase the amount of matter disruption. Likewise, as we have seen earlier, a softening too
small is more exposed to two-body relaxation effects, which contribute to flatten the central
density profile and thus to enhance disruption. Thus, based on this naive analysis, force softening should have no other consequences on the amount of matter observed than increasing the
mass loss. Surprisingly however, the simulations show the opposite: for  < opt , the bound
remnants are larger and survive longer. Thus, one can already suspect that physical disruption
is very sensitive to the value assigned to . Finally, one must assess the consequences of increasing or decreasing the mass resolution. As mentioned earlier, simulations are necessarily
run with a limited number of particles, which unavoidably creates artificial discreteness noise
that translates into highly divergent behavior in the bound fraction of mass and artificially triggers subhaloes disruption. The smaller the mass resolution, and the smaller the orbital radius,
the higher the divergence is: the standard deviation in fbound(t) after 60 years from a simulation to the exact same simulation can reach 0.4dex even for a very high mass resolution of
N p = 300000 (2018, 4075).
Consider now what happens to simulations run with the fiducial parameters at the orbital
radius rorb /rvir,h = 0.1 at which subhaloes are supposed to undergo disruption, when the mass
resolution and the force softening are increased together. If you look for a region in the parameter space where the discreteness-driven instability is kept under control 14 and a ‘converged’15
fraction of bound mass fbound (t) remaining after a given time can be found, the upper-left corner
of the figure below will give you the closest you can hope for to such an ideal. In this upper-left
13

See for instance Van Kampen, 2000.
The sensitivity to discreteness noise is characterized by the authors using the variance σlog f in log( fbound ).
15
‘Converged’ here means that “(i) no significant changes occur when N p is increased further, and (ii) the
standard deviation in fbound after one Hubble time is sufficiently small (i.e., σlog f ≤ 0.05)” (van den Bosch and
Ogiya 2018, p. 4076.
14
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Figure 4.4: This figure shows the bound fraction of mass as function of time for simulations
with different mass resolution N p and different force softening  with physical parameters, time
step and force accuracy kept at their fiducial values. The black line shows the ‘converged’ results of a simulation with N p = 107 and  = 0.003; the blue line the results from 10 simulations;
the red line their average. See van den Bosch and Ogiya (2018), figure 10, 4077.

corner however, subhaloes do not disrupt after 13 Gyrs. On the contrary: a large fraction of
bound mass survives, which seems to indicate that resolving the dynamics at rorb /rvir,h = 0.1
requires very high mass resolution and even stronger force resolution.
Note especially the contrast between this result at large N p and small  and the ones observed along the yellow-shaded band, which corresponds to the scaling between mass resolution and force softening defined by Power et al. 2003. This scaling is obeyed by most of the
state-of-the-art simulations since the publication of this convergence study. If you focus on the
red lines, i.e., on the averaged results of simulations, the bound fraction of mass appears converged: the red line prediction stays more or less the same despite increasing the mass and the
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force resolution, which is precisely why it is taken to be a robust prediction by Power et al.’s
standards. Yet, this red line indicates a full disruption of the subhalo between 5 and 8 Gyrs.
Thus, simulations converge on predicting that subhaloes fully disrupt after 8 Gyrs for a given
range of values but also on predicting that they survive after 13 Gyrs for a different range.
What should alert the philosopher here is not so much that only one of these contrary results can be accurate, or that the results displayed in the upper-left corner might more likely
be exact than the outcomes of simulations corresponding to Power et al.’s scaling. What must
be emphasized, rather, is that convergence alone will not tell you which one of these results is
the correct one, or whether one of them is. Given the range of the optimal softening defined
by Power et al. 2003, i.e., 0.02 <  < 0.06, increasing the mass resolution and the force softening will give you good agreement among simulations and confidence in your prediction that
subhaloes at rorb /rvir,h = 0.1 will not survive after one Hubble time. But if you do not follow
this scaling and keep increasing the resolution beyond the range defined by the convergence
studies, you will find convergence on another prediction, that contradicts the former. As summarized by the authors, convergence is “not a sufficient condition to guarantee that the results
are reliable” (van den Bosch and Ogiya 2018, 4067).

4.3.2

Pseudo-convergence or convergence?

In the previous section I have argued based on the fascinating work done by van den Bosch
and Ogiya that robustness analysis in the form of convergence studies is not enough to exclude
numerical artifacts and that robust predictions cannot be considered genuine physical predictions on such grounds. In this section, I push this thought further and argue that convergence
can actually result from artifacts in some cases. Instead of the missing satellite controversy,
I will focus in this subsection on the cusp-core problem, i.e., the fact that the central density profile apparently predicted by the CDM model in dark matter only simulations does not
match galaxy observations, especially observations made for the galaxies mostly made of dark
matter–low-surface brightness and dwarf galaxies.
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In N-body simulations, real dark matter is substituted by a limited number of heavy test
bodies, so that the computational task is made tractable while preserving the averaged density
of the system. However, whereas dark matter is thought to be collisionless, heavy test bodies
can undergo collisional relaxation, which is a decisive factor in determining the density profile
of dark matter haloes. Baushev 2014, for instance, has shown that a moderate energy relaxation
inevitably forms a core in the center of the halo, while a very intensive energy relaxation would
contribute to a cuspier profile. Collisional effects of test bodies can be characterized by the
relaxation time τr =

N(r) 16
,
8lnΛ.τd

with N(r) the number of test bodies inside a sphere of radius r,

lnΛ the Coulomb logarithm and τd the characteristic dynamical time of the system at radius r.
As a consequence, Power et al. 2003 recommended, as one of their main convergence criteria,
that convergence would be reached in a time t ≤ 1.7τr , with τr the relaxation time, since the
first sign of the influence of collisions seems to be the apparition of the core profile after 1.7τr .
The stability of the density profile up to 1.7τr was actually taken to be the proof of its physical
significance.
Baushev’s claim that violent relaxation generates cuspy profiles is very intriguing and raises
important questions. Indeed, dark matter haloes undergo violent relaxation when they collapse,
as the density inhomogeneities appearing lead to small scale gravitational fields that mediate
the exchange of energy among dark matter particles (Baushev 2015, 48). This mechanism,
however, is only efficient at the moment of the collapse. The halo, once formed, has a stationary
gravitational field. How come then that N-body simulations based on the cold dark matter
model predicts cuspy density profiles for formed haloes? If the cuspy profiles stems from
collisionality, where does this phenomena come from? It is artificial or physical?
This question was addressed by Baushev et al. in a beautiful paper in 2017, with a methodology very similar to that at play in van den Bosch and Ogiya (2018). First, they proposed an
idealized, unrealistic scenario where all sources of collisionality could be kept under control
except the one under scrutiny–here, they simulated an isolated halo, to avoid the tidal influence
16

See Binney and Tremaine 2011, eqn 1.32.
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of nearby haloes affecting the energy exchange between particles and the gravitational capture
of more mass from the surrounding that could lead to a secondary violent relaxation. Then,
they identified a prediction resulting from artificial relaxation. They simulated a halo with a
Hernquist density profile, i.e., behaving exactly like the NFW profile in the central region, but
describing a stationary, fully stable halo. Given that such a halo has a constant gravitational
potential field φ(r), the density and velocity profiles should remain the same and all (the im2

plicit functions of) the integrals of motion such as the specific energy ω = φ(r) + v2 , the specific
~ and the apocenter distance r0 17 should be conserved. Thus, any variangular momentum K,
ation of them should be attributed to numerical effects. Then, they run these simulations and
determined whether the prediction extracted from the artificial hypothesis was verified. Figure
5 (2017, 6) tracks the variations of the integrals of motion as a function of radius over 200 snapshots and clearly shows that the integrals of motion vary significantly in one single timestep.18
Thus, the convergence criterion advised by Power et al. 2003 by no means guarantees that all
of sources of numerical artifacts have been excluded.
This preliminary conclusion becomes even more interesting when one starts, with the authors, to wonder why the density profile remains stable–which, as our reader might recall, is
precisely the convergence criterion emphasized in the literature–if the integrals of motion do
vary. In other words, one might wonder whether the fact that the cuspy profile ρ ∝ r−1 is very
stable is a mere coincidence, or a direct result of the numerical effects observed in figure 5.
If energy and angular momentum exchange occur between particles, then the system is not
17

r0 is the maximum distance on which the particle can move off the center and depends only on the integrals
of motion: ω = φ(r0 ) + K 2 /2r0 .
18
Here is the more detailed methodology of Baushev et al. 2017, 5:
• Start by ordering the 106 particles according to their r0 in the initial snapshot,
• Divide them into 200 groups of 5000 particles with same r0 and characterize these groups by the averaged
initial r0 of their members
• Calculate the deviations ∆r0 /r0 = (r0 (i + 1) − r0 (i)/r0 ) and ∆K/Kcirc = (K(i + 1) − K(i)/Kcirc ) for each
particle on each timestep
• Find the root-mean-squares of ∆r0 /r0 and ∆K/Kcirc averaged over each group and for each snapshot and
ˆ 0 /r0 i and
finally average them over all the timesteps. These final averaged values are denoted by h∆r
ˆ
h∆K/Kcirc i. i is the number of the snapshot and Kcirc the angular momentum for circular orbit r0 .
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ˆ 0 /r0 i (crosses) and h∆K/K
ˆ
Figure 4.5: Averaged variations h∆r
circ i (squares) of the integrals of
motion. See Baushev et al. (2017), 6.
modelled by the collisionless Boltzmann equation d f /dt = 0, but can be by an ‘essentially
collisional’ (Baushev et al. 2017, 7) equation, i.e., that of Fokker-Planck. The Fokker-Planck
equation is used in astrophysics in order to model the evolution of stellar systems due to weak
binary encounters. Roughly speaking, this equation describes the energy changes as the cumulative effect of such encounters. Given that dynamical friction and diffusion constitute the
two main processes at play in the dynamics of collision, and since the Fokker-Planck takes into
account both processes, it is considered a good approximation of the exact collisionless Boltzmann equation, which includes strong encounters and is thus harder to handle. Although the
Fokker-Planck equation is not exact, it offers good insights about the full collisional Boltzmann
equation, as some of its stationary solutions hold for this equation too.19
If the system is modelled using this collisional equation, then the Fokker-Planck diffusion
streams created by the particle interactions could compensate each other and contribute to form
a stable density profile. And, as it turns out, the Fokker-Planck equation does have a stationary
solution close to the NFW one. If the cusp is a product of this Fokker-Planck diffusion, then the
19

The Fokker-Planck equation is derived from the exact collisional Boltzman equation by expanding the collision integral in a Taylor series and truncating the series after the first two terms given that only these terms matter
for small velocity changes. See Binney and Tremaine 2011, section 7.4. for the derivation of this equation from
the collisional Boltzmann equation and the simplifications needed for such a derivation to hold, and Evans and
Collett (1997) for a first application of the Fokker-Planck equation to the cusp-core problem.
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Figure 4.6: The upward ∆N+ (r)/∆t (squares) and downward ∆N− (r)/∆t (crosses) FokkerPlanck streams of particles divided by the total number of the particles N(r) inside r.
artificial collisions must form a downward and an upward stream of particles, with increasing
and decreasing r0 respectively, that compensate each other and thereby explain the stability of
the profile. Note, again, that this stability is taken to be the proof of the physical significance
of the density profile since at least 2003. This prediction can be tested by taking two adjacent
snapshots, preferably at the beginning of the simulation to avoid the core formation effects,
and calculating, for an array of radii r the number of particles ∆N+ (r) of particles which had
r0 < r at the first snapshot and r0 > r at the second one and the number of particles ∆N− (r) of
particles which had r0 > r at the first snapshot and r0 < r at the second one.
The results, presented in figure 6 (2017, 9), demonstrate not only that the Fokker-Planck
streams exist, but that they compensate each other very well outside of r = 0.4a.20 Moreover,
these streams are important, important enough for being responsible for the shape of the density
profile, as they represent more than 2% of the total mass of the halo at each time step.
Two conclusions force themselves upon us at this stage:
• First, the variations of the integrals of motion unambiguously demonstrate that N-body
simulations are still suffering from artificial collisional effects, due to the limited number of particles simulated, even though the convergence criterion usually prescribed is
20

a is the scale radius, i.e., one of the two parameters that define the NFW profile along with the characteristic
contrast density.
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supposed to exclude them.
• The stability of the density profile cannot be considered as a convergence criterion warranting the reliability of the density profile, as it likely results from numerical artifacts.

4.3.3

Discussion

Although convergence failed, in the two cases discussed above, to deliver a reliable methodology for excluding artifacts, one still has two options to rescue robustness analysis. One way
to do so is to argue that van den Bosch and Ogiya and Baushev et al.’s studies actually constitute instances of robustness analysis, thereby showing its efficiency.21 Remember that we
defined robustness analysis, along with Wimsatt, as an inference to the reliability of a phenomenon from its invariance over multiple models or processes. We argued that convergence
could be subsumed under this concept, given that convergence studies aim at determining the
conditions under which a prediction is reliable, based on its invariance over multiple numerical
parametrization. One could therefore consider that what is actually shown by van den Bosch
and Ogiya and Baushev et al. is the unreliability of the predictions examined, and hence their
lack of robustness, based on their unsteady behavior over different parametrizations.
The methodology at play in these two papers cannot, however, be considered a case of robustness analysis, for at least two reasons. Let us consider first what is under investigation in
the paper by van den Bosch and Ogiya. What the authors scrutinized here is not the reliability
of the simulations outcomes, but the convergence criterion itself. This point is made clear when
discussing the unrealistic setting of the simulations. The authors insist that the goal of the numerical experiments is not realism or the search of robust properties, but to understand whether
“the dominant cause of (..) [the] prevalent disruption of subhaloes in numerical simulations (...)
is artificial (numerical) or real (physical)”(2018, 4067):
The experiments conducted here correspond to idealized set-ups that one will never
21

Thank you to M. Weisberg for pointing this to our attention.
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encounter in nature. In reality, subhaloes will already have been affected by the
tidal field of the host halo well before it reaches the starting point of our simulation.
If realism is the goal of the simulation, one has little choice but to simulate the
system in its proper cosmological setting (i.e., run a cosmological simulation).
The goal of the idealized experiments described here, though, is to gain a physical
understanding of the complicated, non-linear and numerical processes associated
with the tidal stripping of dark matter subhaloes (2018, 4068).

The main conclusion of this paper is that “most, if not all, disruption of substructure in Nbody simulations is numerical in origin”, a conclusion that “questions whether the fact that subhalo mass functions appear to be converged down to 50-100 particles per subhalo implies that
results are reliable” (2018, 4084). In other words, the authors showed that, even though convergence was reached, numerical artifacts had not been excluded; and that the results backed
up through convergence were still not reliable. What is at stake here is not whether the amount
of substructure predicted through N-body simulations is a reliable prediction, but whether the
reason it is taken to be a reliable prediction is a sound one.
One could insist that robustness analysis has a positive and negative use: it serves both
to show that predictions are reliable when they are robust, and that they are not when the
robustness analysis breaks down. Indeed, one could assert that van den Bosch and Ogiya
(2018) showed that predictions made about the number of satellite galaxies that should be
observed in a dark matter halo are not reliable, because their alleged robustness breaks down
when the resolution is increased a little further. However, this reconstruction of their argument
is misleading: what we see in their paper is not that the appearance of convergence of the results
based on Power et al. breaks down, while ‘true’ convergence is reached for higher resolution.
What we see instead is a first instance of converged results for a region of the parameter space
and a second one for another region. Asserting that the robustness of the first breaks down
when increasing the resolution is assuming that we have more reasons to trust the second set
of results than the former. On which grounds could such a claim be made, if robustness is
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the only criterion on the basis of which reliability is assessed? The authors actually carefully
avoided to make any claim about which ones among those two should be taken as the correct
prediction, if any, for there would be no way to justify such a choice based on robustness only.
If robustness is the basis on which reliability is assessed, then we have equally good reasons to
accept one or the other converged results.
Even more undoubtedly, robustness analysis has no role to play in showing the failure of
convergence in Baushev et al.’s paper. The aim of the paper, like van den Bosch and Ogiya’s,
is not to test the reliability of the NFW density profile per se, but to test whether its stability
can really constitute a convergence criterion. Furthermore, the demonstration that convergence
does not guarantee reliability does not involve any attempt to make the robustness of this property break down. The point of this paper is not that the alleged convergence of the simulations
disappear when the resolution is further increased. On the contrary, it shows that convergence
does not and will not break down, precisely because it results from numerical artifacts. Simulations converge on the NFW profile because the artificial diffusion streams generated by
numerical collision effects correspond to a stationary solution to the Fokker-Planck equation
that is very close to the NFW profile. In other words, the NFW profile is a robust property, and
will remain so as long as these artificial collisional effects are not suppressed. The lesson to be
drawn from this paper is that robustness by no means says anything about the physical nature
of the prediction made, and even less about its reliability.
There is, however, another way to rescue robustness analysis. One could deny that convergence is robustness, based on the facts that different numerical parametrizations do not
constitute an appropriately diverse set of simulations to compare. One could argue, say, that
different values assigned to numerical parameters–be it an increase in resolution–are not independent in the relevant sense, and that invariance should therefore not be searched for over
changes in these values. Orzack and Sober refer to the search of robust predictions within a
single model as ‘internal robustness’, a kind of robustness that the authors deem ‘useful’ but
no indication of truth, given that robust predictions can be found in incorrect models (1993,
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540). Thus, convergence studies could be interpreted as an internal form of robustness that
does not fully capture the strength of the concept of robustness, which necessitates to examine
a diversity of independent models. This is, to my eyes, a more convincing attempt to preserve
robustness analysis22 , especially given the lack of consensus in the literature on defining what
constitutes an appropriately diverse set of models to compare. I devote the following section to
assess whether comparisons across different codes could be considered instances of robustness
analysis, and, if so, whether they do any better than convergence studies.

4.4

Robustness and Code Comparisons

In this section, I present two examples of code comparisons recently done on hydrodynamical
simulations–i.e., on simulations that include not only dark matter, but also baryonic physics.
I chose to focus on these two specific code comparison projects for two reasons: first, they
constitute two of the most recent ones, and of the most important ones in terms of the number
of different teams involved. Second, they are based on sharply different methodologies, both
of which can teach us a lot about robustness analysis. I start with the most recent and still ongoing project AGORA and deny that this methodological enterprise for code comparison can
really constitute an instance of robustness analysis, based on the problem of sufficient diversity
mentioned in section 4.2. I then proceed to analyze the methodology of another project, named
AQUILA, and the lessons that can be drawn from this project despite its failure to find any
convergence across codes.

4.4.1

Code Comparison: The AGORA Project

The Assembling Galaxies Of Resolved Anatomy (hereafter AGORA) project was launched in
July, 2012, in an impressive attempt to insure that comparisons across codes are actually pos22

Thank you to E. Winsberg for pointing this argument to my attention.
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sible, i.e., that apples are compared to apples.23 This project currently gathers fourteen teams
across the world, with more than 150 participants and 60 institutions involved.

24

The project

bears not on large cosmological volumes simulations or on dark matter haloes “zoom-in” simulations, but on galaxies formation, which requires to model baryonic physics–dissipation,
heating and cooling of gas, the formation of stars and supermassive black holes, magnetic
fields, and so on. These simulations thus necessitate to take into account not only collisionless
dark matter, but also astrophysical phenomena that requires fluid motion–‘hydrodynamics’–
calculations. Different codes tend to prioritize different energy feedback and to implement
them through different subgrid physics, making them difficult to compare. This is the reason
why the underlying aim of AGORA is to make sure that different codes actually target identical astrophysical systems. In other words, in order for a comparison to be meaningful, and
to provide a relevant basis for robustness analysis, one must determine whether distinct codes
with distinct subgrid physics are simulations of one and the same system. Indeed, whereas
dark matter-only simulations have only numerical parameters left unconstrained, hydrodynamical simulations have also unconstrained degrees of freedom in implementing the physics of
the cooling, the shocks, or even more significantly the interstellar medium (ISM). Not only
different codes have different preferences for deciding on the values of these parameters, but
parameters may sometimes not have the same significance across different codes. However,
if one cannot assess whether the galaxies simulated are actually intended to be the same, then
nothing can be learned from a disagreement or an agreement among distinct codes. As a result,
the methodological core of the AGORA project is to develop a framework guaranteeing that
codes share their initial conditions and astrophysical packages and can be read using common
analysis toolkit.
More precisely, the project as described in the Flagship paper consists of comparing 5
codes–two Smoothed-Particle-Hydrodynamics (SPH) codes GADGET and GASOLINE, and
23

Private correspondence with Ji-Hoon Kim, first author of the two AGORA publications and project coordinator.
24
Information retrieved from the website of the project https://sites.google.com/site/santacruzcomparisonproject/outline
on March, 4th 2019.
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three adaptative mesh refinements (AMR) codes ART, ENZO and RAMSES. Two distinct sets
of initial conditions were generated using the platform MUSIC (Hahn and Abel 2013) for
haloes with z = 0 ranging from 1010 to 1013 solar masses,i.e., from dwarf galaxies as well
as of galaxy groups. The first set corresponds to galaxies forming with a quiescent merger
history, while the other describes a violent one, with many mergers between z = 2 and 0. A
low-resolution large volume is simulated with cosmological parameters chosen in accordance
with the ΛCDM cosmology and the WMAP results, while the astrophysical package for gascooling, UV background, the stellar initial mass function and mass loss, star formation and supernovae energy feedback is implemented through GRACKLE, which provides a standardized
primordial chemistry for H and He as well as a cooling library. Other subgrid physics parameters, especially those regulating stellar feedback processes–star formation density threshold,
star formation efficiency, initial mass of star particles, stochasticity of star formation–, are calibrated on an isolated disk galaxy scenario, by varying the feedback parameters and the mass
and spatial resolutions until succeeding in simulating a realistic disk galaxy. Eventually, all
simulations outcomes are analyzed with the common analysis platform yt.25
A test of the AGORA set-up is then performed to ensure that “1) each participating code
can read the common “zoom-in” initial conditions generated by the MUSIC code, 2) that each
code can perform a high-resolution cosmological simulation within a reasonable amount of
computing time, and 3) that the simulation output be analyzed and visualized in a systematic
way using the common analysis yt platform” (Kim et al. 2013, 11). The test consists of simulating a dark-matter only cosmological simulation of a galactic halo of intermediate size at
z = 0. This ‘proof-of-the concept’ test shows great agreement overall, especially on the mass
distribution around the central halo, the target halo mass, and the density profiles26 and the
Flagship paper thus concluded on a rather optimistic note about the possibility of comparing
25

See Turk et al. 2010 for a detailed introduction to yt.
The agreement does not hold for the substructure mass distribution. Possible culprits identified by the authors
are a) a small deviation in density distribution evolving into a significant difference, b) a timing mismatch in the
numerical integration of the equations of motion, c) an intrinsic difference in solving Poisson equation–i.e., in the
gravity solvers.
26
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different codes:

We have found that the dark matter density profiles as well as the general distributions of matter exhibit good agreement across codes, providing a solid foundation
for future hydrodynamic simulations. Throughout the test we have demonstrated
the practical advantage of our common initial conditions and analysis pipeline by
showing that each code can read the identical ‘zoom-in’ MUSIC initial conditions
and that each simulation output can be analyzed with a single yt script independent
of the output format. By doing so, we have produced evidence that the cumbersome barriers in comparing galaxy simulations can be, and are, removed.

The second paper, published in 2016, extended this methodology to nine codes total, whose
convergence was tested on an isolated Milky Way-size disk galaxy and its properties such as
gas/stellar disk morphology and kinematics, the thermal structure of the ISM, or the star formation relation. The conclusion of this paper was even more optimistic than that of AGORA-I:

Our experiment reveals the remarkable level of agreement between different model
simulation tools despite their codebases having evolved largely independently for
many years. It is also reassuring that our computational tools are more sensitive
to input physics than to intrinsic differences in numerical schemes, and that predictions made by the participating numerical codes are reproducible and likely
reliable. If adequately designed in accordance with our proposed common parameters (e.g, cooling, metagalactic UV background, stellar physics, resolution (...)),
results of a modern high-resolution galaxy formation simulation are likely robust
(Kim et al. 2016, 26).
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Robustness Analysis and the Problem of Sufficiently Diverse Models

The AGORA project developed an impressive and very much needed apparatus to ensure that
codes could actually be compared, i.e., to ensure that code comparisons are ‘apple-to-apple
comparisons’. This attempt to develop common platforms, including common initial conditions (ICs), common astrophysical packages and common analysis tools, was indeed required
to make sure that outcomes of simulations were representing the same system. Furthermore, a
lot was learned about the codes themselves through this enterprise and will still certainly be in
the future. For instance, the AGORA teams decided to take what they called a ‘0 Myr snapshot’ when testing the effectiveness of common platforms, i.e., a snapshot immediately after
the ICs were read, in order to determine whether different codes were reading the ICs consistently. This step not only allowed to correct all the possible ways in which the ICs could be
misread by the codes–wrong units, wrong definition, wrong convention–27 , but also permitted
to gain some insights about intrinsic differences between mesh-based codes like ART I and
II, ENZO, RAMSES, GIZMO and particle-based ones like GADGET, GEAR, CHANGA or
GASOLINE. An example of this is illustrated by figure 1 of Kim et al. 2016, that shows the
differences between these hydro-solvers for the surface density of disk galaxies: particle-based
codes seem “to smooth out the strong density contrast in the ICs at the edge of the initial gas
disk” (2016, 10), due to the way the density is reconstructed from the positions of particles in
these codes.
This effort to make comparison possible is nevertheless in tension with the search of robust properties. In this section, I will argue that this effort to make comparisons possible is
not compatible with achieving the relevant diversity needed for robustness analysis, and more
generally speaking that the methodology at play here is not sufficient to exclude artifacts.
The first question that arises about this methodology is whether it can succeed in excluding
27

The nature of these corrections is not detailed in the paper itself, but was in private correspondence with
Ji-Hoon Kim.

4.4. Robustness and Code Comparisons

145

the artifacts diagnosed in van den Bosch and Ogiya 2018 and Baushev et al. 2017. The proof-of
the-concept simulations described in Agora-I make me doubt that it can be the case. Indeed, in
this zoom-in, dark matter-only simulation of a halo of virial mass 1.7 × 1011 M at z = 0, the
particle resolution (∼ 3.38 × 105 M ) and the force softening (322 comoving pc from z = 100
to z = 9, 322 proper pc after for particle-based codes; 326 comoving pc for the others28 ) follow the recommendations made by Power et al. 2003 and fall along the yellow-shaded band
highlighted in fig.3 by Van den Bosch et al. Given the extremely high resolution prescribed
by the latter to appropriately resolve a dark matter halo, one could suspect that a project like
AGORA would not have been able to detect any artifact generated by an inadequate force softening, despite the convergence reached across codes. It is all the more true when it comes to
the halo density profile: in that case, the convergence could as well be the symptom of the artificial collisionality still present in the way dark matter is modeled. In his Baushev et al. 2017,
Baushev proceeded to a code comparison–although of much smaller extent–between the direct
summation code Ph4 and the tree code Gadget-2. The idea behind this code comparison was
to determine whether the artificial Fokker-Planck streams likely stabilizing the density profile
have their origin in the potential calculation algorithm. Numerical effects potentially affecting
the density profiles include discretization effects, the algorithm of particle trajectory evaluation,
inadequate softening and the potential calculation algorithm. Since Ph4 and GADGET-2 differ
only on the latter, the impact of the potential calculation algorithm–had it been the responsible
for the pseudo-stability–should have appeared through the absence of Fokker-Planck streams
in the direct summation code. This, however, was not the case29 ; which means not only that the
artifact could not be excluded through this code comparison, but that AGORA could not exclude it either if it stems from the first two possible culprits listed. Discretization, for instance,
is a necessary idealization made for any simulation. As such, its effects, as the effects of any
of the necessary idealizations made, could not be diagnosed through a code comparison, even
one with the breadth and infrastructure of AGORA.
28
29

See section 5.1 of Kim et al. 2013 for the dark matter-only simulation set up.
See figure 7 and its discussion in Baushev et al. 2017, section IV.
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Our second worry with the AGORA project bears on whether this enterprise preserves the
kind of diversity needed for robustness analysis. The effort undertaken by the AGORA teams
to make a comparison across codes possible relies on the use of common platforms to generate
ICs, common toolkit to implement part of the astrophysics, and common analysis tools. While
I agree that an apple-to-apple comparison requires the development of such a common infrastructure, this infrastructure comes with its own problems too. How can one then guarantee that
these common tools are not introducing new sources of numerical artifacts? Consider the example of MUSIC (MUlti-Scale Initial Conditions), for instance, which is conceived as a way to
generate common cosmological initial conditions for zoom-in simulations readable by all the
codes involved in the comparison. Remember that for zoom-in simulations, one must first carry
out a a low-resolution simulation of a large volume, in order to have an idea of the large-scale
cosmic environment where haloes structure will develop, before zooming-in on a particular
object at higher resolution. The challenge is thus to generate initial conditions for both scales:
since the density perturbations in the cold dark matter are responsible for structure formation,
and these perturbations extend from solar system size to giga parsec scales, a reliable simulation of an individual halo in its cosmic environment must be able to track both smaller scale
perturbations directly impacting the halo structure and the large-scale perturbations. The aim
of MUSIC is to provide an algorithm generating multi-scale initial conditions, i.e., generating
“Gaussian random fields that follow a prescribed power spectrum and act as source terms for
density and velocity perturbations in Lagrangian perturbation theory” (Hahn and Abel 2013,
2).30 MUSIC itself is a code, based on a number of assumptions, idealizations and numerical
parameters, including force softening, that expose it to numerical artifacts. While the comparison across codes made both in Hahn and Abel 2013 and in the AGORA project is reassuring
about the fact that codes do read initial conditions in a similar way31 , this fact alone does not
30

More precisely, MUSIC uses Fast-Fourier Transformations convolutions to obtain the density field from a
hierarchical white noise field, and an adaptative multigrid Poisson solver for displacement and velocity fields. See
Hahn and Abel 2013, sections 2 and 3 for more details.
31
As shown in figure 1 of Kim et al. 2016 however, there are intrinsic differences between particle-based codes
and mesh-based codes when it comes to properties such as surface density.
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mean that these initial conditions are free of errors and immune to numerical artifacts that
would similarly impact all codes. The same reasoning can be applied to GRACKLE for the astrophysical sub-packages it implements, and for the analysis tool yt. These common platforms
serve their role, inasmuch as they do allow for a comparison on similar grounds for all codes,
but they also hinder the search for the diversity needed to proceed to a sound robustness analysis, genuinely in a position to assess whether predictions made by simulations are physical
predictions.
What about the astrophysical physics that is not handled through common platforms, like
the star formation and stellar feedback parameters? Can the AGORA strategy provide some
grounds for thinking that the agreement of different codes is enough for trusting this part of
the physics? Before addressing this question, we need to pause and look at an older code
comparison undertaken in 2012. This project, called ‘AQUILA’, greatly contributed to motivate
the methodology of AGORA, for its disappointing results32 were thought to entirely stem from
the failure of the project to offer comparable targets. Hence, the AGORA project focused
on building a common infrastructure to allow for a genuine comparison of similar targets.
However, AQUILA, with its own methodology, was able to deliver very interesting insights
that must not be forgotten when looking at AGORA’s results.
AQUILA, indeed, was based on a comparison among different codes but also different
versions of the same code, i.e., of one code with different implementation of the subgrid
physics. AQUILA is a code comparison based on a zoomed-in simulation of one of the
haloes of the Aquarius project named ‘Aq-c’.33 . Thirteen different hydrodynamical simulations
32

The AQUILA paper ends with these words: “Although numerical convergence is not particularly good for any
of the codes, reasonably good convergence is found for the properties of the stellar component, such as total mass
and median age. Less well converged are the internal properties of the galaxy, such as the half-mass radius, or the
fraction of stars in a rotationally supported disc” (Scannapieco et al. 2012, 1742). What follows is even worse:
“Aside from these considerations, perhaps the main result of the AQUILA project is that, despite the large spread
in properties spanned by by the simulated galaxies, none of them has properties fully consistent with theoretical
expectations or observational constraints in terms of mass, size, gas content and morphology” (ibid, 1742).
33
Aquarius is a collaborative project similar in scope and scale to the Millenium simulation, which provides
ultra-high resolution simulations of 6 Milky-way size individual dark matter haloes, named Aq-A, B, C D, E and
F. See table 1 in the flagship paper of the project for more details about the haloes’ properties (Springel et al.
(2008)).
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based on nine different codes were run at two different resolutions: seven Smooth-ParticleHydrodynamics codes including six versions of the codes GADGET3 and GASOLINE, one
adaptative mesh-refinement (RAMSES) and a moving mesh (AREPO), each of which has its
own preferred treatment of radiative cooling, star formation and its own numerical treatment
of feedback–injecting the feedback energy in the interstellar medium as thermal energy, kinetic energy, or temporarily decoupling the gas from the interstellar medium. GADGET3
and RAMSES were also run three times with different subgrid physics modules: GADGET3
only included supernovae feedback whereas G3-BH also considered the energy feedback of
supermassive black holes and G3-CR that of the energy deposition of cosmic rays. Likewise,
RAMSES was run three times, one with longer star formation time-scale as compared to the
fiducial run of RAMSES (RAMSES-LSFE)—, and one adding the feedback energy of an active galactic nuclei associated with a supermassive black hole. Looking at this diversity in the
physics implemented itself, the deceptive results of AQUILA seem no longer as surprising as
they appear at first glance, and not even as worrying as presented by the authors of the project.
The divergence of the results observed by different codes could very well be explained by the
fact that these codes do not consider the same physics to begin with. As a result, no rushed
conclusion should be made about the unreliability of N-body simulations from AQUILA’s divergent results–the results could be different merely because they compare different things.

However, AQUILA does deliver a lot of knowledge with respect to the impact of different astrophysical packages that should inform our interpretation of AGORA’s more optimistic
assessment. In particular, the results of AQUILA about galaxy morphology highlight the importance of stellar feedback and star formation for the morphology of galaxies. The delayed
star formation of the RAMSES-LSFE version of the code, with delayed star formation, shows
that the later the gas turns into stars, the more prominent the disc will be. Delaying star formation gives time for the gas to accrete into a centrifugally supported structure and thus promotes
the apparition of a thin disk. On the other hand, the earlier stars form, the more galaxies will
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tend to be spheroidal.34 These conclusions are supported by the fact that G3 and AREPO,
which share their subgrid physics but differ on their hydro solvers, both lack discs in the simulated halo, making it more likely to find the culprit in the astrophysics than in the numerical
scheme; and that codes with more efficient feedback, preventing the stars to form too early, do
exhibit a disc, although less prominent that the one displayed by RAMSES-LSFE. However,
star formations parameters and feedback modules35 in the AGORA project are individually
tuned so as to produce a realistic disk, thus erasing the differences met in the AQUILA project:
It is of primary importance to understand how each individual code needs to be
calibrated to reproduce various observational constraints. In a comparison like
the AGORA project, it is even more important to cross-calibrate stellar feedback
processes of the various codes using an idealized set-up such as an isolated disk.
This is precisely the goal of this second type of initial conditions: we would like
to model a realistic galactic disk using our various codes and their feedback parameters and the mass and spatial resolutions. By doing so, subgrid star formation
and feedback prescriptions in various code platforms will be tuned to provide a
realistic interstellar and circumgalactic medium (Kim et al. 2013, 6).
How then can any conclusion be made about the final agreement of these codes on galaxy
morphology? How can one determine whether this agreement stems from the reliability of
the predictions made or from this forced initial agreement obtained by individually tuning the
codes? This is all the more worrying that the tuning is made to produce a realistic disk galaxies,
when in the AQUILA project, none of the codes–including GADGET and RAMSES, which
are involved in both code comparisons– were able to produce realistic results, compatible with
theoretical expectations and observations. One might be concerned, in this case, by the extent
to which codes have been tuned to agree on a realistic disk.
In sum, I doubt that code comparisons can provide solid grounds for robustness analysis,
34

See figure 4 and its interpretation, Scannapieco et al. 2012, 1731-1732.
More specifically, the relevant tuned parameters includes: star formation density threshold, star formation
efficiency, initial mass of star particles, stochasticity of star formation. See section 3.2. of Kim et al. 2013.
35
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because of the incompatibility that a project like AGORA exemplifies between 1) making sure
that the comparison bears on comparable simulation outcomes, and 2) providing a diverse set
of codes to compare in order to eliminate all possible sources of numerical parameters. Codes
already share some necessary assumptions or idealizations whose impact cannot be evaluated,
like that of the discretization of dark matter. But the effort to make sure that codes target
similar systems multiply these shared and unexamined sources of artifacts, first through the
development of a common infrastructure to generate initial conditions, implement the subgrid
physics and analyse the snapshots, and second via the forced agreement of different codes on
a given scenario through their thorough tuning. The independence of the set of codes under
comparison is already a difficult requirement to satisfy, given the limits on computational power
and the subsequent idealizations that must be made by all codes. But this requirement becomes
even more difficult to achieve when one wants to ensure that these codes simulate one and
the same system, given that this effort demands that the codes under scrutiny all share some
common assumptions, i.e., in contradiction with the independence relied upon by robustness
analysis. As of today, it is difficult to conceive a code comparison that would not necessarily
fall prey of this trap, and thus would constitute a proper instance of robustness analysis.

4.5

Alternatives to Robustness

In sections 4.3 and 4.4, I have shown the pitfalls of robustness analysis when applied to N-body
simulations and argued that robustness analysis cannot be a reliable method for determining
whether the outcome of a simulation is fully explained by the physics that it implements or is
affected by numerical artifacts. Section 4.5 is devoted to build upon the positive insights met
in both sections and to offer, based on them, a new methodology that could play the role that
robustness analysis fails to satisfy. In this section, I detail the two facets of this methodology,
which I referred to as the method of Crucial Numerical Experiments or Crucial Simulations,
after Bacon’s famous experimentum crucis.
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Reviving Crucial Experiments

One thing that may have struck our reader already is the similarities exhibited by van den Bosch
and Ogiya and Baushev et al.’s reasoning to evaluate the effectiveness of convergence studies.
In both cases, the aim of their study was to address a specific hypothesis opposing a numerical against a physical explanation to a given property considered as predicted by the ΛCDM
model. In the former case, the author asked whether the matter disruption that is prevalent
in N-body simulations is caused by tidal stripping or by inadequate force softening. In the
latter case, the author investigated whether the cuspy density profile was a consequence of a
proper modelling of collisionless dark matter, or the result or artificial collisionality. Likewise,
both started by listing all the possible physical explanans, and constructed a idealized scenario
where all these possible physical culprits would be eliminated but one, thus offering an exclusive alternative between a numerical and a physical mechanism. van den Bosch and Ogiya
simulated an isolated halo on a circular orbit to eliminate other possible physical mechanisms
like tidal heating or galaxy harassment. Baushev focused on the central density profile of a
stationary Hernquist halo to rule out other sources of collisionality such as a violent secondary
relaxation through late mass accretion, tidal influences of nearby structure, or substructures
within the haloes. Finally, both studies decided between the two hypotheses by extracting from
one of them a prediction that could be verified in the given idealized scenario suggested: in the
overmerging problem, Van den Bosch hypothesized that the amount of substructure disrupted
would not be affected by a joint increase in mass resolution and force softening if caused by
tidal stripping.36 Baushev conjectured that, if the density profile was affected by artificial col36

Of course, one could argue that this joint increase of resolution is an instance of convergence studies, properly
conceived, and does not as such constitute an objection against this methodology. Such an argument, however,
would ignore that this specific way of testing the numerical hypothesis is due to the nature of the possible culprit,
i.e., an inadequate force softening. Such an hypothesis, by definition, necessitates to test other values of force
softening, and thus to increase the mass resolution given the scaling between these two parameters. For any other
numerical culprits, the methodology would be different: the integration scheme, for instance, can be tested via
a comparison between an Eulerian- and a leapfrog-based method, other things being equal; two-body artificial
effects can be tested through mass segregation effects and so on. The increased resolution is specific to the nature
of the hypothesis tested, and does not constitute by itself a methodology. See section 4.3.3. for a more detailed
discussion of why this increase of resolution does not constitute an instance of robustness analysis.
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lisionality, this exchange of energy and angular momentum should be turned into variations in
the constants of motion, and proceeded to track their changes over successive snapshots.
We can abstract away from their reasoning the following steps to construct the methodology
of what we will hereafter call crucial simulations:
• Step 1: Select a property, seemingly predicted by simulations, whose physical significance is at doubt.
• Step 2: List all the possible physical mechanisms Pi , P j , P. .., Pn and numerical artifacts
Ni , N j , N. .., Nn that could generate the scrutinized property.
• Step 3: Select among all numerical artifacts the most likely culprit Ni and fix the values of
other parameters such that this value is as conservative as possible without unnecessarily
increasing the computational cost.
• Step 4: Design a simplified scenario where all these possible culprits can be ignored but
one on each side, so as to construct a solid explanatory alternative Pi Y Ni between a
physical or a numerical origin for the property under discussion.
• Step 5: Extract from one the two hypotheses a prediction E that is not satisfied by the
rival hypothesis.
• Step 6: Carry out the simplified simulation and verify whether E is observed or not.
This methodology revives the idea of crucial experiment forged by Bacon and convincingly
argued against by Duhem. Recall that a crucial experiment, or so the story goes, opposes
two competing theories, say T 1 and T 2 . T 1 entails the prediction that E, whereas T 2 entails
that not-E. A crucial experiment is an experiment favouring either E or not E such that the
(non)observation of P will disprove (T 1 ) T 2 , and indirectly confirm (T 2 ) T 1 through the elimination of its rival. In a similar manner, I call a ‘crucial simulation’ that simulation which
proposes an idealized, simplified scenario where a physical hypothesis can be tested against a
numerical one, by allowing the observation of a prediction P drawn from one of the hypotheses
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and absent from its rivals. The observation of the phenomena P in the outcome of the simulation then disproves one of the alternatives, thereby confirming the other; i.e., it disproves or
confirms the numerical or physical nature of a given property of a simulation outcome.
The methodology of crucial experiment was heavily criticized by Duhem in his 1991, and
rightly so to my eyes. Duhem’s attack goes against the two branches of the crucial experiment
methodology: crucial experiments cannot be used to confirm a theory based on the elimination
of its rivals, for physical theories are not contradictory, but contrary hypotheses; meaning that
they could very well be false together. As a result, the elimination of T 2 is not in itself sufficient
for confirming T 1 . Can crucial experiments still, however, be enough to definitely rule out an
hypothesis, and thus at least be used for refuting theories? Not so, according to Duhem. Part
of Duhem’s famous holism37 aims at showing that this account of testing is an illusion, since
no prediction can be derived from an hypothesis taken in isolation. As Duhem himself puts it,
“the prediction of the phenomenon whose nonproduction will cut off the debate does not derive
from the disputed proposition taken in isolation but from the disputed proposition joined to this
whole group of theories” (Duhem 1894, 82). In other words, if the phenomenon predicted is
not produced, then the entire theoretical scaffolding involved in the prediction is “shown to be
wanting”, which also means that any part of this scaffolding can be amended such as to recover
the phenomena. Hence, a crucial experiment is never sufficient to refute a given hypothesis,
given that the blame could be put on any other part of the theory involved in the prediction, and
that these parts can always be amended such as to recover empirical adequacy. These criticisms
were justifiably considered as devastating for the methodology of crucial experiments. So,
how could such a methodology be of any help when it comes to assessing the reliability of
simulations?
Let us first consider the confirmation branch of the dilemma, i.e., the idea that a physical
theory cannot be confirmed by the exclusion of its rival, for the two theories can both be false.
This criticism loses its relevance when applied to simulations, for the alternative at stake does
37

For a detailed account of Duhem’s holism, see Gueguen and Psillos 2017, 62-65.
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indeed exhaust all possibilities: the property whose reliability is scrutinized is either caused by
a physical or a numerical mechanism, but cannot be caused by anything else. These two possibilities are contradictory, which entails that the refutation of one amounts to the confirmation
of the other. Note, however, that this argument only works if one can be sure that they came
up with a legitimate alternative, i.e., that the list of physical culprits was exhaustive, and the
other possible candidates successfully ruled out in the simplified scenario where the alternative
is tested. We will come back to this point in 4.5.2.
The criticism bearing on the disproving power of crucial experiments is trickier to handle,
for Duhem’s point with the holist threat seems particularly relevant when considering the lack
of modularity of N-body simulations. One of the main challenges in assessing the reliability
of simulations is indeed, as we mentioned earlier, their lack of modularity. The difficulty to
assess the soundness of simulations is precisely grounded in the fact that the praise or blame
that results from comparisons with observations cannot be distributed to individual components rather than to the simulation as a whole, given our lack of understanding of their causal
contribution to the overall outcome of the simulations. Consider for instance the case of force
softening that we have discussed extensively. N-Body simulations approximate the density of
real stellar systems by simulating fewer, but more massive, particles. Force softening is then
needed to prevent divergences in the gravitational force when massive bodies get close to each
other. As shown by van den Bosch and Ogiya however, smoothing the gravitational potential
to avoid these numerical errors tends to artificially enhance matter disruption, and so to reduce
the amount of substructure predicted in dark matter haloes. As this example illustrates, it is
difficult to determine precisely how a particular feature of a simulation depends upon the basic
physics, and to separate genuine results from numerical artifacts. How can we hope then to
escape Duhem’s objection?
I need to emphasize that crucial simulations are meant to be cases where the contrast between competing hypotheses can be made particularly sharp, given their focus on idealized
situations where the holistic challenges associated with modularity can be minimized. The role
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of crucial simulations is not to confirm or disconfirm a model, but a very specific component
of this model.The simplified, idealized scenarii suggested in step 3 above serve precisely to
isolate and clarify the impact of very specific aspects of the simulation, by making sure that
one or several physical factors are minimized or fully turned off. The conception of such a
simplified scenario is an essential part of the methodology and is precisely meant to counter
worries associated with holism. This step would be problematic if the goal of the methodology
was to test simulations against observations, since such a goal would require simulations to be
as realistic as possible. Crucial simulations, on the contrary, aim first and foremost at gaining
a better understanding of what originates from the numerical scheme and what is caused by
the physical model. Therefore, a simplified scenario does not jeopardize the assessment of the
simulation’s reliability, but rather serves its purpose to better isolate the role of different modules, and thereby to detect artificial consequences of the numerical scheme. to recover in this
context.
For these reasons, I think that crucial simulations do not fall prey of Duhem’s criticisms and
constitute a viable, if not advantageous, alternative to robustness analysis. I do acknowledge
nevertheless that the merits of crucial simulations heavily depend upon how well constructed
steps 2 and 3 of the methodology are, i.e., on whether the lists of possible culprits examined
is exhaustive and whether the scenario on which the crucial simulation is based succeeds in
properly isolating the two components under test. Section 4.5.2. is therefore arguing in favor
or re-directing the use of code comparisons such as to supplement and strengthen these two
steps of the methodology.

4.5.2

What do we learn from code comparison: on supplementing crucial
simulations

As touched upon in the previous subsection, one challenge for the methodology of crucial
simulations is to provide a solid alternative to explore, and that providing such an alternative
requires to have already a sense of which components of the simulations have what effects. But
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how could we have such an understanding of the causal impact of different components, when
the ‘fuzziness’38 of their roles is exactly what creates the challenge for assessing the trustworthiness of simulations? This apparent circularity is what motivates the need to supplement this
crucial simulation method for ruling out artifacts. In this subsection, I go back to the methodological contrast between the AQUILA and the AGORA project and the kind of knowledge
that can be built from the strategies underlying these two code comparisons.
I emphasized earlier that the AGORA project was born from the frustration generated by the
methodology of AQUILA, as many astrophysicists felt that the pessimistic appraisal of stateof-the-art simulations of the latter only stemmed from an attempt to compare non-comparable
things. Hence, from the beginning, AGORA focused on developing an infrastructure that
would allow for a relevant comparison. I have argued that, while this goal might indeed have
been reached, it was at the detriment of others goals, such as testing the robustness of predictions. Here, I want to argue that a similar argument can be made for AQUILA: while it failed
at providing the basis for the apple-to-apple comparison they were aiming at, it might still have
reached one of its original targets, that of getting a better understanding of “what determines
the morphology of a galaxy, what the main feedback mechanisms are and what role they play
on different mass scales and at different times”, and of “whether the difficulties in reproducing
realistic discs are predominantly a consequence of insufficient numerical resolution, inappropriate modelling of the relevant physics, or a failure of the cosmological model” (Scannapieco
et al. 2012, 1728). And the responsible for this success, I contend, is precisely the specific
methodological choices made by the AQUILA group.
Remember that AQUILA is a comparison among different codes but also different versions of similar codes, i.e., of one and the same code with different implementation of the
subgrid physics. In particular, GADGET3 and RAMSES were run three times each with different subgrid pysics modules. Although this methodology does not promote the diversity that
robustness analysis has to look for, it offers some very insightful overlapping between codes
38

This term refers to the “fuzzy modularity” discussed in Lenhard and Winsberg 2010.
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Figure 4.7: On the left, the table taken from (Scannapieco et al. 2012, 1729) summarizes the
different types of hydro solvers, their preferred way of calculating the radiative cooling, the
kind of feedback considered (Supernovae, Black Holes, Cosmic Rays) and the way it was
implemented (through the injection of thermal or kinetic energy into the ISM or into the gas
itself). On the right, I reproduced and colored this table to show the overlapping between codes
like G3 and AREPO, or different versions of RAMSES.
and their modules, as one can see on the figure below: Notice, for instance, that GADGET3
and AREPO have exactly the same subgrid physics, but differ on the type of hydrodynamical solvers they rely on. This overlapping allows for very interesting insights in the results of
AQUILA. The codes disagree on properties of the simulated halo such as the stellar mass of
galaxies. AREPO predicts twice as many stars forming as G3, despite the fact that they share
their subgrid physics. Such a disagreement thus indicates that the numerical scheme adopted
play a role in the star formation efficiency that impacts the outcomes of the simulation. Another
interesting characteristic of these two codes is that they both fail to produce a galaxy with a
prominent thin disk. This agreement of both codes, despite the different numerical methods
they adopt, is a good indication that the morphology of a galaxy is not affected by the type of
hydrodynamical solver used, but that the prevalent mechanism in determining its morphology
is to be found in the feedback efficiency.39
These two conclusions provides hypotheses to be tested in the context of crucial simulations, and support that these hypotheses are well-grounded. Considered separately, the code
comparison and the crucial simulation are not sufficient to definitively conclude on whether
39

We emphasize these two cases of agreement and disagreement as they are the ones that the AQUILA group
insists on. The same reasoning, however, applies to other codes with relevant overlapping between their modules.
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the numerical scheme or the physical model should be held responsible for generating the halo
property under discussion. Together however, the code comparison offers hypotheses whose
relevance is supported by the adequately constructed comparison between codes with overlapping modules that the crucial simulation is then in charge of confirming or disproving. The
conjunction of these two methods can give us confidence that the results of crucial simulations
can be trusted.
Based on these insights delivered by the AQUILA project, I suggest to re-direct the use of
code comparisons such as to become a new source of hypotheses to test in crucial simulations.
A code comparison is a very expensive enterprise to undertake, be it in terms of logistics, of
time or in terms of computational power. Constructing them in such a way guarantees that code
comparisons are optimized and knowledge gained about the different roles of the simulation
components even in the case where the codes widely diverge on the properties they predict.
These re-directed code comparisons should not be substituted to an effort to develop semianalytical models offering some guidance for what the properties of a realistic halo should
look like, but constitute a resource to supplement them whose power has yet to be exploited.

4.6

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that robustness analysis, in the form of convergence studies, is certainly not sufficient to exclude the presence of numerical artifacts in N-body simulations; and
thus to warrant the conclusion that the simulation outcome is reliable. Even worse, the convergence used as a criterion for the robustness of a prediction is sometimes the direct product of
numerical artifacts, as it appears to be the case for the stability and universality of the density
profile predicted by simulations.
Since one could object that convergence studies do not exhibit the kind of diversity needed
for a relevant robustness analysis, and thus deny that convergence studies constitutes proper
instances of it, I have examined whether the search for robust predictions across code compar-
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isons would better capture the notion of robustness. However, in order to fill that role, code
comparisons would have to achieve two tasks that seems extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to reconcile: developing a common infrastructure that guarantees that the comparison bears on
similar systems, while at the same time preserving the diversity needed for the code comparison
to constitute a genuine instance of robustness analysis. Since the common infrastructure itself
is a possible source of artifacts, and that this infrastructure is not itself scrutinized; and given
that not all parameters can be implemented through these common platforms but rather need
to be individually tuned to agree on a given scenario, the code comparison thus constructed is
not in a position to exclude all possible sources of numerical interference.
As a result, I suggested another methodology to fill the task initially assigned to robustness
analysis, that of crucial simulations. The gist of crucial simulations is to provide a simplified scenario where the numerical or the physical origin of a prediction can be tested. Crucial
simulations, more generally speaking, are useful as a way to overcome the holist threat–or
‘fuzzy modularity’–that makes the assessment of the reliability of N-body simulations such a
challenge to begin with. Used more specifically, i.e., as a confirmation method confirming or
disproving the physical or numerical nature of a given phenomena, crucial simulations need to
be done in conjunction with code comparisons with an adequate methodology. The confirmation or falsification power of crucial simulations depends upon the exhaustivity of the list of
culprits considered and on the scenario subsequently investigated in the crucial simulation–that
is, on whether it successfully isolates two and only two candidates. Code comparisons based
on adequate overlapping of codes modules offer a better understanding of the–sometimes far
detached–consequences of numerical artifacts, thereby providing confidence in the fact that all
possible mechanisms, physical or numerical, have been reviewed and that the alternative tested
is a relevant one.

Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
I would like to close this dissertation with some concluding remarks, emphasizing three of the
main themes that emerge from this work.

5.1

Theoretical Internalism

In chapters 2 and 3, I have insisted on the relation between the aim of a theory, its structure,
and the way distinct theoretical structures might differ in how they construct their explanatory
targets. In chapter 2, exploring these relations led me to conclude that the theoretical equivalence strategy, as a realist weapon against cases of underdetermination, presupposes that the
structure of rival theories can be analyzed in terms of what is physically relevant and what is
superfluous in a common and neutral vocabulary. In practice however, such a vocabulary is
not available. Thus, the comparison is established on the basis of one of the rival theories,
although their vocabulary is embedded in an epistemological stance on what constitutes a good
theory that favours the content of this theory, while dismissing significant parts of the other.
The algebraic formulation of Quantum Field Theory, for instance, is embedded in a strong operationalism, and has been developed based on a very thin concept of physical content. The
proof of equivalence formulated in this context clearly missed fruitful features of the parafield
program. Notably, it missed what made it possible to develop parafield theories into an exper160
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imental program to test Pauli’s exclusion principle, as it did not seem to have the resources to
take these features into account. In sum, I do not think that the structure of a theory can be
interpreted, especially when this interpretation amounts to separating the relevant from the superfluous, independently of the epistemic considerations that motivated its construction. And
given that formal approaches presuppose that one can simply read off from the theory its relevant content, I do not consider that formal approaches to equivalence can really do justice to
the interesting features of the disadvantaged theory–by which I mean that pairing these theories
as one and the same will most probably amount to loosing the characteristics of the theory that
could be heuristically fruitful and should be preserved for this reason.
In chapter 3, I criticized the appeal to theoretical virtues such as explanatory power in order
to discriminate between empirically equivalent theories. I argued that one’s stance on what a
good theory–or, in that case, a good interpretation of Quantum Mechanics–should be like not
only shapes what counts as physically relevant and as superfluous structure; but that it also
determines what constitutes a fact requiring an explanation, the nature of the explanandum and
the resources available within the theory for providing an explanans. Focusing on comparing
interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in terms of their theoretical virtues hides the fact that
“justifying the Symmetrization Postulate” does not define a similar explanatory program in
both interpretations given their different resources. In Bohmian Mechanics, what needs to
be explained is why the Symmetrization Postulate is not needed at all, once the scope of the
Indistinguishability Postulate is extended so as to apply to the particles’ velocities. Likewise, in
standard Quantum Mechanics, the Symmetrization Postulate does not require an explanation,
but should be understood as the mere acknowledgement of the referential ambiguity created by
the use of labels. In this context, this postulate is nothing but the statement that the assumptions
underlying the use of labels need to be neutralized for systems of identical particles, as the
referential ambiguity they create, combined with the linear nature of the laws that quantum
systems obey, generates artifacts.
I call ‘theoretical internalism’ the position according to which what constitutes relevant
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and superfluous structure, and what constitutes an explanandum are defined within a given
theory, and thus do not allow for a neutral comparison across theories. This does not mean that
criteria of physical significance, or explanatory targets, never overlap in different theoretical
contexts. But the burden should be on showing the existence of such an overlapping, before
proceeding to such a comparison. The use of theoretical equivalence or theoretical virtues to
either pair theories as one and the same or privilege one over the others should be based on
a demonstration that such a comparison is possible, meaningful, and is fair to both theories.
I hope to have shown in chapters 2 and 3 that such a basis is not always present, and that
comparing theories in that sense can be damaging, misleading or masking the features worthy
of interest of the theories under comparison.

Does it mean that we should never try to compare rival theories? That theories are incommensurable? This is by no means what I mean by ‘theoretical internalism’. First, the kind of
comparisons that I deem unfruitful and misleading is a very specific kind, those comparisons
made across alleged empirically equivalent theories in the hope of escaping cases of underdetermination. Comparisons like these are made to deny that there are really two theories, or to
favour one over the others. Such a goal necessitates 1)to establish that the entire content considered relevant by both sides is included in the notion of theoretical equivalence at play, and 2)
that the explanatory demand upon which the claim of greater explanatory power depends is fair
to both parties. Second, as I mentioned above, I am not excluding that sometimes such a basis
can be found and used as grounding an underdetermination escaping strategy. Nevertheless,
this common basis cannot be merely assumed, it must be demonstrated. Finally, my suggestion
to use theoretical equivalence to clarify the structure of rival theories instead of merging them
as one and the same shows that comparisons are not only possible, but fruitful for clarifying the
structure of rival theories and pinning down where exactly the interesting differences between
them lie.

5.2. Eliminating superfluous structure is counterproductive
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The theoretical equivalence strategy and the appeal to theoretical virtues are supposed to be
answers to an underdetermination problem, i.e., they are supposed to provide a way for the
scientific realist to escape this threat by either denying that the theories are genuine rivals, or
by offering a solid epistemological reason to choose one over the other. None of these strategies, however, seem to have ever been in a position to convince the other side. Yet, in many
cases, had they been listened to, they would have prevented the exploration of fruitful features
of these theories. Let us take a look at theoretical equivalence first. Greenberg (Greenberg
and Mohapatra 1989, Greenberg 2000) has eventually abandoned his non-relativistic quantum
mechanics of parastatistics because the violations of Pauli’s principle it implies would be gross
and already observed; his locally gauged parafield model because of the difficulties to formulate a local field theory that would be consistent with small violations of the PEP–i.e., not
already empirically ruled out, while Govorkov continued to develop possible parafield theories
((Govorkov 1991), and physicists such as Nelson (Nelson et al.) kept working on defining
conditions in which an pair of paraparticles could be observed.
In parallel, Bohmiam Mechanics and standard Quantum Mechanics are sometimes presented as cases of notational versions of one and the same theory. Yet, Bohmian Mechanics
clearly accepts more structure than the latter, and gives a role to this structure: to recover classical physical concepts, or provide a complete theory in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen sense
for instance. No counterpart to this extra structure can be found in the standard formulation.
A proof of theoretical equivalence, if reached, would then necessarily rests on the dismissal
of this additional structure, and thus fail to convince the Bohmian side. More generally, as
pointed out by Coffey (2014), there is no agreement on an unambiguous criterion for theory
equivalence, and more broadly on which theories to pair as theoretically equivalent. Coffey
explains this lack of consensus by the focus on formal relations between theoretical structures,
which according to him fail to take into account the differences in individual intuitions with
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respect to theoretical equivalence (2014, 834):1
But logico-structural relationships between formulations hold independently of individual intuitions regarding which formulation pairs are theoretically equivalent.
(Whatever the formal relations between Newtonian gravitation theory and Cartan
theory, for example, those relationships are fixed, regardless of intuitions about
their theoretical equivalence.) So if agents disagree about whether two formulations are intuitively theoretically equivalent, an appeal to an analysis based on
the logico-structural relations holding between those formulations is unlikely to
account for the diverging intuitions.
However, Coffey does not think that this failure undermines the theoretical equivalence strategy in general, but only the formal approach to theoretical equivalence. He suggests as an
alternative the project of ‘interpretive equivalence’, which he defines as follows:
Two theoretical formulations are theoretically equivalent exactly if they say the
same thing about what the physical world is like, where that content goes well
beyond their observable or empirical claims. Theoretical equivalence is a function
of interpretation. Its a relation between completely interpreted formulations.
I share, to some extent, Coffey’s anti-formalism, although I do not agree with his motivations
for rejecting formal approaches. I do not think that our intuitions with respect to a notion
as subtle and complex as theoretical equivalence should have any weight in the discussion.
In many ways, our physical theories are not intuitive at all, be it at very small or at very large
scale. As a result, I do not consider that intuitions are the relevant place to look at to inform our
judgments about theoretical equivalence. But I tend to support his idea that formal approaches
are never enough, in that they do not consider all the relevant aspects that should be considered
1

The second reason he offers to explain this failure is the fact the theoretical equivalence judgments are identity judgments, which should be symmetric judgments, but that many cases of formal approaches to theoretical
equivalence ends up with asymmetrical judgments. Many consider–although again, there is no consensus on this–
for instance that the Newtonian and the Lagrangian approaches to dynamics, are theoretically equivalent, but that
the other has advantages that the first does not have. (Coffey, 2014, 830-831).
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to deem two theories equivalent. Nevertheless, while I agree with the fact that, in order to play
the role it is supposed to play, our concept of theoretical equivalence must include more than
the empirically confirmable or disconfirmable, and necessitates a common interpretive project,
I am not at all optimistic that many cases of rival theories accept a common interpretation.
Moreover, I do not think that those rare cases for which a common interpretation is possible
would exhibit interesting cases of rivalry. The algebraic quantum field theory of ordinary
particles and the algebraic parafield theory have a common interpretive project. But they do
not present a genuine case of underdetermination, as neither of these theories are empirically
adequate and take seriously ‘paraparticle’ as a theoretical term in a realist sense.
The same inconclusive results seem to be reached in the case of theoretical virtues. It does
not seem that any defender of the standard Quantum Mechanics has been convinced by the
Bohmian argument to the point of switching sides. Those who are convinced that paraparticles
are surplus structure will continue to think so. Likewise, they will certainly not be convinced
of the greater explanatory power of Bohmian Mechanics given that this explanatory power
explains away something that does not require an explanation, and rests on hidden variables
that they consider superfluous as well.
One way to formulate the general worry I have with eliminating structure deemed superfluous is the following: either this strategy will remain inconclusive, and a considerable amount of
time and energy will be devoted to suggest arguments that can only convince people already on
your side. Or these arguments will have an impact, and most probably lead to drop parts of the
theories that could have been useful in eventually breaking the empirical equivalence of the rivals, as was the case for the parastatistics program, ignored by most physicists after the 1970’s.
According to Laudan and Leplin (1991), most of if not all the examples of underdetermination
provided are cases of transient underdetermination, whose equivalence will ultimately break
down when sufficient progress in technology will have been done so as to revise the auxiliary
hypothesis thanks to which predictions get extracted from scientific theories. If they are right
to think so, we should make sure to preserve these features that differ from a theory to another.
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Betting on the transient character of the underdetermination seems to be a much safer bet than
forcing a choice upon us or dissolving the problem: the scientific realist remains unthreatened,
for she can simply suspend her judgment with respect to which theory is the correct theory,
and meanwhile work on clarifying the structure of the alleged rivals, from the point of view
from which they have been developed, to find potential sources of experimentally exploitable
disagreements, or to get a clearer understanding of the theory itself.
Consider the following example. As we have seen, the Indistinguishability Postulate states
that only those observables that are invariant under permutation are physically relevant to describe a system of indiscernible particles. Dirac, when introducing what is now referred to as
the Indistinguishability Postulate, justified it based on observationalist principles. According
to him, the postulate was nothing more than an expression of the observational indistinguishability of a quantum state describing indistinguishable particles and another state where these
particles would be permuted. But then, if the PI stems from crude observationalist standards,
how come that we need to add another stipulation such as the Symmetrization Postulate to recover the observed facts? One could argue that the Indistinguishability Postulate is justified in
a different way, for instance experimentally or logically. However, a postulate that states that,
for measurements made on indiscernible particles, it should not make any observable difference whether the measurement is made on the initial system or the permuted one is obviously
not testable experimentally. And, as we have already seen, the indistinguishability postulate as
we know it, i.e., as applying to observables, is not logically required by the axioms of Quantum
Mechanics, for other ways to understand permutation invariance are available.
Another option would be to embed metaphysical considerations into the formulation of the
IP such as the individuality or non-individuality of quantum particles. Weyl, for instance, was
taking the IP as an expression of the metaphysical nature of quantum objects. Redhead and
Teller, on the other hand, were arguing that assuming that quantum particles are individuals
introduces surplus structure in the theory. Putting aside any consideration of what should be
the role of metaphysics when it comes to decide on physical principles, metaphysics does not
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commit us either to one or the other understanding of the permutation group.
It seems then that if a justification has to be found, it is only in the action of the permutation
group itself and in what it implies for the structure of the theory. The question of whether
paraparticles are superfluous, of whether the Symmetrization Postulate needs to be explained
and the Indistinguishability Postulate justified have to be put into brackets until one really
understands what is meant by permutation invariance and how it relates to the structure of the
theory. If this understanding does not rely on any experimental, metaphysical, observational or
logical reasons, then one might hope that it would possibly stem from the structure of the theory
itself. By switching the focus from attempts to eliminate superfluous structure or warrant the
explanatory power of one of the rivals to clarifying the meaning of permutation invariance
in different theoretical structures, based on different assumptions, I contend that one has better
chances to clarify how these three problems need to be differently addressed in an interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics, which does not have the resources to distinguish between permuted
states describing indiscernible particles, and another which can distinguish between them at
least diachronically.

5.3

Crucial simulations

In chapter 4, I have criticized robustness analysis as an effective method to identify reliable
predictions in cosmological simulations. I offered an alternative to robustness analysis with
the methodology of crucial simulations. In a crucial simulation, a very simplified scenario is
provided that makes it possible to rule out all the possible numerical and physical responsible
for a given prediction but one of each, considered the most likely culprits. Then, the idealized
simulation is run to verify or infirm the prediction extracted from the numerical or physical
hypothesis and absent from the other, so as to confirm the artificial or physical nature of the
mechanism at play.
In the future, I would like to extend this work to other scientific areas heavily based on
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simulations, like the study of climate models. Similarly to cosmological simulations, interactions between distinct climate processes are so complex that only simulations can track them.
Thus, one would like to know when a prediction made through simulations is likely to be
true, and when it should be discarded. Wendy Parker, in her 2011, has shown that robustness
analysis fails to deliver a reliable methodology for sorting out trustworthy from non-trustable
predictions: when distinct climate models agree on a hypothesis, it cannot be inferred that this
hypothesis is likely to be true or that our confidence in it should increase. The premise on which
the robustness argument rests, i.e., the assertion that “it is likely that at least one simulation in
this collection is indicating correctly regarding hypothesis H” (2011) is not warranted, first
because a comparison across an ensemble of models will not sample enough of the possibility
space that such a claim can be justified, but will only span that uncertainty range corresponding
to the models actually used in such a comparison. Second, one cannot trust the performance of
models which successfully predicted past climate, for this success may be artificially inflated
and the models tuned to reproduce the known data. Crucial simulations could thus be a good
candidate to replace robustness analysis in evaluating climate models too, but only under the
indispensable condition that simulations can be simplified in a way similar to the cosmological
ones. In other words, one has to assess whether an alternative of mutually exclusive hypotheses can be tested in this context, and this requires to have enough control on the simulations
to proceed to such a simplification. Given the complexity and the diversity of the phenomena
intertwined in formulating a prediction about future climate, the extent to which crucial simulations can be successfully applied to climate models deserves careful scrutiny, and as such
goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Remember, however, that our primary concern was to find a methodology to exclude artifacts from scientific theories, and that we were hoping to find in the study of simulations
methods that could be applied to clarifying the structure of theories. The answer to whether
crucial tests can fill such a task is not a definite and unequivocal one. Like the extension of
crucial simulations to other scientific areas, it requires an assessment of whether one is in a po-
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sition to provide a relevant alternative to test, and whether there is a context/scenario in which
the discriminating prediction extracted from the artificial or the physical hypothesis can be
verified. The difficulty with the first condition comes from the fact that artifacts might remain
hidden because they come from unavoidable, or close to unavoidable, idealizations. Finding
a scenario to test such an alternative might thus be really tricky. The difficulty with the second condition is similar to the one described for climate change: listing all possible simulation
components responsible for a given property or prediction, and constructing a scenario where
possible culprits can be ‘turned off’ and the remaining one tested is a very complicated task.
This does not mean that it is an impossible one. My analysis of Bacciagaluppi’s derivation and
of Quantum Field theories in section 4 constitute attempts to construct such crucial tests. But
the impossibility to list all possible assumptions that could introduce paraparticles as artifacts,
decide on the most relevant alternative, and to ‘turn off’ the discarded assumptions accordingly
clearly lessen the confirmatory power of such a crucial test. In sum, crucial tests might be to
some extent used to analyze the structure of scientific theories, but will never meet the ideal
conditions that one can find with cosmological simulations. Their effectiveness may thereby
be lessened.
Note that the proof-of-the-case of section 4 is designed as a crucial test and not as an
instance of robustness analysis, even though different models are compared. The relevant set
of models, theories or interpretations to compare cannot be determined without already having
formulated an hypothesis about the source of the artifacts. One does not know where to look
at unless one already have in mind a possible culprit. Furthermore, as I mentioned already,
robustness analysis would probably conclude that paraparticles are a robust property, for they
seem to appear in all interpretations of Quantum Mechanics and even in QFT, whether or not
labels are used– Bacciagaluppi’s derivation put aside. If so, then robustness analysis and crucial
tests reach different conclusions when it comes to paraparticles.
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A. Yu. Ignatiev and V.A.Kuzmin. Is a small violation of the Pauli principle possible? Yad Fiz,
46(786), 1987.
Tom D. Imbo, Chandni Shah Imbo, and E.C.G. Sudarshan. Identical particles, exotic statistics
and braid groups. Physics Letters B, 234(1-2):103–107, 1990.
Jenann Ismael. Symmetry and Superfluous Structure: Lessons from history and tempered
enthusiasm. In Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson, editors, The Routledge Companion to the
Philosophy of Physics. New York, USA: Routledge, forthcoming.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

177

Jenann Ismael and Bas C. Van Fraassen. Symmetry as a guide to superfluous theoretical structure. In K. Brading and E. Castellani, editors, Symmetries in physics: Philosophical reflections, pages 212–238. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2003.
Daniel Kaastler. A C*-algebra approach to field theory. In Proceedings of the Conference
on Theory and Applications of Functional Analysis, pages 179–191. MIT Press Cambridge,
MA, 1964.
J. Kim, T. Abel, O. Agertz, G.L. Bryan, D. Ceverino, C. Christensen, C. Conroy, A. Dekel, N.Y.
Gnedin, and N.J. Goldbaum. The AGORA high-resolution galaxy simulations comparison
project. The Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series, 210(1):14, 2013.
Ji-hoon Kim, Oscar Agertz, Romain Teyssier, Michael J. Butler, Daniel Ceverino, Jun-Hwan
Choi, Robert Feldmann, Ben W. Keller, Alessandro Lupi, and Thomas Quinn. The AGORA
high-resolution galaxy simulations comparison project. II. Isolated disk test. The Astrophysical Journal, 833(2):202, 2016.
A. Klypin. Methods for cosmological N-body simulations. 2017.
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